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This research project is based on three individual essays which are inter-linked. Our research 
starts from the development of a firm’s profitability forecasting model. Given the much shorter 
history of quantile regression and its infrequent use in finance and accounting compared to the 
popular ordinary-least-squares (OLS) regression, it is not clear whether stock prices have fully 
reflected the incremental information from quantile-regression profitability forecasts over and 
above the information contained in their OLS counterparts. This thesis examines the issue using a 
forecasting and a hedge portfolio analysis. We construct quantile-regression forecasts on an 
economy-wide and an industry-specific basis and compare them to their OLS counterparts out-of-
sample. We verify that the quantile-regression forecasts are more accurate than their OLS 
counterparts on either basis. We further show that a hedge portfolio formed by contrasting the 
quantile-regression forecasts to their OLS counterparts, whether on an economy-wide or industry-
specific basis, can earn an abnormal return. Our results hold for a number of new and traditional 
profitability measures and are not sensitive to various methodological and sample choices.  
Following similar interests in the profitability forecasting model, we focus on loss-making 
firms in the second essay. We examine the effects of diversification on loss persistence. Diversified 
firms have higher probability of loss reversal than focused firms. Using various measures of the 
abandonment option, we find that diversified firms can liquidate their loss-making assets or 
segments more efficiently than focused firms so as to achieve profits in the following year. 
Additional tests suggest that the efficiency of the abandonment option for diversified firms can be 
dampened by the agency problem of over-investment. Our findings are robust to various agency 
problem proxies and our analyses are controlled for endogeneity. 
 iii 
In our third essay, we investigate the effect of firm structure on dividend payout ratio. 
Consistent with the substitute theory, we find that diversified firms have significantly higher 
payout ratio than focused firms. We develop our analysis based on two hypotheses which are 
agency problem hypothesis and efficient internal capital market hypothesis. Under the agency 
problem hypothesis, we find that diversified firms have much higher dividend payout ratio than 
focused firms when they are under the agency problem but no difference in payout ratio when they 
are out of agency problem. Under the efficient internal capital market hypothesis, we find that 
diversification increases the dividend payout ratio for firms that are financially constrained but not 
for financially unconstrained firms. These findings further confirm the substitute theory that 
dividend payment is used as a signal for firms with agency problems and financial constraints. Our 
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1.1 Background and research motivation 
How much do investors and analysts know about firm performance and behaviour based on 
their fundamental characteristics? This might be the most interesting and widely-explored topic 
that both academic researchers and practitioners have dedicated their time to. This thesis explores 
this interesting topic by choosing three different but inter-related perspectives on firm performance. 
In the first essay, we advocate the superiority of quantile regression (least absolute deviate) over 
OLS regression (least squares) in firm profitability forecasting accuracy. In the second essay, we 
focus on the performance of loss-making firms. Referring to real option theory, we explain the 
difference in firms’ loss reversal abilities under different structures, diversified firms vs. focused 
firms. In the third essay, we consider how firms distribute their profits, relating the ‘dividend 
puzzle’ to empirical evidence from firms with different structures. 
 
Motivation for Essay 1 
Investors and analysts seek the best predictions of firms’ performances in order to decide on 
their most appropriate investment strategies. Firms’ profitabilities are discussed in the literature in 
relation to mean reversion (Lev 1969, Brooks and Buckmaster 1976, Freeman, Olson and Penman 
1982, Collins and Kothari 1989, Ou and Penman 1989, Easton and Zmijewski 1989, Penman 1991, 
Elgers and Lo 1994, Basu 1997, Fama and French 1995, Fama and French 2000). In a competitive 
market, the advantages of firms with extraordinarily high levels of profitability will, in time, be 
diluted by their competitors. Similarly, firms with depressed or negative earnings will make efforts 
to improve or leave the market in order to avoid losses and failure. As a result, the rate of return 
 2 
on investment converges in all industries under competition for established products or services 
(Stigler 1963). Researchers and practitioners then have a benchmark based on past profitability to 
predict future profitability. To best make the prediction, subsequent studies explore methods of 
forming this in-sample benchmark estimation: including comparing an industry-specific model 
with an economy-wide model (Fairfield et al. 2009), aggregate level forecasting with segment 
level (Shroeder and Yim 2017) and a firm-specific time-series forecasting model (Lev 1969, 
Freeman, Ohlson, and Penman 1982). Most in-sample estimations in such studies are based on 
OLS regression. In statistics, central tendency refers to the statistical measure that identifies a 
single value represneting the whole distribution (Gravetter and Wallnau 2016). However, given 
the rich literature documenting that firms’ profitabilities are negatively skewed (Basu 1997, Givoly 
and Hayn 2000, Konstantinidi and Pope 2016), mean estimation via OLS regression may produce 
an inappropriate estimation of the central tendency of the profitability sample. 
Quantile regression, an alternative approach based on the least absolute deviation method, was 
developed four decades ago by Koenker and Bassett (1978). This method is widely used in 
application areas such as medicine, survival analysis, and economics (Yu et al. 2003). Its 
applications in finance and accounting include return forecasting, portfolio analysis, risk 
measurement, and forecasting risk in earnings (Pohlman and Ma 2010, Basset Jr and Checn 2001, 
Lauridsen 2000, Konstatinidi and Pope 2016). Unlike OLS regression, it is not sensitive to outliers 
(Chen et al. 2008) and, particularly, median regression as its special case has found a role in several 
areas (Yu et al. 2003). Despite the apparent advantage of quantile regression, applications in 
finance and accounting remain uncommon. Owing perhaps to insufficient understanding by market 
participants, it is not clear whether stock prices have fully reflected the incremental information 
from quantile regression profitability forecasting over OLS. In Essay 1, we conduct a 
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comprehensive comparison of median forecasting by quantile regression and mean forecasting by 
OLS regression, answering the following research questions: 
Research questions for Essay 1: 
1. Under the concept of mean reversion, how well does median estimation using quantile 
regression perform, compared to mean estimation quantile regression, in forecasting a firm’s 
profitability? 
2. Is the above conclusion sensitive to the profitability measures used? 
3. How well does quantile regression outperform OLS regression, long term forecasting vs. short 
term? 
4. Is the above sensitive to the forecasting model used?  
5. Using simulation, how superior is quantile regression over OLS regression when related to the 
characteristics of the sample, such as skewness and kurtosis? 
6. Is mean reversion at industry level or economy-wide level?  Is an industry-specific model more 
accurate than an economy-wide model? 
7. Is analyst forecast bias related to the distribution of the profitability? In other words, are analysts 
aware of the incremental advantage of quantile regression over OLS in forecasting? 
8. Do investors consider the superiority of quantile regression over OLS in pricing stocks? 
In order to address these questions, Essay 1 performs a series of empirical analyses. We build 
on various forecasting models to compare the forecasting accuracy between quantile regression 
and OLS regression, using actual firms’ profitabilities. Robustness analyses provide a 
comprehensive picture of the usefulness of quantile regression in forecasting. We present evidence 
of the incremental information of quantile regression in analysts’ forecasting bias analysis and 
hedge portfolio tests. 
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Motivation for Essay 2 
In essay 2, we are interested in loss-making firms. In the mean reversion literature, negative 
changes in earnings and extreme changes reverse faster compared to changes with profitable firms 
(Elgers and Lo 1994, Fama and French 2000). This difference in earnings persistence between 
loss-making and profitable firms has been discussed and explored in subsequent studies. Hayn 
(1995) tests the informative of positive and negative earnings to the stock returns. She finds that 
negative earnings have much lower explanatory power for stock returns than positive earnings. 
She proposes using real option theory to explain this phenomenon, whereby loss-making firms 
have the option of abandonment to prevent persistent losses. Pinnuck and Lillis (2007) find that 
reporting accounting losses act as “an heuristic trigger for firms to exercise the abandonment 
option” and drop unproductive investments. This study provides solid evidence of the 
abandonment option applied by loss-making firms rather than the theoretical arguments in prior 
studies. A recent study by Lawrence et al. (2017) provides direct evidence that curtailments are 
important factors leading to the low persistence of losses. Inspired by these studies, my second 
essay pushes the idea further by investigating the efficiency of the exercising abandonment options 
- stated as an unsolved problem by Pinnuck and Lillis (2007).  
We are interested in the efficiency (or otherwise) of exercising that abandonment option as 
related to firm diversification. The finance literature documents the importance of firm 
diversification in exercising options. Bernardo and Chowdhry (2002) emphasise the role of growth 
opportunities in accounting for the diversification discount. They argue that focused firms have 
more options to expand while diversified firms may have already exhausted these. In opposition 
to this, we argue that diversified firms have a selection of options (segments or business lines) 
making it easier and more efficient to liquidate their loss-making assets while focused firms only 
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perform in the single industry making it harder for them to liquidate without closing the whole 
firm.  
Research questions for Essay 2: 
1. Are there any differences in loss reversal probabilities between diversified firms and focused 
firms when they are suffering losses? 
2. How should we define abandonment options among loss-making firms? 
3. Do diversified firms exercise their abandonment options more easily (frequently) than focused 
firms? 
4. Do diversified firms exercise their abandonment options more efficiently? 
5. Does the agency problem insert obstacles when firms try to exercise their options? 
Building on the classic loss reversal profitability model of Joos and Plesko (2005), Essay 2 
provides direct evidence of the explanatory power of firm diversification on the efficiency of 
exercising abandonment options. 
 
Motivation for Essay 3 
In essay three, we are interested in exploring differences in how firms distribute their earnings: 
specifically, dividend payouts related to firm diversification. There are common literatures shared 
between firm diversification and dividend policy. Diversified firms may be valued at a discount 
due to the agency problems (Berger et al., 1995) with diversified firms suffering higher agency 
problems due to conflicts between managers and shareholders. Although dividend irrelevance 
theory has been proposed following Miller and Modigliani (1961), various studies attempt to solve 
this puzzle using different theories: signalling, tax issues, and the catering hypothesis. Some 
studies argue that agency theory is one of the main issues affecting a firm’s dividend policy 
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(Easterbrook 1984, La Porta et al. 2000). Dividend payout is used as a tool to distribute excess free 
cash flows to avoid their discretionary use by managers. Therefore, in Essay 3 we are interested in 
how firm diversification affects dividend policy. 
Research questions for Essay 3: 
1. Do diversified firms have different dividend payouts compared to focused firms? 
2. If they do, is this related to agency problems? 
3. How does this difference in dividend payout relate to internal capital? 
Therefore, in the third essay, first we propose a regression test to show if there are any 
differences in dividend payouts between diversified firms and focused firms. Then we further test 
the agency problem hypothesis and internal efficient capital market hypothesis to provide more 
evidence of the relationship between dividend payout and firm diversification. 
 
1.2. Structure of dissertation 
Chapter 2 reviews the important literature related to the three essays. Since these essays have 
independent topics, we keep the general and comprehensive background literature in Chapter 2 
and put essay-specific literature in the essays. Thus, Chapter2 reviews the literature of mean 
reversion of profitability (background literature for Essay 1), firm diversification (background 
literature for Essay 2&3), and dividend policy (background literature for essay 3). 
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 are my three main pieces. Chapter 3 investigates model forecasting 
accuracy comparison between quantile regression and conventional OLS regression. Analyses here 
are model forecasting accuracy comparisons using various profitability measures, and hedged 
portfolio tests. 
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Chapter 4 examines the performance of loss-making firms by firm diversification 
characteristics. Based on the loss reversal model, we compare the loss reversal probability between 
diversified firms and focused firms and use real option theory to interpret my findings. We also 
group my sample by various agency problems to present further evidence. 
Chapter 5 explains the famous dividend puzzle by investigating dividend payout with firm 
diversification. Agency problems and efficient internal market hypotheses are tested in the 
analyses. Like Chapter 4, Chapter 5 conducts various econometric techniques to eliminate 
endogeneity problems. 



















2.1 Mean reversion and profitability forecasting models 
2.1.1. Quantile regression  
Quantile regression has long been considered an attractive method in application areas such as 
medicine, survival analysis, and economics (Yu et al. 2003). Its applications in finance include 
return forecasting, portfolio analysis, and risk measurement (Pohlman and Ma 2010; Bassett Jr and 
Chen 2001; Lauridsen, 2000). Recent applications in accounting include forecasting risk in 
earnings (Konstantinidi and Pope 2016). 
We propose constructing point forecasts of profitability using quantile regression, as opposed 
to the prevalent practice of using OLS regression. Specifically, we focus on the quantile regression 
for τ = 0.5 (i.e., the 50th percentile), which is also referred to as median regression. This special 
case of quantile regression uses the absolute error loss criterion, as opposed to the squared error 
loss criterion upon which OLS regression is based. Median regression has the advantage of being 
more robust to outlier effects than OLS regression (Cameron and Trivedi 2005). Similarly, quantile 
regression is a more robust alternative for accommodating dependent variables with skewed 
distributions (Olsen et al. 2012). It is well-documented that firms’ earnings are negatively skewed 
(Basu, 1997; Givoly and Hayn, 2000; Konstantinidi and Pope, 2016). This makes the mean 
estimation by OLS regression less appropriate for capturing the central tendency of the earnings 
distribution.  
2.1.2. Profitability and mean reversion 
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Profitability measures, such as ROE and RNOA, are summary indicators of a firm’s 
performance. Freeman et al. (1982) show that the mean in ROE can be expressed by a regression 
and establish that extreme ROEs are not as persistent as moderate ones. Fama and French (2000) 
provide evidence that mean reversion in firm profitability is a robust phenomenon and suggest that 
changes in profitability and earnings are to some degree predictable. In a simple partially adjusted 
model using US data, they find an estimated rate of mean reversion around 38% p.a. Similar results 
are documented by Allen and Salim (2005) who report a mean reversion rate of 25% p.a. in the 
UK market. We follow Fairfield et al. (2009) in using a forecasting model that captures the mean-
reversion pattern of profitability conditional on the deviation of a firm’s profitability from the 
median profitability benchmark (Fama and French 2000; Freeman et al. 1982).   
Besides ROE and RNOA, we consider three alternative measures of profitability in our analysis. 
They are the gross profit, operating profit, and cash-based operating profit, deflated by the total 
assets lagged by one year. Gross profit is the sales minus the cost of goods sold. Operating profit 
is defined as the gross profit minus the selling, general, and administrative expenses reported (i.e., 
the Compustat-adjusted selling, general, and administrative expenses with the expenditures on 
research and development subtracted in order to undo this adjustment by Compustat). Cash-based 
operating profit is obtained by purging accruals from the operating profit. We consider two 
versions of cash-based operating profitability, depending on whether the balance-sheet or the cash-
flow approach is used to convert operating profitability to a cash basis. Table 3.1 summarizes the 
definitions of the profitability measures examined in this study, which are consistent with prior 
studies (Novy-Marx, 2013; Ball et al. 2015, 2016; Fairfield et al. 2009).  
Arguably, gross profitability, operating profitability, and cash-based operating profitability are 
cleaner measures of economic profitability than ROE and RNOA. Lower down the income 
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statement, the net income for ROE and the operating profit after depreciation and amortization for 
RNOA are more polluted by financial reporting discretion, unlike gross and operating profits. 
Although the gross profit is cleanest in this sense, certain items farther down the income statement 
are not pure noise. Specifically, the reported selling, general, and administrative expenses, like the 
cost of goods sold, represent to a large extent expenses incurred to generate the current revenue. 
In contrast, the expenditures on research and development concern generating future revenues and 
are more discretionary in nature. Ball et al. (2015) show that the operating profitability, which has 
selling, general, and administrative expenses but not research and development expenditures 
subtracted off, can explain the cross section of stock returns even better than gross profitability. 
Ball et al. (2016) show that the cash-based operating profitability as an alternative free from 
accounting accruals adjustments can explain the cross section of stock returns even better than the 
operating profitability.  
Being cleaner measures of a firm’s economic profitability, the three measures are likely to have 
a closer tie to the industry membership of the firm. Therefore, they are especially relevant to our 
analysis comparing the industry-specific and economy-wide approaches to profitability 
forecasting.  
2.1.3. Industry effects and broad industry classification 
Early research documenting the mean reversion of profitability is often based on time series 
models fitted to individual firms separately (Brooks and Buckmaster 1976; Freeman et al. 1982; 
Lipe and Kormendi 1994; Penman 1991;). To minimize survivorship bias and increase the 
statistical power of tests, Fama and French (2000) use year-by-year cross-sectional regressions to 
establish evidence of mean-reverting profitability. None of these studies has considered the role of 
industry membership, as if it is irrelevant to firm profitability and its mean reversion pattern. 
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Consistent with this, Brown and Ball (1967) and Rumelt (1991) find only weak effects of industry 
difference in earnings. Moreover, Mueller and Raunig (1999) find that the proﬁt rates of individual 
firms vary widely and do not converge to industry benchmarks even over a long period. Barber 
and Lyon (1996) also report that industry effects cannot effectively explain the future abnormal 
firm performance. 
Other research, however, argues that industry membership is a fundamental determinant of 
firm profitability (Schmalensee 1985) and that industry differences affect the mean reversion of 
profitability (Gebhardt et al. 2001). Cheng (2005) finds that the increase in industry abnormal ROE 
is related to industry level factors such as industry concentration, industry level barriers to entry, 
and industry conservative accounting factors. Bou and Satorra (2007) observe significant and 
permanent differences in profitability between industries. Soliman (2004) show that industry-
adjusted DuPont components of profitability is useful to predicting future profitability. McGahan 
and Porter (1997)   also document the importance of industry effects on the variance of firm’s 
profitability. 
Fairfield et al. (2009) explore the potential of improving the accuracy of profitability forecasts 
using industry-specific OLS regressions. They find little forecast improvement over the economy-
wide approach. In contrast, Schröder and Yim (2017) find industry effects in profitability 
forecasting for single-segment firms under various broad industry classifications. In comparing 
different forecasting approaches, we take advantage of their discovery of the importance of using 
a broad industry classification. 
2.1.4 Profitability forecast versus current profitability 
Gross profitability, operating profitability and cash-based operating profitability have received 
considerable attention in the literature because of their predictive power in explaining the cross 
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section of stock returns (Novy-Marx 2013; Ball et al. 2015, 2016; Fama and French 2015, 2016, 
2017; Akbas et al. 2017). This literature focuses on current profitability and its relation to stock 
return in the following year.  
Current profitability may be viewed as the random-walk forecast of future profitability. 
Accordingly, the current profitability’s relation to the stock return has a valuation interpretation. 
A higher current profitability is likely to result in a higher future profitability and a higher valuation 
of the stock, leading to a higher stock return.  
Our interest in the profitability measures comes from their potential for valuation. Because 
valuation is forward-looking in nature, this study focuses on the forecasts of the measures, rather 
than their realized current levels.  
 
2.2 Firm diversification  
We review the diversification discount literature for Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. 
2.2.1 Why diversify 
Martin and Sayrak (2003) summarise three theoretical perspectives that explain why firms 
choose to diversify: a market-power view, a resource-view and an agency view. The market-power 
view serves the purpose of firm’s profit maximization. Montgomery (1994) and Villalonga (2000) 
summarize three ways in which conglomerates can use to yield power: “deep-pocket” where a 
diversified firm can use its profits from one segment to support predatory pricing activities in 
another segment in a different market industry. Mutual forbearance, where competitors meeting in 
multiple markets recognize their interdependence and competition becomes less aggressively 
(Bernheim and Whinston 1990). Reciprocal buying, where smaller competitors are squeezed or 
eliminated by the firms engaging in reciprocal buying with other big firms. 
 13 
The agency view focuses on the incentives of managers engaging in diversification strategies. 
First, managers can receive higher power and prestige (Jensen 1986, Stulz 1990) or higher 
managerial compensation (Jensen and Murphy 1990) by running larger firms. Amihud and Lev 
(1981) argue that a diversification strategy is not beneficial to shareholders by reducing the risk of 
the entity, since shareholders can achieve on their own the preferred degree of risk in their own 
portfolios. However, diversification can reduce the risk of the manager’s undiversified personal 
portfolios (“employment risk” such as risk of losing jobs and personal reputations). Furthermore, 
managers can entrench themselves and reduce the probability of being replaced by shareholders 
through making manager-specific investments which require specific skills (Shleifer and Vishny 
1989).  
Early strategic management studies support diversification in a resource-based view. 
Diversification is an efficient form for organizing economic activities (Penrose 1959). These 
efficient economies of scale appear not only in the scope in production, distribution and marketing 
channels (Teece 1980, Teece 1982), but also from a managerial perspective such as utilizing 
financial and legal employees to support a different segment in different industries (Wernerfelt 
and Montgomery 1998, Bodnar et al., 1999) and financial synergies such as earnings smoothing. 
There is no clear evidence about the overall value of firm diversification. 
2.2.2. Diversification destroys value 
Are diversified firms worth less than their counterpart specialized firms in the same industry? 
Lang and Stulz (1994) find that industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q of diversified firms is on average 
lower than single segment firms.  Instead of Tobin’s Q, a selection of the research documents 
evidence that diversified firms are priced at a discount of approximately 10%~ 15% relative to 
non-diversified companies in their industries by using the asset-based and the sales-based multiple 
 14 
methods (Berger and Ofek, 1995, Servaes and Lins 1999, and Lamont and Polk 2000). Berger and 
Ofeck (1995) apply this multiple valuation method to examine whether diversification creates or 
destroys firm value1. They measure the percentage difference between a firm’s total value and the 
imputed value which is the sum of values for its segments as stand-alone firm. Later empirical 
studies apply this method and find the diversification discount phenomenon in their studies 
(Servaes, 1996; Stowe and Xing, 2006; Borghesi et al., 2007; Hoechle et al., 2012; Kuppuswamy 
and Villalonga, 2016).  
Based on the finding for a diversification discount, studies focus on the potential causes of the 
poor diversification performance. The main potential reason is the effect of the internal capital 
allocation of diversified firms. Theoretical studies call the internal transfer of resources within 
diversified firms a cross-subsidization. There are two sides of cross-subsidization. It can be 
efficient if it helps the firm overcome financial constraint, while can be inefficient if it causes firms 
to misallocate their funds. Here, we focus on the inefficient part as it is related to the diversification 
discount literature. 
 A substantial body of empirical papers support the capital misallocation hypothesis. Evidence 
has been found that diversified firms tend to overinvest in business lines with poor investment 
opportunities (Berge and Ofek 1995, Stulz 1990, Scharfstein 1998). In particular, a study by Shin 
and Stulz (1998) concludes that the capital expenditure made by a diversified firm’s segment not 
only depends on its own cash flows but also on the cash flows of other segments. In addition, the 
capital expenditures by the segments of firms with high diversity level are not as sensitive as to 
their cash flows than the capital expenditures of comparable focused firms. More importantly, the 
                                                 
1 See Appendix for a detailed introduction of this method. 
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sensitivity of a segment’s capital expenditure to the cash flow of other segments is not related to 
if the investment opportunities (Tobin’s Q) are better than those of the firm’s other individual 
segments. This may cause the issue of over-investment and inefficient investment. Meyer, 
Milgrom, and Robert (1992) note that poorly performing business segments cannot have a negative 
value if operated on their own (as the independent entities) but can if being cross-subsidized among 
diversified firms. Therefore, they predict that loss-making segment or business create more value 
loss in diversified firms than they would as stand-alone firms.  
Some literature finds that the inefficiency of cross-subsidization is caused mainly by agency 
problems, since the agency problem is one of the main incentives for firms choosing to diversify. 
Jensen (1986) points out that managers are more likely to undertake negative NPV (net present 
value) projects by using “unused borrowing power” and excess free cash flows. Since business 
lines are more likely to access higher amounts of free cash flows as a part of diversified firms than 
on their own, diversified firms tend to invest more in negative NPV projects than their segments 
would if they were investing as independent entities. A recent study by Denis, Denis and Sarin 
(2012) finds that there is a negative relationship between the diversity level and managerial equity 
ownership. They find a correlation between decreases in diversification with financial distress, 
management turnover and external control threats. These findings suggest that agency problems 
are the main reasons causing firms’ value-reducing diversification strategies. A similar study by 
Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000) shows that diversification mainly causes resources to flow to 
inefficient investments due to power struggles in firm’s divisions. Scharfstein and Stein (2000) 
provide evidence of the subverting of the internal capital budgeting allocation by the rent-seeking 
segment managers. 
2.2.3. Concerns in diversification discount 
 16 
Early strategic papers point out that the decision to diversify is not random. There are 
systematic differences between the firms choosing to diversify and those choosing not to diversify 
(Lemelin, 1982; MacDonald, 1985; Montgomery and Hariharan, 1991; Merino and Rodrigues 
1997; Silverman 1999). Lang and Stulz (1994) point out that firms that choose to diversify are 
poor performers relative to firms that choose not to. Several studies support this view by showing 
that diversified firms have already valued at a discount before they diversify (Hyland 1999; Campa 
and Kedia 2002; Villalonga 1999). Graham et al. (1999) document that an average diversification 
discount of approximately 15% is related to the acquired segments which were also discounted 
before acquisition as focused firms. Therefore, there is a need to eliminate the self- selection 
problem when evaluating treatment effects with non-experimental data. 
Campa and Kedia (2002) and Villalonga (1999) apply various econometric techniques to 
reduce the issue of self-selection bias. Methods include propensity score matching, Heckman’s 
two-stage model and instrumental variables. While applying these techniques, various firm level 
differences between diversified firms and focused firms are controlled for: size, industry growth 
rate, and variables deflated by sales such as capital expenditures, profitability and research and 
development expenses. After applying these methods to eliminate the self-selection problem, the 
diversification discount disappears or even becomes a premium. 
There are other studies challenging the existence of diversification discount. First, instead of 
using the Compustat segment database, Villalonga (2003) find a diversification premium by using 
a new Census database covering the whole U.S economy at the establishment level. A possible 
explanation raised by Villalonga is that segment data measure purely unrelated diversification 
while established data measure both related and unrelated diversification. In the spirit of the early 
strategic papers addressing the related and unrelated diversification effect on firm performance 
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(Rumelt 1974), Villalonga’s finding can be interpreted as showing that there is a premium to 
related diversification but a discount to unrelated diversification (such as conglomerate). 
Other studies, such as the one by Mansi and Reeb (2002), question the existence of a 
diversification discount by challenging the method of calculating excess values based on the sales 
and asset based multiple. Since this method define the market value of a firm as the sum of the 
market equity value and book value of equity, they find that such diversification discount 
disappears in all-equity firms. They argue that the use of book value of debt to calculate excess 
value generates a downward bias for diversified firms. 
2.2.4. Diversification creates value 
The benefits of diversification giving rise to a diversification premium is supported by different 
views in the literature. Corporate finance literature focuses on the efficient internal capital market 
view that the corporate headquarters can transfer and allocate valuable resources to competing 
projects in an internal capital market. Stein (1997) points out that this “winner-picking” funds shift 
within firm is efficient and value-enhancing when the overall firm is facing credit constraints 
(when not all the positive NPV projects can be financed). The notion of “winner-picking” is based 
on several early papers (Williamson 1975, Donaldson 1984) which argue that cash flows in 
diversified firms are exposed to internal competition rather than being allocated automatically. 
Similar studies show evidence for investment interdependence. Shin and Stulz (1996) indicate that 
within diversified firms the investments of small divisions are strongly associated with the cash 
flows of other divisions. The phenomenon of “intracompany liquidity spillovers” in the U.S. oil 
industry is demonstrated in Lamont (1997). The major oil companies suffering an oil price decline 
in 1986 cut investments across the board even in their non-oil-related divisions to deal with the 
decline in cash flows.  
 18 
2.3. Dividend literature 
Why do some firms pay dividends while others do not? This has been of interest since the 
dividend irrelevance paper by Miller and Modigliani (1961) was published. The M&M theorem 
suggests that in a perfect capital market, the dividend decision is irrelevant to the firm’s value. The 
reason is that higher dividend payouts lead to lower retained earnings and capital gains with 
shareholder’s wealth unchanged.  
2.3.1. Dividend smoothing and dividend puzzle 
So-called dividend smoothing is probably the most widely-documented phenomenon in early 
studies. Lintner (1956) conducted a small study on how U.S. managers make decisions on 
dividends, interviewing managers from 28 firms using 15 variables that might impact dividend 
decisions. He found that a change in a firm’s earnings has the most impact on the size of dividend 
since firms tend to make partial adjustments in payout ratio each period to the direction of their 
target payout ratio rather than paying dividends with significant changes periodically. Managers 
tend to believe strongly that a premium is added by the market on firms with a stable and consistent 
dividend policy. Therefore, dividend smoothing is implemented by the managers to avoid a 
fluctuating dividend streams. Subsequent studies support Lintner’s findings on managers’ 
preference for stable dividend policy (Brittain 1964, Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler 1997, Brav et 
al., 2005). Fama and Babiak (1968) show that changes in the dividends are closely associated with 
a firm’s target payout, current or previous earnings, and previous dividend. Brav et al. (2005) find 
that managers are willing to avoid cutting the dividend at the cost of raising costly external funds 
or even foregoing positive NPV projects.  
Lintner’s (1956) dividend smoothing phenomenon and methodology inspired a series of 
empirical studies examining cross-sectional differences and using broader sample ranges. 
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Michaely and Roberts (2011) suggest that the propensity to smooth dividends is closely related to 
ownership structure among UK firms. Specifically, they find that private firms smooth dividends 
much less than counterpart public firms. This indicates that public capital markets play a key role 
in the propensity of firms to conduct dividend smoothing. Dewenter and Warther (1998) compare 
dividend policies between U.S. firms and Japanese firms. They find that Japanese firms (keiretsu 
members) smooth less than U.S. firms since they face less information asymmetry and agency 
conflicts. Aivazian, Booth, and Cleary (2006) find that firms with bond ratings follow the pattern 
of dividend smoothing in Lintner (1956), while firms with no bond ratings show much less 
dividend smoothing behaviour. 
Although these stylized facts are well-documented in literature, it is still not understood how 
and why firms choose their dividend policies. The puzzle becomes deeper in those countries such 
as the U.S. where dividend receipts are taxed more heavily than capital gains. Therefore, we 
summarize a few hypotheses that could explain this dividend puzzle in different perspectives. 
2.3.3. Signalling hypothesis 
Like the dividend smoothing literature, the signalling effect of dividends is addressed in 
subsequent studies. The signalling hypothesis suggests that firms can communicate their views of 
future performance through paying dividends since managers have asymmetric information about 
the firms (Bhattachrya 1979, Miller and Rock 1985, John and Williams 1985, and Ambarish, John, 
and Williams 1987). There are two approaches to testing the relationship. One is to examine 
whether changes in dividends can predict changes in stock prices. A positive relation between 
dividend change and dividend announcement is documented in the literature (Aharony and Swary 
1980, Asquith and Mullins 1983, Bajaj and Vijh, 1990, Kalay and Loewenstein 1985, Petit 1972). 
The other approach focuses on the relation between dividend changes and the changes in future 
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accounting earnings (Watts 9173, Gonedes 1978, Penman 1983, DeAngelo et al. 1996, Benartzi et 
al. 1997, Nissim and Ziv 2001, Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan 2002, Brav et al. 2005, 
Grullon et al. 2005, Denis and Osobov 2008, Braggion and Moore 2011). The signalling 
hypothesis assumes that the managers resist increasing (decreasing) dividends unless the increase 
(decrease) in earnings is persistent. Koch and Sun (2005) provide more direct evidence and find 
that investors do indeed interpret a change in dividend as a signal about the change of persistence 
of past earnings. 
The signalling theory has been challenged by several scholars. DeAngelo, DeAngelo and 
Skinner (1996) use various model specifications but find no evidence that dividends signal superior 
future profitability. They argue that a dividend is not a reliable signal, through six possible 
explanations. (1). Current earnings are so informative about future earnings that they leave little 
additional content to dividends. (2). Dividends can be a free-cash-flow payout rather than 
signalling when managers cut off capital outlays. (3). Dividend increases are not favourable signals 
but instead are lagged responses to previous increases in earnings. (4). Managers send good 
dividend signals by mistake, while “these mistakes are understandable given the information 
available at the time”. (5). Managers tend to overestimate a firm’s future growth by sending the 
optimistic dividend signal. (6). Only modest cash commitments are made by managers when they 
increase dividends. This can undermine the reliability of the signal. Through a comprehensive 
analysis, their findings support (5) and (6). Specifically, (5) is consistent with the Jensen’s (1993) 
behavioural hypothesis. The theory suggests that managerial mindset and corporate culture 
normally lead managers to overestimate the firm’s growth perspective. 
Other studies present different arguments against the dividend signalling hypothesis. Myers 
and Majluf (1984) suggest that the distribution of dividends can affect future earnings but not by 
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signalling. Since firms prefer internal funds over external funds, dividend increase can reduce the 
amount of internal funds for investment. Consequently, firms may need to access costly external 
funds or forgo positive NPV projects, which can cause a decrease in future earnings. This relation 
can be also shown in the constant dividend growth model of Gordon (1962). With expected return 
of portfolio constant, high dividend payout should be offset by low expected earnings growth. 
2.3.4. Dividend and agency hypothesis 
Other studies suggest different motives behind dividend policy, converging with agency theory. 
Jensen’s (1986) agency theory suggests that managers are more likely to undertake negative NPV 
projects by using unused excess free cash flows. Extensive studies show that dividends are used 
as a tool for distributing excess free cash flows in order to reduce agency costs. (Rozeff 1982, 
Easterbrook 1984, Lang and Litzenberger 1989, Grullon and Michaely 2004, DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo and Stulz 2006, Michaely and Roberts 2012). Thus, agency theory predicts that 
shareholders may prefer dividends over retained earnings. 
In Esterbrook’s work (1984), dividends play a monitoring role in mitigating the conflicts 
between managers and shareholders, while agency theory is not limited to conflicts between 
managers and shareholders but also applies to the inside shareholders (controlling shareholder) 
and the outside shareholders (minority shareholders). La Porta et al. (2000) introduce two 
competing models explaining how conflicts between corporate insiders and minority shareholders 
influence dividend policy. The outcome model states that dividend payout is the outcome of 
minority shareholders pursuing legal protection. Evidence is found that dividend payouts in civil-
law countries are much lower than that in common-law countries. They claim that minority 
shareholders can use their legal power to force insiders to distribute excess cash. The other model 
is substitute model. Insiders pay dividends to establish a reputation for decent treatment of minority 
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shareholders since insiders need to build a good reputation for the future fund-raising. These two 
models predict opposite impacts of the agency problem on dividend payouts: the outcome model 
predicts stronger minority shareholder rights should relate to higher payout while the substitute 
model predict the opposite. 
2.3.5. Catering hypothesis 
Yet other empirical studies focus on the role of investor demand in affecting dividend policy, 
which is known as the catering hypothesis. Firms paying dividends cater to a preference for 
dividends from heterogeneous clienteles (Baker and Wurgler 2004a & 2004b, Jayaraman and 
Sabherwal 2009, Li and Lie 2006).  Here we have two interesting examples. Becker, Ivkovic and 
Weisbenner (2011) document retail investors preferring local stocks and older investors tending 
to hold dividend-paying stocks. They find that firms headquartered in areas where most 
populations are seniors tend to pay dividends, initiate dividends and have higher dividend yields. 
Desai and Jin (2011) find that “dividend-averse” institution shareholders are significantly less 
likely to hold shares in firms which pay high dividends. 
2.3.6. Life-cycle theory 
Life-cycle theory considers dividend payout patterns from a different perspective. This theory 
reflects a financial cycle and suggests that dividends are more likely to be paid by mature and 
established firms than by young and small firms. On the one hand, young firms may face financial 
constraints if they insist on paying dividends but simultaneously have abundant investment 
opportunities. On the other hand, mature and established firms have higher and stable profitability 
and fewer attractive investment opportunities and so are better placed to pay dividends. Evidence 
for life-cycle theory can be found in U.S. and developed markets (DeAngelo et al., 2006, Fama 
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Stock Returns and Profitability Forecasting by Quantile Regression 
3.1. Introduction 
In an efficient market, stock prices should fully reflect the prospects of firm profitability 
anticipated by the market, based on publicly available information. To formulate profitability 
forecasts as accurately as possible, sophisticated market participants are likely to resort to 
statistical methods. Ordinary-least-squares (OLS) regression is a very popular choice, if not the 
prevalent choice. The least squares method has a very long mathematical history dating back to 
1795 (Courgeau 2012). Given its familiarity, educated investors should be able to figure out the 
implications of the information contained in OLS-regression forecasts of profitability.  
In contrast, quantile regression, an alternative approach based on the least absolute deviation 
method, was developed only four decades ago by Koenker and Bassett (1978). Unlike the least 
squares method, the least absolute deviation method is not especially sensitive to outliers (Chen et 
al. 2008). In recent years, quantile regression, or median regression as its special case, has found 
a role in various areas (Yu et al. 2003). Despite the advantage of quantile regression, its 
applications in finance and accounting remain uncommon (see section 2.1 for more details). Owing 
to an insufficient understanding by market participants, it is not clear whether stock prices have 
fully reflected the incremental information from quantile-regression profitability forecasts over 
and above the information contained in their OLS counterparts.  
This chapter examines the issue through two sets of analyses. In the forecasting analysis, we 
construct quantile-regression forecasts on an economy-wide and an industry-specific basis and 
compare them to their OLS counterparts out-of-sample. We verify that in terms of absolute forecast 
error, the quantile-regression forecasts are more accurate than their OLS counterparts on either 
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basis. In this sense, quantile-regression forecasts are more informative than OLS-regression 
forecasts. Moreover, we find that industry-specific quantile-regression forecasts are most accurate 
among the four types of forecasts.  
In the hedge portfolio analysis, we utilize the incremental information from the quantile-
regression forecasts by sorting stocks according to the excess of the quantile-regression 
profitability forecasts over their OLS counterparts. Quantile-regression forecasts being more 
accurate than their OLS counterparts, investors should follow the investment guidance by the 
former rather than the latter. Therefore, we form a dollar-neutral hedge portfolio with a long 
position in the stocks of the large-excess firms and a short position in those of the small-excess 
firms. The incremental information from the quantile-regression forecasts is economically 
significant if investors can earn an abnormal return from the portfolio constructed with the 
information. We find significantly positive alphas based on the Carhart (1997) four-factor and the 
Fama and French (2015) five-factor asset pricing model. This suggests that the incremental 
information from the quantile-regression forecasts have not been fully impounded in stock prices, 
consistent with the hypothesis that quantile regression is much less familiar to investors than OLS 
regression.    
To our knowledge, we are the first to examine whether quantile regression is more accurate 
than OLS regression in constructing point forecasts of profitability.2 The motivation follows from 
the observation of the highly-skewed earnings distribution. In statistics, central tendency is 
described as the statistical measure that identifies a single value as representative of the whole 
distribution (Gravetter and Wallnau 2016. When a distribution is asymmetrical, the median is 
                                                 
2 Despite the availability of methods to produce interval and density forecasts, point forecasts remain the most 
commonly used in practice. They are often easier to understand and act upon and are less costly to produce (Diebold 
2015). 
 26 
considered the more preferred measure of central tendency than the mean since the former is less 
affected by outliers and skewed data (Healey 2015). We investigate forecasting by quantile 
regression because it can produce median forecasts as opposed to mean forecasts produced by OLS 
regression.  
We focus on three new profitability measures in our comparison of the different types of 
forecasts. They are the gross profitability (GP) defined by Novy-Marx (2013), operating 
profitability (OP) defined by Ball et al. (2015) and two versions of cash-based operating 
profitability (CbOP) defined by Ball et al. (2016). Novy-Marx (2013) finds that GP can explain 
most earnings-related anomalies. Ball et al. (2015), however, show that OP has a much stronger 
link with stock returns than GP. The usefulness of OP in explaining the cross section of stock 
returns has led to its inclusion as a new factor in the latest five-factor asset pricing model (Fama 
and French 2015; 2016; 2017). Adding to the success of OP, Ball et al. (2016) show that CbOP 
outperforms OP in predicting the cross section of stock returns, explaining two anomalies related 
to accruals and profitability measures that include accruals.  
Besides the new profitability measures above, we also include return on equity (ROE) and 
return on net operating assets (RNOA) in our comparison. Prior research on profitability 
forecasting examines these conventional measures of profitability because they are the inputs to 
accounting-based valuation models (Fairfield et al. 2009; Schöder and Yim 2017).  Their inclusion 
here facilitates the comparison of our results with prior research findings. It is also interesting to 
include ROE in its own right. This is the profitability measure used in the Hou et al. (2015) q-
factor asset pricing model, whose performance is comparable to and sometimes even better than 
that of the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model and the Carhart (1997) four-factor model.  
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This chapter contributes to the broad literature on market anomalies and stock return 
predictability (e.g., Fama and French 2008; Richardson et al. 2010; Campbell 2015; Mclean and 
Pontiff 2016; Akbas et al. 2017; Green et al. 2017). We find evidence for quantile-regression 
profitability forecasts being more accurate than their popular OLS counterparts. Despite this, the 
low familiarity appears to have prevented the information uniquely contained in the quantile-
regression forecasts from being impounded into stock prices. Consequently, a hedge portfolio 
formed by contrasting the quantile-regression forecasts to their OLS counterparts can yield an 
abnormal return.    
We also contribute to the valuation literature by showing that profitability can be forecast more 
accurately by industry-specific quantile regression. Price multiples are widely used for firm 
valuation despite the availability of more sophisticated valuation methods (Roosenboom 2012; 
Imam et al. 2008; Asquith et al. 2005; Demirakos et al. 2004; Fernandez 2002). Liu et al. (2002) 
have examined the valuation performance of a long list of multiples. They find that multiples 
derived from forward earnings explain stock prices significantly well. In contrast, multiples based 
on historical earnings, cash flow, book value of equity, or sales do not perform as well. How useful 
forward earnings are to multiple-based valuation depends on the forecast accuracy. One could rely 
on financial analysts’ professional skills to obtain high-quality earnings forecasts. However, 
analyst earnings forecasts are unavailable for many firms (Li and Mohanram, 2014). Besides, 
analysts also use forecasting models to assist in developing their forecasts. Therefore, it is 
important to know how model-based earnings forecasts can be constructed more accurately.3  
                                                 
3 Forecasting earnings in practice is often equivalent to forecasting profitability (e.g., Li 2011; Chang et al. 2016). 
Data samples used to forecast earnings typically include firms of different sizes. Deflation is a technique to control 
for the size differences. Deflating an earnings measure by a certain size variable, such as book value of equity, net 




Lastly, although we are not the first to compare the industry-specific and economy-wide 
approaches to profitability forecasting, we are first to compare them for quantile regression. 
Fairfield et al. (2009) investigate the two approaches and conclude that there is little improvement 
from using the industry-specific approach to forecast profitability. Schröder and Yim (2017) re-
examine the topic utilizing segment reporting information. They find that the industry-specific 
approach produces more accurate forecasts for single-segment firms under broad industry 
classifications, such as the Fama-French 12-industry and the first-digit Standard Industry 
Classification (SIC). We take advantage of their discovery of the importance of using a broad 
industry classification. For the first time, we find forecast improvements for all firms when using 
industry-specific quantile regression, as opposed to economy-wide quantile regression, to 
construct profitability forecasts.  
 
3.2. Research Design and Sample Selection 
3.2.1. Forecasting analysis 
Consistent with prior studies such as Fairfield et al. (2009) and Li and Mohanram (2014), we 
construct the profitability forecast for each firm-year in two steps. First, we estimate in-sample a 
forecasting model on a rolling basis using the data of all the firms for the previous ten years. For 
example, to forecast the profitability of a firm for year T, we first estimate the coefficients of a 
forecasting model using the data of all the firms from year T−10 to year T−1. Next, we apply the 
estimated coefficients from the in-sample regression to the current-year data of a firm to obtain the 
one-year-ahead profitability forecast of the firm.  
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We consider four forecasting approaches. The first approach uses the following forecasting 
model based on the economy-wide OLS regression specification studied in Fairfield et al. (2009):  
 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑇 + 𝛽𝑇𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜆𝑇𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐺𝑆𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡,  (1) 
where t = T−10, …, T−1. The dependent variable 𝑥𝑖,𝑡, indexed by firm i and year t, stands for one 
of the profitability measures considered: GP, OP, CbOP, ROE, and RNOA. 𝐷𝑖,𝑡  is a dummy 
variable equal to one if in year t−1, the profitability of firm i is below the median profitability of 
all firms and equal to zero otherwise. 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐺𝑆𝐿𝑖,𝑡 is the predicted growth in sales, which is found 
to be useful for profitability forecasting. 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. The model parameters 𝛼𝑇, 𝛽𝑇, 𝛾𝑇, 
and 𝜆𝑇 are indexed by year T to highlight that they are estimated for each year T using the previous 
ten years of data.     
To construct PREDGSL, we use the following simple first-order autoregressive model 
estimated by OLS regression on an industry-specific basis: 
 𝑔𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜇𝑗,𝑇 + 𝜐𝑗,𝑇𝑔𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡,  (2) 
where 𝑔𝑖,𝑡 is the growth in sales of firm i  in year t,  𝜖𝑖,𝑡 is the error term, and t = T−10, …, T−1. 
The model parameters 𝜇𝑗,𝑇  and 𝜐𝑗,𝑇  are indexed by industry j and year T to highlight that the 
estimation is done on an industry-specific basis and for each year T using the previous ten years 
of data. The 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐺𝑆𝐿𝑖,𝑇 for each firm-year (i,T) is set to the predicted value 𝑚𝑗,𝑇 + 𝑛𝑗,𝑇𝑔𝑖,𝑇−1, 
where 𝑚𝑗,𝑇  and 𝑛𝑗,𝑇  are the estimated coefficients of the model parameters 𝜇𝑗,𝑇  and 𝜐𝑗,𝑇 . We 
construct PREDGSL by OLS regression on an industry-specific basis since Fairfield et al. (2009) 
find that sales growth forecasts are more accurate when constructed this way, rather than on an 
economy-wide basis.4  
                                                 
4 We verify that this also holds for our sample. We discuss in section 5 the robustness of our results to alternative ways 
to construct PREDGSL.  
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Our second forecasting approach, economy-wide quantile regression, uses the same model as 
specified in equation 1 except that the parameters (𝛼𝑇 , 𝛽𝑇 , 𝛾𝑇 , 𝜆𝑇 ) are estimated by quantile 
regression for τ = 0.5 (i.e., by median regression). In general, quantile regression estimates are 
obtained by minimizing the loss function 𝜌𝜏(𝑢) on the error term u (see the illustration in Figure 
3.1). For τ = 0.5, the loss function becomes symmetric and equals |𝑢|. The quantile regression 
estimates for this case are conditional median estimates. In our context, the estimated coefficients 
are given by  
 argmin
(𝛼𝑇, 𝛽𝑇, 𝛾𝑇, 𝜆𝑇) 
∑ |𝑥𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑇 + 𝛽𝑇𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜆𝑇𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐺𝑆𝐿𝑖,𝑡)|.𝑖,𝑡    (3) 
 Our third forecasting approach, industry-specific quantile regression, uses the following 
industry-specific forecasting model:  
 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑗,𝑇 + 𝛽𝑗,𝑇𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑗,𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜆𝑗,𝑇𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐺𝑆𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,  (4) 
where t = T−10, …, T−1, with the parameters (𝛼𝑗,𝑇 , 𝛽𝑗,𝑇 , 𝛾𝑗,𝑇 , 𝜆𝑗,𝑇) estimated by quantile regression 
for τ = 0.5 on an industry-specific basis. For this forecasting model as well as the construction of 
𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐺𝑆𝐿𝑖,𝑡 throughout the different forecasting approaches, the industries are classified based on 
the first-digit SIC. Schröder and Yim (2017) find that a broad industry classification like this better 
balances the bias from model misspecification and the sample size for industry-specific estimation, 
increasing the chance of finding a forecasting improvement. We examine whether this finding for 
OLS regression holds for quantile regression as well.  
We compare industry-specific quantile regression to the fourth forecasting approach, industry-
specific OLS regression, which estimates equation 4 by OLS regression on an industry-specific 
basis. This last comparison verifies whether quantile regression is more accurate than OLS 
regression not only on an economy-wide basis but also on an industry-specific basis.  
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Following prior research such as Li et al. (2014) and Fairfield et al. (2009), we use absolute 
forecast error (AFE) to measure the accuracy of a forecasting approach. Specifically, the AFE of 
forecasting approach A for a firm-year (i,T) is defined as the absolute difference between the actual 
profitability xi,T and the profitability forecast EA[xi,T] constructed with forecasting approach A:   
 AFEA(i,T) = | xi,T – EA[xi,T] |.  (5) 
For example, the profitability forecast constructed with the first approach (i.e., economy-wide OLS) 
is  
 Eew_OLS[xi,T] = 𝑎𝑇 + 𝑏𝑇𝑥𝑖,𝑇−1 + 𝑐𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑇 ∗ 𝑥𝑖,𝑇−1 + 𝑙𝑇𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐺𝑆𝐿𝑖,𝑇,  (6) 
where (𝑎𝑇, 𝑏𝑇, 𝑐𝑇, 𝑙𝑇) are the economy-wide OLS estimates of the model parameters (𝛼𝑇, 𝛽𝑇, 𝛾𝑇, 
𝜆𝑇 ). Because the actual profitability is not part of the data used to construct the profitability 
forecast, the assessment by the AFE is said to be out-of-sample.  
To assess the relative accuracy of two forecasting approaches, say, A and B, we compute the 
forecast improvement (FI) of approach A over B for a firm-year (i,T). This is defined as the 
difference in the AFE between the forecasts from the two approaches:   
 FIA,B(i,T) = AFEB(i,T) − AFEA(i,T). (7) 
The FI would be positive if approach A has a lower AFE than approach B. To conclude on the 
relative accuracy of the two forecasting approaches, we perform tests on the mean as well as the 
median FI over all firm-years. Consistent with the framework of comparing predictive accuracy in 
Diebold and Mariano (1995), the test on the mean FI is a regression-based t-test using robust 
standard errors controlling for two-way clustering by firm and year. The test on the median FI is 
the Wilcoxon signed rank test.  
To ensure an equal-footing comparison, the same sample is used to construct the forecasts by 
the industry-specific and the economy-wide quantile regression approach. We first determine the 
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sample used for the industry-specific quantile regression approach. This is the more restricted 
sample because whenever estimation is done on an industry-specific basis, we include only the 
industries with at least 100 firm-year observations in the rolling sample period of the previous ten 
years to avoid unreliable estimation5.  
 
3.2.2. Hedge portfolio analysis 
To see whether investors can benefit from quantile-regression profitability forecasts, we 
perform a hedge portfolio analysis similar to Li et al's (2014) to link forecast accuracy to stock 
return predictability. The hedge portfolio in the analysis is constructed based on the relative 
accuracy of an improved approach versus a benchmark approach. Suppose that knowing the 
forecasts from the improved approach adds nothing beyond knowing the forecasts from the 
benchmark approach. It would not be possible to earn an abnormal return from a hedge portfolio 
constructed using the forecasts of the two approaches. However, if an abnormal return can be 
found for such a portfolio, the forecasts from the improved approach must contain economically 
important information not already reflected in the forecasts from the benchmark approach.    
We construct the hedge portfolio for year T by sorting the sample of firms into quartiles based 
on  
 𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹A,B (𝑖, 𝑇 + 1)  = 𝐸A[𝑥𝑖,𝑇+1] − 𝐸B[𝑥𝑖,𝑇+1].  (8)  
This measure captures the extent to which the profitability forecast of an improved approach A is 
higher than that of a benchmark approach B. Because approach A on average is more accurate than 
approach B, one should trust the guidance by the profitability forecast 𝐸A[𝑥𝑖,𝑇] more than that by 
                                                 
5 This is consistent with the Fairfield et al., (2009, p 158) by requiring at least 100 observations to generate a reliable 
estimation of the coefficients for both industry-specific and economy-wide forecasting models. We also tried different 
minimum number of observations in the in-sample estimation, the results are very close. 
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𝐸B[𝑥𝑖,𝑇] . To take advantage of the better guidance, a dollar-neutral hedge portfolio can be 
constructed by shorting the lowest-quartile firms and going long the highest-quartile firms. 
Considering further that the implication of 𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹A,B (𝑖, 𝑇 + 1) is less likely to be reliable for those 
firms with FIA,B(i,T) ≤ 0, we confine to the subsample of firms with positive FIs in sorting the 
firms into quartiles for the hedge portfolio construction. To avoid a look-ahead bias, the portfolio 
is formed each year at the end of June based on forecasts constructed with data available by the 
end of December of the preceding year. The portfolio is held for the following year to track the 
monthly returns.  
We report the value-weighted raw and risk-adjusted returns of the hedge portfolio. The risk-
adjusted return is the alpha from the time-series regression of the hedge-portfolio returns (HEDGE) 
onto the returns to a market portfolio of stocks (MKT) and factor-mimicking portfolios based on 
two asset pricing models. They are (i) the Carhart (1997) four -factor model: 
 𝐻𝐸𝐷𝐺𝐸𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡, (9) 
where SMB, HML, and UMD denote the returns to the size, book-to-market, and momentum 
factors, respectively; (ii) the Fama and French (2015) five-factor model:  
 𝐻𝐸𝐷𝐺𝐸𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡, (10) 
where CMA and RMW denote the returns to the investment and profitability factors, respectively.  
 
3.3. Sample selection 
Profitability forecasts for the forecasting analysis are constructed for the period from 1989 to 
2016 because some measures require data from the cash flow statements available only from 1988 
onwards. The forecasts used for the hedge portfolio analysis are from 1989 to 2014 since we need 
to track the returns of the hedge portfolios formed at the end of each following June and held for 
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the next twelve months. We use the previous ten years of data to construct the profitability 
forecasts for a year. As the PREDGSL variable in the forecasting models requires ten earlier years 
of data to construct, the profitability forecasts for 1989 are constructed with data as far back as 
1969.  
We obtain accounting data of US firms from the Compustat North America annual 
fundamentals file and stock data from the Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) monthly 
stock file on Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). Only observations with non-missing SIC 
codes are retained. We exclude financial and utility firms (SIC from 6000 to 6799, or from 4900 
to 4949) because they are highly regulated. In addition, the U.S. postal service (SIC 4311) and 
public administration (SIC 9000 or above) are also excluded. 
To mitigate the effect of small denominators on the profitability and growth in sales measures, 
observations with total assets, net operating assets, or sales below USD 10 million or book value 
of equity below USD 1 million are excluded. To further mitigate the effect of mergers and 
acquisitions on the relation between current-year and lagged variables, we remove observations 
with growth in total assets, net operating assets, sales, or book value of equity exceeding 100%.  
To reduce the influence of outliers, we remove observations with any of the profitability and 
sales growth measures exceeding 1 in absolute value. For the in-sample estimation of the 
forecasting models, we trim all continuous-value dependent and predictor variables to the 1st and 
99th percentiles. To avoid any bias in assessing the forecast accuracy out-of-sample, there is no 
such trimming in the data upon which the estimated coefficients are applied to obtain the forecasts. 
Table 3.1 presents the definitions of all the variables used in our analyses. 
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TABLE 3.1   
Variable definitions 
Variable name Description Computation / WRDS mnemonic 
(USD million)     
OPINC Operating income after depreciation  OIADP 
NI Income before extraordinary items - 
available for common equity 
IBCOM 
TA Total assets AT 
NOA†  Net operating assets Common stock (CEQ) + Preferred stock (PSTK) + Long-term debt (DLTT) + Debt in current liabilities 
(DLC) + Minority interest (MIB) – Cash and short-term investments (CHE) 
BV Common/Ordinary shareholder’s 
equity 
CEQ 
SALES Sales/Turnover (net) SALE 
GP Gross profitability [Sales (SALE) - Cost of goods sold (COGS)] scaled by Total assets (AT) lagged by one year 
OP Operating profitability [Gross profit (SALE - COGS) - Selling, general, and administrative expenses reported (XSGA - XRD)] 
scaled by Total assets (AT) lagged by one year 
CbOP_BS‡ Cash-based Operating profitability 
(balance-sheet approach) 
[Operating profit (SALE - COGS - (XSGA -XRD)) - △(Accounts receivable (RECT)) - △(Inventory 
(INVT)) - △(Prepaid expenses (XPP)) + △(Deferred revenue (DRC+DRLT)) + △(Trade accounts 
payable (AP)) + △(Accrued expenses (XACC))] scaled by Total assets (AT) lagged by one year 
CbOP_CF Cash-based Operating profitability 
(cash-flow approach) 
[Operating profit (SALE - COGS - (XSGA -XRD)) - Decrease in accounts receivable (RECCH) - 
Decrease in inventroy (INVCH) - Increase in accounts payable and accrued liabilities (APALCH)] scaled 
by Total assets (AT) lagged by one year 
RNOA Return on net operating assets OPINCt/(0.5*(NOAt + NOAt–1)) 
ROE Return on equity NIt/(0.5*(BVt + BVt–1)) 
GSL Growth in sales (SALESt - SALESt–1)/ SALESt–1 
   
† If the data items for preferred stock, long-term debt, debt in current liabilities, minority interest and cash and short-term investments are not available, they are 
assumed to equal zero. 
‡ If the data items from balance sheet accounts are not available, they are assumed to equal zero. 
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Panel A of Table 3.2 summarizes the sample selection procedure for the forecasting analysis. 
The forecasting models are estimated annually on a rolling basis using the previous ten years of 
data. The actual number of observations used in each industry-specific estimation can vary because 
only industries with at least 100 firm-year observations are included to avoid unreliable estimation.   
TABLE 3.2  
Sample selection and descriptive statistics, 1989-2016   
Panel A: Sample selection   
Total observations with non-missing SIC code 171,081 
Less financial and utility firms, U.S. postal service, and public administration  34,828 
Less observations with small denominators 36,420 
Less observations with growth exceeding 100%  5,063 
Less observations with profitability or growth in sales larger than 1 in absolute value 8,314 
Less top- and bottom-percentile observations 5,846 
Observations available for in-sample estimation 80,610 
  
This panel summarizes the sample selection procedure and the number of observations available after each 
filter. The in-sample estimation of the forecasting models is done for each year from 1989 to 2016 on a rolling 
basis using the previous ten years of data. The actual number of observations used in each industry-specific 
estimation can vary because only industries with at least 100 firm-year observations are included to avoid 
unreliable estimation.  
  
Panel B of the table presents the descriptive statistics of the sample with data available for 
constructing the profitability and sales growth forecasts. On average, the OP and the two versions 
of CbOP are in the range of 14% to 15.5%, in contrast to the smaller RNOA and ROE (12.6% and 
6%, respectively). As GP only has the cost of goods sold deducted, its average value is much 







TABLE 3.2 (continued)        
Sample selection and descriptive statistics, 1989-2016         
Panel B: Descriptive statistics           
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Coefficient 





Gross profit  820.2 3,422.3 4.17 -2,865 131.2 130,978 14.86 0.72 
Operating profit  487.7 2,074.3 4.25 -4,171 61.4 89,797 14.68 0.77 
OPINC 286.9 1,310.8 4.57 -8,715 30.6 71,230 18.69 0.79 
NI 140.7 1,010.8 7.18 -98,696 11.3 53,394 3.05 0.82 
TA 3,261.4 12,487.9 3.83 10.1 429.4 479,921 13.47 0.78 
NOA 2,010.4 7,350.5 3.66 10.0 274.0 281,441 12.64 0.78 
BV 1,210.9 4,727.6 3.90 1.1 197.8 174,201 14.64 0.74 
SALES 2,673.7 11,526.7 4.31 4.8 431.3 483,521 18.24 0.73 
GP 35.1% 21.1% 0.60 -6.8% 31.7% 94.4% 0.66 0.16 
OP 15.3% 9.8% 0.64 -19.2% 14.1% 56.9% 0.54 0.26 
CbOP_BS 14.5% 10.4% 0.71 -21.8% 13.6% 56.3% 0.32 0.21 
CbOP_CF 14.1% 10.1% 0.71 -22.9% 13.3% 54.1% 0.30 0.21 
RNOA 12.6% 15.8% 1.26 -65.3% 11.9% 75.7% -0.10 0.21 
ROE 6.0% 17.9% 2.97 -78.4% 9.2% 59.4% -1.41 -0.36 
GSL 7.9% 19.1% 2.42 -55.9% 6.3% 79.3% 0.45 0.20 
         
This panel gives an overview of the data with 80,610 firm-year observations used to compute the forecast improvements 
for the period from 1989 to 2016. Except for the profitability and growth in sales measures, the descriptive statistics 
reported are in USD million. Gross profit = Sales (SALE) - Cost of goods sold (COGS). Operating profit = Gross profit 
(SALE - COGS) - Selling, general, and administrative expenses reported (XSGA - XRD). See Table 3.1 for other 
variable definitions. The Coefficient of Variation column reports the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean as a 
standardized measure of dispersion. The Skewness Coefficient column reports the adjusted Fisher-Pearson standardized 
moment coefficient of skewness, with negative and positive values representing negative and positive skewness, 
respectively. The Quartile Skewness column reports the Bowley skewness with a similar interpretation. It is defined in 
terms of quartiles (Kim and White 2004) and has a value between -1 and +1.  
 
The Coefficient of Variation column of the panel reports the ratio of the standard deviation to 
the mean. This is a standardized measure of dispersion that can be compared across the profitability 
measures. The coefficients of variation for the new profitability measures are at very similar levels 
(from 0.60 to 0.71), whereas those for the traditional measures are substantially higher (1.26 for 
RNOA and 2.97 for ROE). This suggests that the variations in profitability across firms for a 
traditional measure are much greater than those for a new profitability measure. Consequently, for 
a given industry classification, the within-industry heterogeneity in profitability for ROE or RNOA 
is likely to be greater than that for a new profitability measure. That means, if an industry 
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classification effectively balances the bias-variance tradeoff for forecasting a new profitability 
measure on an industry-specific basis, the classification is unlikely to do so as effectively for a 
traditional measure. We will come back to this implication later when discussing the forecasting 
analysis results.     
The Skewness Coefficient column reports the adjusted Fisher-Pearson standardized moment 
coefficient of skewness. The Quartile Skewness column reports the Bowley skewness defined in 
terms of quartiles (Kim and White, 2004). All the earnings and size measures are positively skewed 
(i.e., skewed to the right – with a long, fat right tail). Similarly, most of the profitability and sales 
growth measures are positively skewed. The only exceptions are RNOA and ROE. Note that they 
are deflated by the average of the current- and previous-year investment base (i.e. NOA and BV, 
respectively), unlike the other profitability measures which are deflated by the previous-year total 
assets (TA). When measured by the moment coefficient of skewness, the negative skewness of 
RNOA is mild. In contrast, ROE is highly negatively skewed. This is likely due to the relatively 
light skewness of NI matched to the highly-skewed BV used as the deflator. In terms of the quartile 
skewness, ROE is still negatively skewed, whereas RNOA is not.   
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Panel C of the table reports the number of observations and the mean profitability and growth 
in sales by industry. The Manufacturing sector spreads over two first-digit SIC codes; so does the 
Services sector. 6  The Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing sector has the smallest number of 
observations. There are variations in the industry means of profitability and growth in sales. For 
the industry GP, it ranges from 17.4% to 49.2%. The variations in the industry OP and CbOP are 
much smaller (from 11.5% to 17.4%), with the industry RNOA falling into a comparable range 
(from 9.2% to 14.9%). For the “most polluted” ROE, the industry means vary from 2.5% to 8.5%. 
The industry GSL has a low at 6.7% and a high at 12.0%.             
 
                                                 
6 In unreported analysis, we consider the industry classification by SIC Division (A to I) with Manufacturing firms 
and Services firms each under one division and Mining, Construction, Wholesale Trade, and Retail Trade in separate 
divisions. Although this classification improves the homogeneity of some divisions, it is achieved at the cost of their 
smaller sizes. Additionally, the classification is likely to worsen the homogeneity of some others by defining them 
overly broadly. The results based on this industry classification are weaker as expected, consistent with the insight of 
Schröder and Yim (2017).  
TABLE 3.2 (continued)         
Sample selection and descriptive statistics, 1989-2016 
Panel C: Descriptive statistics by industry         
1st-digit 
SIC Description Obs. GP OP CbOP_BS CbOP_CF RNOA ROE GSL 
0 
Agriculture, Forestry, 
and Fishing 445 26.5% 13.2% 12.1% 12.3% 11.3% 7.0% 7.0% 
1 Mining; Construction 5,522 22.0% 14.2% 13.2% 13.0% 9.2% 4.1% 10.9% 
2 Manufacturing I 12,517 39.5% 16.3% 15.3% 15.0% 14.9% 8.5% 6.9% 





14,380 17.4% 12.8% 12.7% 12.4% 11.4% 8.5% 6.7% 
5 
Wholesale Trade; 
Retail Trade 9,946 49.2% 13.2% 11.9% 11.5% 13.5% 6.3% 8.6% 
7 Services I 9,365 38.1% 15.8% 16.0% 14.9% 11.5% 2.5% 9.3% 
8 Services II 3,411 35.1% 14.3% 13.4% 12.0% 14.0% 4.5% 12.0% 
  Overall 80,610 35.1% 15.3% 14.5% 14.1% 12.6% 6.0% 7.9% 
          
This panel reports by industry the number of observations and the mean profitability and sales growth of the sample 
for the forecasting analysis. Industries are defined using the first-digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC). 
Financial and utility firms (SIC from 6000 to 6799, or from 4900 to 4949), U.S. postal service (SIC 4311), and 
public administration (SIC 9000 or above) are excluded from the sample.  
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To select the sample for the hedge portfolio analysis, we start with all firms traded on the 
NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq and retain only observations for ordinary common shares. Following 
Ball et al. (2015), we use CRSP delisting returns and impute a return of -30% whenever a delisting 
return is missing and the delisting is performance- related (see also Shumway 1997; Shumway and 
Warther 1999; Beaver et al. 2007).  
We merge the stock data with the accounting data with a lag of six months assuming that 
accounting disclosure for a fiscal year would be available to the public six months after the fiscal 
year end. To determine the risk-adjusted returns, we consider both the Carhart (1997) four-factor 
and the Fama and French (2015) five-factor asset pricing model. We obtain the returns data for the 
models from Kenneth French’s website  
(http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/ faculty/ken.french/data_library.html).  
 
3.4. Main Results 
3.4.1. Forecasting analysis 
Table 3.3 presents the forecasting analysis results comparing the alternative approach by 
economy-wide quantile regression to the benchmark approach by economy-wide OLS regression. 
We obtain strong evidence showing significantly positive forecast improvements for all the 
profitability measures. This holds not only for the mean forecast improvements but also for the 
median. The levels of significance are consistently high (all at the 1% level).  Interestingly, among 
the new profitability measures or among the traditional ones, the ranking of the magnitudes of the 
forecast improvements appears to be more or less consistent with the relative degree of skewness 
of the profitability measures shown in table 2B. Taken together, the findings in table 3 are in line 
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with the expectation that quantile regression can improve the forecast accuracy of profitability 
measures with skewed distributions.  
 
TABLE 3.3    
Profitability forecast improvements of economy-wide quantile regression over economy-wide OLS regression 
  Value   p-Value 
GP    
Mean 0.342% *** 0.000 
Median 0.379% *** 0.000 
OP    
Mean 0.195% *** 0.000 
Median 0.196% *** 0.000 
CbOP_BS    
Mean 0.112% *** 0.000 
Median 0.101% *** 0.000 
CbOP_CF    
Mean 0.121% *** 0.000 
Median 0.112% *** 0.000 
RNOA    
Mean 0.270% *** 0.000 
Median 0.235% *** 0.000 
ROE    
Mean 0.448% *** 0.000 
Median 0.332% *** 0.000 
    
This table reports the profitability forecast improvements of economy-wide quantile regression (the alternative 
approach) over economy-wide OLS regression (the benchmark approach). The forecast improvement (FI) is 
measured through a matched-pair comparison of the absolute forecast errors (AFE) from the two competing 
approaches. A positive FI means the AFE from the benchmark approach is larger than that from the alternative 
approach. Both forecasting approaches use the same set of predictor variables like those in Fairfield et al (2009). 
Regardless of the forecasting approaches, the underlying predictor variable PREDGSL (i.e., the predicted growth 
in sales) is constructed in the same way by industry-specific OLS regression. Industries are defined using the first-
digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC). Firm-specific forecasts are obtained in two steps. First, the 
coefficients of a forecasting model are estimated for each year from 1989 to 2016 on a rolling basis using data of 
the previous 10 years. Next, the estimated coefficients for a year are applied on a firm's data of the previous year 
to obtain a firm-specific forecast for the current year. The mean and median FIs of all firm-years in the sample are 
reported for different profitability measures (see Table 3.1 for the definitions of the measures). The test on the 
mean FI is a regression-based t-test using robust standard errors controlling for two-way clustering by firm and 
year. The test on the median FI is the Wilcoxon signed rank test. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 3.4 compares the alternative approach by industry-specific quantile regression to the 
benchmark approach by economy-wide quantile regression. Again, the mean and median forecast 
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improvements for all the profitability measures are significantly positive. Those for the new 
profitability measures are highly significant. By contrast, the significance levels of the forecast 
improvements for ROE are not as high, with those for RNOA following in between.  
 
TABLE 3.4    
Profitability forecast improvements of industry-specific quantile regression over economy-wide quantile 
regression 
  Value   p-Value 
GP    
Mean 0.082% *** 0.000 
Median 0.075% *** 0.000 
OP    
Mean 0.012% *** 0.002 
Median 0.017% *** 0.000 
CbOP_BS    
Mean 0.035% *** 0.000 
Median 0.044% *** 0.000 
CbOP_CF    
Mean 0.019% *** 0.000 
Median 0.023% *** 0.000 
RNOA    
Mean 0.010% ** 0.048 
Median 0.009% *** 0.002 
ROE    
Mean 0.011% ** 0.039 
Median 0.005% * 0.064 
    
This table reports the profitability forecast improvements of industry-specific quantile regression (the alternative 
approach) over economy-wide quantile regression (the benchmark approach). The forecast improvement (FI) is 
measured through a matched-pair comparison of the absolute forecast errors (AFE) from the two competing 
approaches. A positive FI means the AFE from the benchmark approach is larger than that from the alternative 
approach. Both forecasting approaches use the same set of predictor variables like those in Fairfield et al (2009). 
Regardless of the forecasting approaches, the underlying predictor variable PREDGSL (i.e., the predicted growth 
in sales) is constructed in the same way by industry-specific OLS regression. Industries are defined using the first-
digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC). Firm-specific forecasts are obtained in two steps. First, the coefficients 
of a forecasting model are estimated for each year from 1989 to 2016 on a rolling basis using data of the previous 
10 years. Next, the estimated coefficients for a year are applied on a firm's data of the previous year to obtain a 
firm-specific forecast for the current year. The mean and median FIs of all firm-years in the sample are reported 
for different profitability measures (see Table 3.1 for the definitions of the measures). The test on the mean FI is a 
regression-based t-test using robust standard errors controlling for two-way clustering by firm and year. The test 
on the median FI is the Wilcoxon signed rank test. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 




The relative strength of the forecast improvements between RNOA and ROE is similar to prior 
findings for the industry-specific versus economy-wide comparison under OLS regression 
(Schröder and Yim 2017). The considerably weaker results for ROE are in line with it being the 
“most polluted” measures of economic profitability. Interestingly, GP as arguably the cleanest 
measure of economic profitability also has the largest forecast improvements. The two versions of 
CbOP, which are found to be better profitability measures than OP in the asset pricing context, 
also have larger forecast improvements than OP. This suggests that accounting accruals 
adjustments weaken the linkage of a firm’s profitability to its industry membership. 
Recall that the variations in profitability across firms are greater for the traditional profitability 
measures (table 2B). This is likely to result in a higher within-industry heterogeneity in 
profitability for these measures. The higher heterogeneity would need a not so broad industry 
classification to effectively balance the bias-variance tradeoff for forecasting the traditional 
measures on an industry-specific basis. This further explains why in Table 3.4 the forecast 
improvements for these measures are weaker than those for the new profitability measures.  
It is worth noting that the magnitudes of the forecast improvements in Table 3.3 are several to 
over ten times bigger than those in Table 3.4. This suggests that replacing economy-wide OLS by 
its quantile regression counterpart is more critical than additionally using the industry-specific 
version in achieving forecast improvements.  
Table 3.5 presents strong evidence showing that forecasts by industry-specific quantile 
regression are more accurate than their OLS counterparts. Without exception, the mean and median 
forecast improvements for all the profitability measures are positive and highly significant. We 
conclude that quantile regression is more accurate than OLS in forecasting profitability, whether 
on an industry-specific or economy-wide basis.  
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TABLE 3.5    
Profitability forecast improvements of industry-specific quantile regression over industry-specific OLS 
regression 
  Value   p-Value 
GP    
Mean 0.228% *** 0.000 
Median 0.230% *** 0.000 
OP    
Mean 0.164% *** 0.000 
Median 0.154% *** 0.000 
CbOP_BS    
Mean 0.109% *** 0.000 
Median 0.101% *** 0.000 
CbOP_CF    
Mean 0.106% *** 0.000 
Median 0.091% *** 0.000 
RNOA    
Mean 0.259% *** 0.000 
Median 0.231% *** 0.000 
ROE    
Mean 0.428% *** 0.000 
Median 0.407% *** 0.000 
    
This table reports the profitability forecast improvements of industry-specific quantile regression (the alternative 
approach) over industry-specific OLS regression (the benchmark approach). The forecast improvement (FI) is 
measured through a matched-pair comparison of the absolute forecast errors (AFE) from the two competing 
approaches. A positive FI means the AFE from the benchmark approach is larger than that from the alternative 
approach. Both forecasting approaches use the same set of predictor variables like those in Fairfield et al (2009). 
Regardless of the forecasting approaches, the underlying predictor variable PREDGSL (i.e., the predicted growth 
in sales) is constructed in the same way by industry-specific OLS regression. Industries are defined using the first-
digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC). Firm-specific forecasts are obtained in two steps. First, the 
coefficients of a forecasting model are estimated for each year from 1989 to 2016 on a rolling basis using data of 
the previous 10 years. Next, the estimated coefficients for a year are applied on a firm's data of the previous year 
to obtain a firm-specific forecast for the current year. The mean and median FIs of all firm-years in the sample are 
reported for different profitability measures (see Table 3.1 for the definitions of the measures). The test on the 
mean FI is a regression-based t-test using robust standard errors controlling for two-way clustering by firm and 
year. The test on the median FI is the Wilcoxon signed rank test. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
3.4.2. Hedge portfolio analysis 
The forecasting analysis results provide clear evidence that quantile regression can improve 
the accuracy of profitability forecasts over the prevalent approach by OLS regression, regardless 
of the profitability measures (new or conventional). To assess the economic importance of 
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knowing the quantile regression forecasts in addition to the OLS regression forecasts, we perform 
a hedge portfolio analysis to see whether that knowledge can lead to abnormal returns.  
Table 3.6 presents the average monthly returns of the long and the short portfolio, as well as 
the average excess returns of the hedge portfolio and the risk-adjusted returns based on the Carhart 
(1997) four-factor and the Fama and French (2015) five-factor asset pricing model. The hedge 
portfolio is formed by confining to the firms with positive forecast improvements and sorting them 
based on the extent the alternative-approach forecasts are higher than the benchmark-approach 
forecasts. In this table, the alternative forecasting approach is economy-wide quantile regression, 
whereas the benchmark approach is economy-wide OLS regression. All the average excess returns 
and the four-factor alphas are significantly positive, except for ROE. The five-factor alphas, 
however, are all significantly positive, even for ROE. Taken together, the evidence confirms that 
it is economically important to know the forecasts by economy-wide quantile regression over and 
above their OLS counterparts.  
Table 3.7 shows that forecasts by industry-specific quantile regression also contain 
economically important information not already found in their OLS counterparts. Like the results 
in the previous table, the average excess returns and the four-factor alphas are significantly positive 
for nearly all the profitability measures. The only exception is ROE. Again, the five-factor alphas 
are all significantly positive, even for ROE. Interestingly, the relative strength of the alphas appears 
to be by and large in line with (i) the superiority of OP and CbOP over GP in explaining the cross-
section of stock returns and (ii) these new profitability measures being more free from financial 
reporting discretion than the traditional measures. Overall, the results in tables 6 and 7 confirm 
that the higher accuracy of the profitability forecasts by quantile regression, whether on an 




TABLE 3.6             
Portfolio returns based on profitability forecasts and forecast improvements: Economy-wide quantile versus economy-wide OLS regression 
 
Long portfolio:  Short portfolio:  Average excess:  Carhart Fama and French  
High (quartiles) Low (quartiles) High − Low 4-factor alpha 5-factor alpha 
  Return   p-Value Return   p-Value Return   p-Value Return   p-Value Return   p-Value 
                
GP 0.889% *** 0.000 0.306%  0.233 0.583% *** 0.002 0.513% *** 0.002 0.537% *** 0.001 
                
OP 0.892% *** 0.000 0.258%  0.357 0.634% *** 0.001 0.579% *** 0.000 0.649% *** 0.000 
                
CbOP_BS 0.870% *** 0.001 0.257%  0.361 0.613% *** 0.000 0.660% *** 0.000 0.746% *** 0.000 
                
CbOP_CF 0.898% *** 0.000 0.295%  0.287 0.603% *** 0.000 0.594% *** 0.000 0.596% *** 0.000 
                
RNOA 0.888% *** 0.000 0.518% * 0.075 0.370% * 0.052 0.416% *** 0.009 0.331% ** 0.028 
                
ROE 0.881% *** 0.000 0.748% *** 0.004 0.133%  0.375 0.190%  0.145 0.255% ** 0.038 
                                
                
This table reports value-weighted excess returns, Carhart (1997) 4-factor alphas, and Fama and French (2015) 5-factor alphas for portfolios sorted by the DIFF 
variable, defined as the alternative-approach forecast in excess of the benchmark-approach forecast, after confining to firms with positive forecast improvements. 
For this table, the alternative forecasting approach is economy-wide quantile regression, whereas the benchmark approach is economy-wide OLS regression. 
Firms with positive forecast improvements are those with the absolute forecast error from the benchmark approach larger than that from the alternative approach. 
At the end of each June, we sort stocks of the firms with positive forecast improvements into quartiles and hold the portfolio for the following year. The sample 






TABLE 3.7             
Portfolio returns based on profitability forecasts and forecast improvements: Industry-specific quantile versus industry-specific OLS regression 
 
Long portfolio:  Short portfolio:  Average excess:  Carhart Fama and French 
 
High (quartiles) Low (quartiles) High − Low 4-factor alpha 5-factor alpha 
                
  Return   p-Value Return   p-Value Return   p-Value Return   p-Value Return   p-Value 
                
GP 0.894% *** 0.000 0.446%  0.161 0.448% ** 0.025 0.469% *** 0.002 0.571% *** 0.001 
                
OP 0.904% *** 0.000 0.417%  0.153 0.487% ** 0.012 0.468% *** 0.003 0.575% *** 0.001 
                
CbOP_BS 0.886% *** 0.000 0.381%  0.179 0.505% *** 0.005 0.595% *** 0.000 0.641% *** 0.000 
                
CbOP_CF 0.903% *** 0.000 0.235%  0.424 0.667% *** 0.000 0.683% *** 0.000 0.742% *** 0.000 
                
RNOA 0.862% *** 0.000 0.513% ** 0.044 0.348% ** 0.036 0.375% ** 0.016 0.411% *** 0.007 
                
ROE 0.844% *** 0.000 0.651% *** 0.004 0.193%  0.198 0.226%  0.104 0.298% ** 0.028 
                                
                
This table reports value-weighted excess returns, Carhart (1997) 4-factor alphas, and Fama and French (2015) 5-factor alphas for portfolios sorted by the DIFF 
variable, defined as the alternative-approach forecast in excess of the benchmark-approach forecast, after confining to firms with positive forecast improvements. 
For this table, the alternative forecasting approach is industry-specific quantile regression, whereas the benchmark approach is industry-specific OLS regression. 
Firms with positive forecast improvements are those with the absolute forecast error from the benchmark approach larger than that from the alternative approach. 
At the end of each June, we sort stocks of the firms with positive forecast improvements into quartiles and hold the portfolio for the following year. The sample 
starts in July 1989 and ends in June 2016.  
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3.5. Additional Analyses 
We perform additional analyses to ensure that our results are not sensitive to various 
methodological and sample choices and can extend beyond profitability forecasting. 
 
3.5.1. Forecasting growth in sales 
Like the profitability measures, growth in sales also has a skewed distribution (see Table 
3.2 Panel B). If skewness is a key reason why forecasts by quantile regression are more accurate 
than their OLS counterparts, our results for the profitability measures should extend to sales 
growth forecasting. The findings in Table 3.8 confirm that this is true. Without an exception, 
the mean and median forecast improvements for growth in sales are positive and highly 
significant for all the three pairwise comparisons.  
 
3.5.2. Alternative ways to construct PREDGSL 
The results in Table 3.8 show that sales growth forecasts by industry-specific quantile-
regression are more accurate than their OLS counterparts. In unreported analysis, we re-run the 
forecasting and hedge portfolio analyses using the PREDGSL variable constructed by industry-











TABLE 3.8    
Sales growth forecast improvements   
  Value   p-Value 
    
Economy-wide quantile versus economy-wide OLS regression: 
Mean 0.065% *** 0.000 
Median 0.095% *** 0.000 
        
    
Industry-specific versus economy-wide quantile regression: 
Mean 0.025% *** 0.000 
Median 0.028% *** 0.000 
        
    
Industry-specific quantile versus industry-specific OLS regression: 
Mean 0.056% *** 0.000 
Median 0.085% *** 0.000 
        
    
This table reports the sales growth forecast improvements of an alternative approach over a benchmark approach 
as indicated in the panels of the table. The forecast improvement (FI) is measured through a matched-pair 
comparison of the absolute forecast errors (AFE) from the two competing approaches. A positive FI means the AFE 
from the benchmark approach is larger than that from the alternative approach. Both forecasting approaches use the 
same simple first-order autoregressive model specification as in Fairfield et al (2009). Industries are defined using 
the first-digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC). Firm-specific forecasts are obtained in two steps. First, the 
coefficients of a forecasting model are estimated for each year from 1979 to 2016 on a rolling basis using data of 
the previous 10 years. Next, the estimated coefficients for a year are applied on a firm's data of the previous year to 
obtain a firm-specific forecast for the current year. The mean and median FIs of all firm-years in the sample are 
reported for the growth in sales (GSL) measure (see Table 3.1 for the definition of the measure). The test on the 
mean FI is a regression-based t-test using robust standard errors controlling for two-way clustering by firm and 
year. The test on the median FI is the Wilcoxon signed rank test. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
3.5.3. Alternative forecasting model specification 
Schröder and Yim (2017) find that the parsimonious first-order autoregressive model (i.e., 
without the above-median-profitability dummy variable and the PREDGSL variable) can 
forecast better out-of-sample, even though the Fairfield et al. (2009) specification has a better 
in-sample estimation fit. In unreported analysis, we re-run our main analyses using the 
parsimonious specification. The results are generally consistent.  
Following Sloan (1996), we use an alternative model by decomposing the profitability 
(ROA) into accruals and cash flows. This decomposition serves two purposes. First, analysts 
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prefer CFO rather than net income since CFO is less subject to distortion (Bernstein 1993, 461). 
A higher CFO to net income ratio is believed to have higher earning’s quality. Second, a vast 
literature finds that CFO and accruals have different prediction ability on forecasting 
profitability (Sloan 1996, Richardson, Sloan, Soliman and Tuna 2005, Joos and Plesko 2005, 
Konstantinidi and Pope 2016). The less reliable accruals lead to lower earnings persistence 
(Richardson et al., 2005). We follow the definition of accruals by Sloan (1996): 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 = (∆𝐶𝐴 − ∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ) − (∆𝐶𝐿 − ∆𝑆𝑇𝐷 − ∆𝑇𝑃) − 𝐷𝑒𝑝 
where ∆𝐶𝐴 = 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚 4), 
∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ = 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚 1), 
∆𝐶𝐿 = 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚 5), 
∆𝑆𝑇𝐷 = 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚 34), 
∆𝑇𝑃 = 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚 71), and 
𝐷𝑒𝑝 = 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚 14). 
Earnings used in the forecasting model is ROA which is decomposed by the deflated 
accrual component and the deflated CFO component. 
𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 =







𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡 =
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 − 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
Other literature documents asymmetric earnings persistence due to the binary classification 
of firms into profits and losses. Hayn (1995) posits that losses are less persistent than profit 
due to the exercising of abandonment options by firms. Basu (1997) argues that the timely 
recognition difference between losses and profits causes the persistence variation where 
earnings reflects bad news more quickly than good news. To capture any difference in 
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profitable and loss-making firms, we include a dummy variable LOSS_D which equals one if 
the firm’s ROA is negative and zero otherwise.  
Our forecasting approach uses the following earnings decomposition model: 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑗,𝑇 + 𝛽𝑗,𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑗,𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜆𝑗,𝑇𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆_𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,          (11) 
The results of the forecasting improvement using this decomposition method are present in 
Appendix 3.1. We find significant and positive forecasting improvement of using quantile 
regression over OLS regression for all the model specifications. 
 
3.5.4. Alternative industry classifications 
In unreported work, we re-run our main analyses using alternative industry classifications, 
such as Fama-French 12-industry and two-digit SIC. Fama-French 12-industry is a broad 
industry classification similar to the first-digit SIC. The results for this industry classification 
are generally consistent and sometimes even stronger. Because the two-digit SIC is a narrower 
classification, the results are weaker though qualitatively similar. This is in line with the insight 
of prior research (Schröder and Yim 2017).  
 
3.5.5. Sample period before financial crisis 
In unreported analysis, we re-run the forecasting analysis for the reduced sample up to 2006 
(i.e., before the financial crisis). The results are very similar, though occasionally weaker. This 
is likely to be have been driven by the sharp reduction in the sample size compared to the full 
sample from 1989 to 2016.  
 
3.5.6. Long-term forecasting analysis 
We also perform a series of forecasting accuracy comparison between quantile regression 
and OLS regression in predicting long-term forecasts. In Appendix 3.2, we present the 
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forecasting improvement of predicted profitability by using quantile regression over OLS 
regression under the economy-wide model. From 2-year ahead forecasts to 5-year ahead 
forecasts, the results show quantile regression forecasts as more accurate than OLS regression 
forecasts. This finding is robust for all our profitability measures. In further unreported results, 
we confirm this finding using the industry-specific forecasting model. 
 
3.5.7. Robustness tests of hedged portfolio analyses 
In Section 3.4.2 we show the economic importance of quantile regression forecasts over 
OLS regression forecasts in terms of obtaining abnormal return through hedged portfolio 
analyses. A hedged portfolio is formed by confining to firms with positive forecast 
improvements and sorting them based on the extent the alternative-approach forecasts are 
higher than the benchmark-approach forecasts. If market participants trade or price stocks 
based on forecasts of firm profitability obtained with OLS, stock price would not fully impound 
the information contained in quantile regression forecasts. We value this informative of 
quantile regression as the difference of predicted profitability based on quantile regression and 
OLS regression (DIFF). As we did in Table 3.6 and Table 3.7, we sort stocks based on DIFF 
with stocks having positive forecasting improvement of using quantile regression forecasts 
over OLS regression forecasts. This method is naturally biased to the quantile regression 
method as we only include the firms which have more accurate forecasts by quantile regression. 
In this section, we provide two additional tests based on two ways to confine the stock sample 
into portfolio to further confirm the usefulness of quantile regression forecasting in hedged 
portfolio analyses. 
In the first set of analyses, we construct a trading strategy based on DIFF with a sample of 
firms whose forecasting improvement of quantile regression forecasts over OLS regression 
forecasts is negative. This method of strategy is in favour of OLS regression forecasts since we 
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only include the firms which have more accurate predicted profitability by using OLS 
regression over quantile regression. In Appendix 3.3 Panel A and B, for both economy-wide 
and industry-specific forecasting models, we cannot obtain any positive and significant 
abnormal returns by sorting stocks based on the negative forecasting improvement. This is 
consistent with fact that OLS regression is widely used by the market participants in trading 
their stocks. Therefore, no further positive abnormal returns can be generated based on the 
advantages of OLS regression forecasts. 
In the second set of analyses, we construct the trading strategy based on DIFF with the full 
sample regardless of whether the forecasting improvement is positive or negative by using 
quantile regression over OLS regression in forecasting. In Appendix 3.4 Panel A and Panel B, 
we find that for either economy-wide or industry-specific model, our trading strategy can 
obtain positive and significant abnormal returns for all our profitability measures. 
These two additional trading strategies further confirm the usefulness of quantile regression 
forecasts over OSL forecasts. Trading strategy guided by quantile regression forecasts when 
quantile regression is more accurate brings a higher abnormal return than trading guided by 
OLS forecasts when OLS forecasting is more accurate. 
 
3.6. The implication of quantile regression in analysts’ forecasts 
In this section, we conduct several tests by comparing our model-based forecasting model 
and analysts’ consensus forecasts. Though analysts’ forecasts are widely explored by prior 
research, few studies compare the forecasts between analysts and forecasting model directly. 
First, analysts’ forecasts have low coverage of data compared to model-based forecasts. We 
collect analysts’ forecasts from I/B/E/S file. The figure 3.2 shows a coverage ratio by different 
earing’s measures per year from I/B/E/S and Compustat. The earning’s measures we compare 
are non-deflated earnings which are gross profit, operating profit, and EPS, and deflated 
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earnings which are ROE, and ROA. The figure suggests that all the profitability measures from 
Compustat maintain a consistent level of coverage from 1960s to 2017. By contrast, all 
profitability measures except EPS from I/B/E/S have very low coverage and only available 
after 2000. The un-deflated EPS from I/B/E/S have a consistent trend of number of 
observations with the profitability measures in Compustat since early 1980s though the 
coverage is lower.  
Second, there is an inconsistency of data between these two databases. The actual and 
analysts’ forecasts from I/B/E/S are adjusted with non-recurring items while the earnings from 
Compsutat are not which follows GAAP.  
Therefore, we reconcile these differences of the earnings between these two databases by 
making the following adjustments. We use the IBES actual EPS as our main earnings in our 
model-based forecast model. To convert EPS into deflated profitability ROE, we use two 
alternative deflators.  
Method1: 𝐼𝐵𝐸𝑆_𝐸𝑃𝑆_𝑃𝑡 = 𝐼𝐵𝐸𝑆_𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡/𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑡−2 
Method2: 𝐼𝐵𝐸𝑆_𝐸𝑃𝑆_𝐶𝐻_𝑆𝐸𝑄𝑡 = (𝐼𝐵𝐸𝑆𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑡−1)/𝐴𝑣𝑔. 𝑆𝐸𝑄𝑡−1 
where 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑡−2  is the fiscal year end price obtained from I/B/E/S. We follow Basu and 
Markov (2004) by using the lagged two year’s price as the deflator. CSHO are common shares 
outstanding and avg. SEQ are the average book value of equity from Compustat. For the 
following sections, these two ways of conversion of ROE are applied to the comparison 









Figure 3.2 summarises the coverage of earnings from Compustat database and I/B/E/S database from 1960s to 
2016. Earnings per share (EPS), gross profit (GP) and operating profit (OP) are the non-deflated earnings. ROA 
and ROE are profitability ratios collected from I/B/E/S directly, while for Compustat database we calculate ROA 
and ROE following their definitions in Table 3.1. 
 
3.6.1. Model-based forecasts and analysts’ forecasts accuracy comparison 
In this section, we compared the forecasting accuracy between analysts’ forecasts and the 
model-based forecasts. We use the economy-wide parsimonious forecasting model to construct 
our model-based forecasts. 
𝑥𝑖,𝑡+𝑛 = 𝛼𝑇 + 𝛽𝑇𝑥𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡,                      (12) 
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where 𝑥 is the ROE defined as IBES_EPS_P or IBES_EPS_CH_SEQ. i is the firm and t is the 
fiscal year. We conduct 1 year ahead to 5 years ahead forecasts as well as quarter 1 to quarter 
4 ahead forecasts in order to give a comprehensive comparison. Therefore, n is 1 year to 5 year 
or quarter 1 to quarter 4. 
 Like our forecasting procedure in the main tests of this paper, we estimate the in-sample 
coefficients using either OLS regression or quantile regression in the rolling basis with the past 
10 years of data. The profitability forecasts using the model is predicted as follow: 
Eew_OLS or QR[xi,T+n] = 𝑎𝑇 + 𝑏𝑇𝑥𝑖,𝑇, 
where (𝑎𝑇 , 𝑏𝑇 ) are the OLS or quantile regression estimates of the economy-wide model 
parameters (𝛼𝑇, 𝛽𝑇). 
For a fair comparison, we construct analysts’ forecasts from I/B/E/S detail file and restricts 
the analysts’ forecasts after the most recent annual earnings announcement date but before the 
first quarter’s earnings announcement date for the following year. During this time interval, 
both analysts’ forecasts and model-based forecasts have the same information of the firm’s 
prior performance. For example, if the forecasted variable is 𝑥𝑖,𝑡+1 , we aggregate all the 
analysts’ forecasts for t+1 during the period between t and t+ Q1(the quarter 1’s earnings 
announcement date). We divide analysts EPS forecasts with our two methods of deflators. 
Method1: 𝐼𝐵𝐸𝑆_𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑠_𝐸𝑃𝑆_𝑃𝑡+𝑛 = 𝐼𝐵𝐸𝑆_𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑠_𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+𝑛/𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑡−2 
Method 2: 𝐼𝐵𝐸𝑆_𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑠_𝐸𝑃𝑆_𝐶𝐻_𝑆𝐸𝑄𝑡+𝑛 = (𝐼𝐵𝐸𝑆_𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑠_𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+𝑛 ∗
𝐶𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑡)/𝑎𝑣𝑔. 𝑆𝐸𝑄𝑡−1 
We use the mean and median analysts’ consensus forecasts in the comparison with the 
model-based forecasts. Consistent to our earlier analyses, we use the absolute forecast error 
(AFE) to measure the accuracy of a forecasting approach.  
We summarise the data descriptive analyses of IBES profitability (ROE) based on our 
deflators (Method 1 and Method 2) and the corresponding deflated analysts’ consensus 
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forecasts in the Appendix 3.5 Panel A and Panel B. Since EPS in I/B/E/S only has a good 
coverage after 1980, we select our sample period from 1985 to 2017 to ensure enough 
observations for in-sample estimation. Similar to the Compustat-based ROE reported in Table 
3.2 Panel B, both annual and quarterly IBES-based ROE constructed by both deflators are 
negatively skewed. IBES_EPS_P is smaller than IBES_EPS_CH_SEQ due to the different 
deflating measures we used. 
We present the profitability forecasting accuracy of the model-based and analysts’ forecasts 
by using the deflator proposed in Method 1 for both actual profitability and analysts’ forecasts’ 
consensus. In Table 3.9 Panel A, we present the forecasting accuracy comparison between 
analysts’ consensus forecasts and our model-based forecasts in forecasting quarter 1 to quarter 
4 ahead quarterly earnings. We find that for quarter 1 to quarter 4 earnings’ forecasts, analysts 
give more accurate forecasts (both mean and median consensus) than our model-based 
forecasts either by using OLS regression or quantile regression. 
We repeat the same forecasting process by using the long-term annual forecasts. In Table 
3.9 Panel B, we report the forecasting accuracy comparison from 2 years ahead to 5 years ahead 
forecasts by using our two deflated earnings. We find that analysts’ forecasts are only more 
accurate than model-based forecasts in the 1 year ahead forecasts but less accurate from 2 years 
ahead onwards.  
For the ‘horseracing’ comparison between the two model-based forecasts, quantile 
regression forecasts are more accurate than OLS forecasts from quarter1 to quarter 4 and 1 year 
ahead to 5 years ahead. The same findings are shown by using the deflators proposed in Method 
2 (results are documented in Appendix 3.6 Panel A and B). Overall, our results suggest that 
analysts’ forecasts produce more accurate earnings forecasts in the short term but model-based 




TABLE 3.9             
Profitability forecast improvements of quantile regression over OLS regression by economy-wide model 
(Column approach forecasts versus row approach forecasts): IBES-based ROE by Method 2 
Panel A: Quarterly forecasting                 
Q1 
 
Analysts' mean consensus 
 
Analysts' median consensus 
 
PRED_OLS 
    Value   p-Value  Value  p-Value  Value  p-Value 
PRED_QR                      
Mean  -0.620% *** 0.000  -0.624% *** 0.000  0.015% *** 0.000 
Median   -0.362% *** 0.000  -0.366% *** 0.000  0.018% *** 0.000 
PRED_OLS                        
Mean  -0.634% *** 0.000  -0.639% *** 0.000     
Median   -0.392% *** 0.000   -0.394% *** 0.000         
                          
Q2 
 
Analysts' mean consensus 
 
Analysts' median consensus 
 
PRED_OLS 
    Value   p-Value  Value  p-Value  Value  p-Value 
PRED_QR                      
Mean  -0.491% *** 0.000  -0.489% *** 0.000  0.023% *** 0.000 
Median   -0.277% *** 0.000   -0.277% *** 0.000   0.029% *** 0.000 
PRED_OLS             
Mean  -0.514% *** 0.000  -0.512% *** 0.000     
Median   -0.317% *** 0.000   -0.318% *** 0.000         
                          
Q3 
 
Analysts' mean consensus 
 
Analysts' median consensus 
 
PRED_OLS 
    Value   p-Value  Value  p-Value  Value  p-Value 
PRED_QR                      
Mean  -0.399% *** 0.000  -0.399% *** 0.000  0.019% *** 0.000 
Median   -0.224% *** 0.000  -0.223% *** 0.000  0.027% *** 0.000 
PRED_OLS                      
Mean  -0.418% *** 0.000  -0.418% *** 0.000     
Median   -0.261%  *** 0.000   -0.261%  *** 0.000         
                          
Q4 
 
Analysts' mean consensus 
 
Analysts' median consensus 
 
PRED_OLS 
    Value   p-Value  Value  p-Value  Value  p-Value 
PRED_QR                      
Mean  -0.327% *** 0.000  -0.330% *** 0.000  0.013% *** 0.000 
Median  -0.193% *** 0.000  -0.194% *** 0.000  0.016% *** 0.000 
PRED_OLS                        
Mean  -0.341% *** 0.000  -0.343% *** 0.000     
Median   -0.214%  *** 0.000   -0.216%  *** 0.000         
This table reports the short-term quarterly profitability forecast improvements of economy-wide model-based 
forecast model (the alternative approach by row) over analysts’ consensus forecasts (the benchmark approach by 
column). The actual earnings and analysts’ forecasts are deflated by lagged two years’ fiscal closing price (Method1). 
See the detailed definitions of the variables in the main texts. The forecast improvement (FI) is measured through a 
matched-pair comparison of the absolute forecast errors (AFE) from the two competing approaches which equals the 
AFE by using the column approach minus the AFE by using the row approach. A positive FI means the AFE from 
the benchmark approach is larger than that from the alternative approach. Both model-based forecasting approaches 
use the same forecasting steps as those in Fairfield et al (2009) but simply based on a parsimonious AR (1) model. 
Firm-specific forecasts are obtained in two steps. First, the coefficients of a forecasting model are estimated for each 
year from 1989 to 2016 on a rolling basis using data of the previous 10 years. Next, the estimated coefficients for a 
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year are applied on a firm's data of the previous year to obtain a firm-specific forecast for the current year. The mean 
and median FIs of all firm-years in the sample are reported for different profitability measures (see main texts for the 
definitions of the measures). The test on the mean FI is a regression-based t-test using robust standard errors 
controlling for two-way clustering by firm and year. The test on the median FI is the Wilcoxon signed rank test. ***, 
**, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
TABLE 3.9             
Profitability forecast improvements of economy-wide quantile regression over economy-wide OLS 
regression (Column approach forecasts versus row approach forecasts): IBES-based ROE by Method 2 
Panel B: Long-term forecasting                 
Y1 
 
Analysts' mean consensus  Analysts' median consensus  PRED_OLS 
    Value   p-Value  Value  p-Value  Value  p-Value 
PRED_QR                      
Mean  -1.211% *** 0.000  -1.210% *** 0.000  0.184% *** 0.000 
Median   -0.666% *** 0.000  -0.661% *** 0.000  0.226% *** 0.000 
PRED_OLS                      
Mean  -1.395% *** 0.000  -1.394% *** 0.000     
Median   -0.933%  *** 0.000   -0.934%  *** 0.000         
                          
Y2 
 
Analysts' mean consensus  Analysts' median consensus  PRED_OLS 
    Value   p-Value  Value  p-Value  Value  p-Value 
PRED_QR                      
Mean  0.329% *** 0.000  0.334% *** 0.000  0.207% *** 0.000 
Median   0.220% *** 0.000   0.222% *** 0.000   0.154% *** 0.000 
PRED_OLS             
Mean  0.212% *** 0.000  0.123% *** 0.000     
Median   0.093% *** 0.000   0.096% *** 0.000         
                          
Y3 
 
Analysts' mean consensus  Analysts' median consensus  PRED_OLS 
    Value   p-Value  Value  p-Value  Value  p-Value 
PRED_QR                      
Mean  1.107% *** 0.000  1.092% *** 0.000  0.133% *** 0.000 
Median   0.480% *** 0.000  0.477% *** 0.000  0.136% *** 0.000 
PRED_OLS                       
Mean  0.974% *** 0.000  0.959% *** 0.000     
Median   0.370% *** 0.000   0.366% *** 0.000         
                          
Y4 
 
Analysts' mean consensus  Analysts' median consensus  PRED_OLS 
    Value   p-Value  Value  p-Value  Value  p-Value 
PRED_QR                      
Mean  1.722% *** 0.000  1.677% *** 0.000  0.175% *** 0.000 
Median  0.710% *** 0.000  0.699% *** 0.000  0.171% *** 0.000 
PRED_OLS                         
Mean  1.547% *** 0.000  1.503% *** 0.000     
Median   0.601% *** 0.000   0.587% *** 0.000         
                          
Y5 
 
Analysts' mean consensus  Analysts' median consensus  PRED_OLS 
    Value   p-Value  Value  p-Value  Value  p-Value 
PRED_QR                      
Mean  2.333% *** 0.000  2.368% *** 0.000  0.305% *** 0.000 
Median  0.824% *** 0.000  0.834% *** 0.000   *** 0.000 
PRED_OLS                       
Mean  2.028% *** 0.000  2.063% *** 0.000  0.311%   
Median   0.615% *** 0.000   0.629% *** 0.000         
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This table reports the long-term annual profitability forecast improvements of economy-wide model-based forecast 
model (the alternative approach by row) over analysts’ consensus forecasts (the benchmark approach by column). 
The actual earnings and analysts’ forecasts are deflated by lagged two years’ fiscal closing price (Method1). See the 
detailed definitions of the variables in the main texts. The forecast improvement (FI) is measured through a matched-
pair comparison of the absolute forecast errors (AFE) from the two competing approaches which equals the AFE by 
using the column approach minus the AFE by using the row approach. A positive FI means the AFE from the 
benchmark approach is larger than that from the alternative approach. Both model-based forecasting approaches use 
the same forecasting steps as those in Fairfield et al (2009) but simply based on a parsimonious AR (1) model. Firm-
specific forecasts are obtained in two steps. First, the coefficients of a forecasting model are estimated for each year 
from 1989 to 2016 on a rolling basis using data of the previous 10 years. Next, the estimated coefficients for a year 
are applied on a firm's data of the previous year to obtain a firm-specific forecast for the current year. The mean and 
median FIs of all firm-years in the sample are reported for different profitability measures (see main texts for the 
definitions of the measures). The test on the mean FI is a regression-based t-test using robust standard errors 
controlling for two-way clustering by firm and year. The test on the median FI is the Wilcoxon signed rank test. ***, 





Prior research has examined the properties of earnings and profitability and alternative 
ways to forecast them (Brown and Ball 1967; Brooks and Buckmaster 1976; Freeman et al. 
1982; Penman 1991; Rumelt 1991; Lipe and Kormendi 1994; Fama and French 2000; Cheng 
2005; Fairfield et al. 2009; Li 2011; Li et al. 2014; Schröder and Yim 2017; Chang et al. 2016). 
Despite the variations considered, all use OLS regression to construct forecasts.  
In this study, we explore two ways to obtain more accurate point forecasts of profitability 
and assess them against the traditional approach. First, we use quantile regression to construct 
forecasts, as opposed to the prevalent method by ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. 
Second, forecasts are constructed on an industry-specific basis, as opposed to the common 
practice of constructing forecasts on an economy-wide basis. We obtain strong evidence that 
quantile regression produces more accurate points forecasts of profitability than OLS 
regression for a number of new and traditional profitability measures, whether on an economy-
wide or industry-specific basis.  
To assess the economic importance of using the more accurate profitability forecasts by 
quantile regression, we perform a hedge portfolio analysis similar to that of Li et al. (2014) to 
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link forecast accuracy with stock return predictability. A hedge portfolio is formed by sorting 
stocks according to the excess of the quantile regression forecast over its OLS counterpart, 
confining to those stocks with the quantile regression forecasts proven to be more accurate. 
The higher accuracy suggests that guidance by the quantile regression forecasts rather than by 
their OLS counterparts should be followed. Therefore, we go long the stocks with the highest 
excess and short those with the lowest. We find that, regardless of the profitability measure, 
the hedge portfolio has a significantly positive risk-adjusted return. This suggests that the 
quantile regression forecasts contain economically important information not already 
contained in their OLS counterparts.  
We contribute to the literature by examining the accuracy and usefulness of forecasting 
profitability by industry-specific quantile regression. This is found to be the most accurate 
approach, compared to its economy-wide counterpart and the industry-specific and economy-
wide OLS regression approaches. Investors can economically benefit from the information 
contained in quantile regression forecasts of profitability for a number of new and traditional 
profitability measures. Our forecasting and hedge portfolio analysis results are not sensitive to 



















Firm Diversification and Loss Reversal Probabilities: Evidence from Abandonment Options 
 
4.1. Introduction 
The percentage of U.S. firms reporting losses, as recorded on Compustat, increased from 
14% in 1979 to 47% in 2016. It is a long-established observation that losses are less persistent 
than profits because they can be avoided through abandoning loss-making assets (Hayn 1995). 
Interestingly, the proportion of firms reporting losses is much smaller for diversified firms than 
for focused firms (see Figure 4.1). Empirical studies suggest that diversified firms differ from 
focused firms: diversified firms can more easily sell their assets to raise funds (Shleifer and 
Vishny 1992, Subramaniam et al 2011), they have better credit ratings giving access to cheaper 
external funds (Lewellen 1971, Dimitrov and Tice 2006), and they have more efficient internal 
fund transfer channels (Stein 1997, Lamont 1997, Shin and Stulz 1998, Khanna and Tice 2001, 
Subramaniam et al 2011). In contrast, focused firms tend to have better investment 
opportunities and are more likely to engage in positive net present value projects (Wernerfelt 
and Montgomery 1988, Lang and Stulz 1994).  
In this chapter, we investigate the role of firm structure in explaining differences in loss 
reversal probabilities across firms, analysing the liquidation of underperforming assets, 
segments or entire firms as real options. Basic economic theory suggests that shutting down 
the business and exit from the market to stem losses is always a natural solution (Samuelson 
1948). Further explanation via the abandonment option also has a long history in the literature 
(Berger, Ofek and Swary 1994, Hayn 1995) but there is less certainty on how to define and 
quantify any such abandonment option. Inspired by Lawrence, Sloan, and Sun (2017) and their 
proxy for curtailment, we use this as a key factor to capture different managerial behaviour 
between diversified firms and focused firms when firm-level losses occur. By adding an 
abandonment option into the loss reversal model of Joos and Plesko (2005), we treat the option 
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not only as a tool to limit loss but also as part of a strategic view of firms’ loss avoidance 
behaviour.  
Our findings are threefold. First, we find that there is a difference in loss reversal 
probability between diversified firms and focused firms. The higher the diversity of the firm, 
the higher the probability of loss reversal in the following year. Second, diversified firms can 
exercise their options to liquidate unprofitable segments more efficiently to stem future losses 
than focused firms. Third, over-investment as a proxy of the agency problem dampens the 
efficiency of diversified firms in exercising their real options.  
This chapter contributes to the literature in three strands. First, our approach is based on 
Hayn’s (1995) abandonment option hypothesis that shareholders of loss firms will liquidate or 
curtail the assets of the firm if they expect the losses to continue. Several studies follow and 
test her theory by quantifying real actions in exercising the abandonment options (Pinnuck and 
Lillis 2007, Lawrence et al., 2017). We close the unsolved question posed by Pinnuck and 
Lillis on whether abandonment options result in improved performance, between diversified 
firms and focused firms in our case, by using a loss reversal model. 
Second, we extend the loss reversal probability forecasting model of Joos and Plesko (2005) 
by involving a firm’s diversity level as a key variable. Prior literature in earnings persistence 
simply pools all the firms without distinguishing between firm structure differences. Our 
analysis confirms the importance of firm structure in explaining loss reversal capability due to 
the higher efficiency of exercising the abandonment options by diversified firms.  
Our final contribution is in giving support to the firm diversification discount literature.  
Diversification has two sides to its effects on firms. On the one hand, diversified firms can 
enjoy the benefit of coinsurance from their multiple segments. Firm-level risk can be 
diversified through imperfectly-correlated segments’ business operations. Therefore, 
diversified firms can benefit from higher debt capacity and an interest tax shield (Lewellen 
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1971, Majd and Myers 1987, Hann et al., 2013). In addition, the larger internal capital market 
of the diversified firms may reduce the problem of underinvestment (Stultz 1990). Our findings 
are relevant to the diversification premium literature since diversified firms can liquidate their 
under-performing assets more efficiently than focused firms in order to achieve loss reversal. 
In addition, diversified firms can more likely sell their assets than focused firms (Subramaniam 
et al. 2011). Such loss-curtailing actions is value-enhancing as firms can use this low cost 
internal financing to invest in better profit-making projects. On the other hand, diversification 
can be costly, mainly due to the agency problem. Managers of diversified firms are more likely 
to pursue resources for personal empire-building (Jenson 1986), power grabbing (Rajan, 
Servaes, and Zingales 2000), or through weaker managerial incentives to maximize 
shareholder value (Denis, Denis, and Sarin 1997). Consequently, over-investment is more 
severe in diversified firms; discretionary investments in unprofitable projects dampen the firms’ 
performance. Our results further support the agency literature by showing that the superior 
efficiency in exercising the abandonment option by diversified firms is destroyed by agency 
problems. This is consistent with the finding that agency problems determine managers’ 
reluctance towards divestment of assets (Boot 1992, Pinnuck and Lillis 2007). 
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes our main hypotheses 
concerning loss reversal and firm diversification. Section 3 introduces the data and in Section 
4 we present our models. Section 5 presents our main results. We provide three econometric 
methodologies to solve the endogeneity problems in Section 6 and additional robustness tests 
in Section 7. Section 8 concludes. 
4.2. Hypothesis Development 
The motivation of the chapter proceeds in two stages. First, we seek to capture the 
importance of a firm’s structure in driving loss reversal probability. Second, we apply 
abandonment option theory to explain the loss reversal capability difference between 
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diversified firms and focused firms. We conduct four sets of tests. The first set seeks to 
investigate whether there is any difference of loss reversal ability between diversified firms 
and focused firms. In the second set, we use abandonment option theory to explain the loss 
reversal phenomenon. Because diversified firms hold more different business assets than 
focused firms, we expect that a firm’s diversity will lead to the exercise the abandonment 
option and probable loss reversal. Our third set of tests focus on the cost effects of a firms’ 
diversity. Since diversified firms more easily suffer agency problems, this could reduce the 
efficiency of abandonment option exercise.  In the last set of tests, to control for endogeneity, 
we present several robustness tests.  
Firms are loss-avoiding by nature (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997, Degeorge et al. 1999; 
Graham et al. 2005). They tend to report higher earnings for an implicit warranty to charge 
higher prices, for better deals from suppliers and lenders and for keeping valuable employees 
(Bowen et al., 1995). The classic theory from Hayn (1995) is related to firms’ loss avoidance 
by supposing that shareholders of loss-making firms can always liquidate the firm rather than 
suffer continuing losses. She predicts that, because of the abandonment option, loss-making 
firms have lower or insignificant earnings response coefficient (ERC) and R2 comparing to 
positively significantly profitable firms. Subsequent studies support Hayn’s conclusions that 
the abandonment option explains the weak ERC of loss firms (Berger et al. 1996, 
Subramanyam and Wild 1996). Joos and Plesko (2005) extend Hayn’s work by proposing a 
logistic model to estimate loss reversal probability using concurrent and past financial 
information. Based on the estimated probability of reversal, a firm’s loss can be grouped as 
transitory with the highest estimated probabilities of loss reversal and persistent loss with the 
lowest likelihood of loss reversal. They predict that if persistent loss indicates a high likelihood 
of abandonment, the ERC will be insignificant or lower than in the transitory loss groups. In 
other words, investors predict that persistent loss is not informative about the future 
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performance of firms since exercising the abandonment option can avoid further losses. 
Conversely, if transitory losses indicate a low likelihood of exercising the abandonment option, 
this can have a positive effect on stock returns. Li (2011) uses a similar profit forecasting model. 
Using the framework of Mishkin (1983), Li finds that investors do not fully distinguish the 
difference in persistence of loss and they tend to treat all losses as transitory. 
Building on the loss reversal model of Joos and Plesko (2005), we conduct our primary 
analysis by testing whether there is any difference in loss reversal ability between these two 
types of firms when suffering loss, giving our first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis (H1). Diversified firms and focused firms have different loss reversal probabilities 
and that difference is reflected through each firm’s diversity level. 
Our second hypothesis concerns the relation between the abandonment option and 
asymmetric loss reversal by interacting the abandonment option and a firm’s diversity. The 
existence of curtailment is difficult to capture because of the unavailability of data and relevant 
information disclosure. Prior research uses abandonment option theory to explain why losses 
are less persistent than profit (Hayn 1995, Basu 1997); however, there is no direct measure to 
identify the presence of curtailments. Pinnuck and Lillis (2007) show that divestment of a 
division can be reflected in a cut of employees. They find that a firm’s reporting of an 
accounting loss acts as a heuristic trigger for the exercise of an abandonment option. Lawrence, 
Sloan and Sun (2017) identify a curtailment as when the sales and employee numbers are both 
less than in the previous period. We borrow their method in our main analysis and in the 
robustness analysis we use two additional methods to support our findings. 
Diversified firms have different business segments while focused firms are only in one line 
of business activity. Therefore, diversified firms hold a selection of abandonment options 
through different segments with imperfectly correlated cash flows. When a loss occurs, they 
can liquidate unprofitable business segments and keep the other businesses operating normally. 
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Conversely, focused firms hold only one abandonment option for their single type of business. 
Thus, focused firms are unlikely to abandon their business easily, since exercising that option 
means shutting down the firm forever. If focused firms determine upon entering a new business, 
it is difficult to make profits in the short run. Even though part of the loss-making assets can 
be liquidated, the normal operating business activities can still be damaged severely. Therefore, 
we hypothesise the following: 
Hypothesis 2.1 (H2.1). Among loss firms, diversified firms have a higher frequency of 
exercising the abandonment option than focused firms. 
Hypothesis 2.2 (H2.2). Diversified firms have a higher probability of having losses reversed 
by exercising their abandonment options. 
There is a trade-off in exercising abandonment options for loss-making firms. The benefit 
of liquidating unprofitable assets or segments is the curtailment of loss and pursuit of profit.  
Firms are profit-seeking not only because those with consistent profits can build their 
reputations but also because profitable firms can access external funding at lower cost. 
However, exercising the abandonment option is irreversible and, importantly, it is part of the 
firm’s strategic plan as determined by its managerial decisions. The agency problem is value-
destroying for the firms (Jensen 1986, Stulz 1990) because managers derive private benefits 
from diversification which is more than their private costs (Denis, Denis and Sarin 1997). In 
other words, managers may maintain an under-performing diversification strategy even though 
doing so reduces the benefit to shareholders. Boot (1992) shows that managers may choose to 
avoid a value-maximizing divestiture because doing so may adversely affect perceptions of 
their abilities and reputations. In addition, Chen and Rey (2012) suggest that cross-
subsidization arises when a firm is engaged with high market power in some markets and can 
use their more protected revenue to finance losses in a competitive market, known as its “deep 
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pocket”. Thus, diversified firms are more likely to finance loss-making segments from their 
cash rich segments instead of exercising the abandonment options. 
We are interested in how such agency problems influence the efficiency of exercising the 
abandonment options. We use over-investment as a proxy for the agency problem since it is a 
potential source of value loss from diversification. We measure a firm’s overinvestment as 
whether Tobin’s Q is below the industry’s median (Berger and Ofek 1995, Subramaniam, Tang, 
Yue, and Zhou 2011). Jensen (1986, 1993) points out that managers tend to engage in 
overinvestment out of free cash flow. Scharfstein and Stein (2000) find that less profitable 
divisions tend to be subsidized by segments with high profitability through the diversified firms’ 
internal capital market. Firms may be reluctant to abandon under-performing business 
segments because doing so can be harmful to a manager’s reputation and business competence 
(Jensen 1986, Boot 1992). We expect that diversified firms suffers severer agency problems 
than focused firms. If such agency problems exist, the headquarters (CEO) of diversified firms 
can play with more resources from the conglomerates or misallocate more resources to the 
underperforming segments rather than curtailing these segments or delay abandoning them 
until after the optimal time. Therefore, we propose the following: 
Hypothesis 3 (H3). The efficiency of diversified firms, when they are engaged in over-
investment, is dampened severely which makes it harder for focused firms to get loss reversal 
through the abandonment option. 
4.3. Data and Sample Selection  
We collect data from three sources via Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). The firm 
level and business segment data are obtained from Compustat North America annual 
fundamentals file and segment files. Stock returns data used in portfolio constructions come 
from the Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) monthly stock file. We sample for the 
loss reversal model from 1979 to 2016. Firms were required to report segment information 
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after December 15, 1977 by Statement of Financial Accounting Standard (SFAS) No.14. Since 
our empirical test involves sales growth forecasting requiring past five-years sales data to 
construct curtailment option, we use firm level data for forecasting as early as 1974. 
We exclude financial firms (SIC from 600 to 6799) from our sample. Segment data are 
merged with firm level data to construct our matched samples. We remove any mismatched 
observations which have summation of segment sales (segment asset) more than 101% or less 
than 99% (more than 125% or less than 75%) of the firm’s total sales (total assets). A detailed 
description of our variables is provided in Table 4.1. For all the balance sheet data constructing 
accruals, we replace the missing values with zero following Ball et al. (2016). For all our 









Table 4.1   
Variable definitions 
Variable name Description Computation / WRDS mnemonic 
(USD million)   
IB Income before extraordinary items  IB 
TA Total assets AT 
NI Net income NI 
DIVD Total dividend  DIV 
SALES Sales/Turnover (net) SALE 
ROA Return on asset Income before extraordinary item (IB) scaled by Total assets (AT) lagged by one year 
MV Market value of firm Price_Fiscal Year_Close (PRCC_F) * Common shares outstanding (CSHO) 
SIZE Firm size Log of MV 
SPI Special items Special items (SPI) scaled by Total asset (AT) lagged by one year 
PAST_ROA Average return on asset in the past five years [ROA(t-1) + ROA(t-2) +……+ ROA(t-5)]/5 
LEVERAGE Leverage level  
[Long- term debt (DLTT) + Current liabilities (LCT)] / [Long-term debt (DLTT) + Current 
liabilities (LCT) + Market value (MV)] 
T_Q Tobin's Q Market value (MV) / Total assets (TA) lagged by one year 
GSL Growth in sales (SALESt - SALESt–1)/ SALESt–1 
HERF(TA) Herfindahl index by total asset  
 
 
HERF(SALE) Herfindahl index by sales 
DIVERSITY_D Diversity dummy variable Equal to one if firm has more than one business segments, zero otherwise 
FIRST_LOSS First loss dummy variable 
Equal to one if current year is not the first year of loss (ie., last year was profitable), zero 
otherwise 
LOSS_SEQ Loss sequence The number of loss sequence in the past five years 
DIVDUM Dividend paying dummy variable Equal to one if paying dividend in the current loss year, zero otherwise 
SIC2_MED_T_Q 
Median Tobin's Q in yearly basis by 2-digit 
Standard Industry Classification 
Median Tobin's Q by year and 2-digit Standard Industry Classification 
AB_D Abandonment option activities dummy variable 
Equal to one if both sales and number of employees decrease compared to previous year, zero 
otherwise 
† If the data items for preferred stock, long-term debt, debt in current liabilities, minority interest and cash and short-term investments are not available, they are assumed to 
equal zero. 
‡ If the data items from balance sheet accounts are not available, they are assumed to equal zero. 
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4.4. The earnings forecast model for loss firms 
Building on the models of Joos and Plesko (2005) and Li (2011), we develop our annual 
earnings forecast models for loss firms in the following two specifications: 
𝑦𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝐴𝑆𝑇_𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑆𝑇𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆_𝑆𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑆𝑃𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑡
+ 𝛽11𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑋𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑇_𝑄𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐶𝑅𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡+1                                          (1) 
where our dependent variable 𝑦𝑡+1 is 𝑅𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐴𝐿𝑡+1. 𝑅𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐴𝐿𝑡+1 is an indicator that is 
one if the loss firm becomes profitable in the next year and zero otherwise. 𝑃𝐴𝑆𝑇_𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑡 is 
defined as the average of past five-year 𝑅𝑂𝐴.  𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑡 is the firm’s profitability measurement 
using return on asset (𝑅𝑂𝐴). It is defined as annual income before extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations (annual Compustat item #18) deflated by lagged total asset (annual 
Compustat item #6).   𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 is the logarithm of market value of equity (annual Compustat data 
item#199*annual Compustat data item#25). 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑡 is the percentage growth in sales over 
year t; 𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑆𝑇𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑡 is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the current loss is the first in 
a sequence and zero otherwise; 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆_𝑆𝐸𝑄𝑡 is the number of sequential annual loss over the 
past five years; 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡 
7is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the firm pays dividend 
in the current year and zero otherwise; 𝑆𝑃𝐼𝑡 
8 is special items scaled by lagged total asset. 
To distinguish loss reversal probability between diversified firms and focused firms, we 
include variable 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑅 which represents a firm’s diversity level. We use three ways to define 
𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑅. First, we use a dummy variable 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑇𝑌_𝐷 equal to one if the firm has more than 
one business segment and zero otherwise. The dummy variable captures the aggregation 
difference between one-segment firms and multiple-segment firms. The second and third 
measurement focuses on the level of firms’ segments diversity level and we are using 
                                                 
7 Firms that pay dividends tend to be more profitable than firms not paying dividends (Fama and French 1999) 
8 We include the special item which is used in Li’s (2011) forecasting model since a special item is transitory 
which results in losses being likewise transitory. 
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𝐻𝐸𝑅𝐹_𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇 and 𝐻𝐸𝑅𝐹_𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆 which are Herfindahl index by asset and sales. The 
Herfindahl index is calculated across N segment for each firm j as the sum of the squares of 
each segment i’s total asset (sales) as a proportion of the firm level total asset (sales): 






)                                     (2) 
where 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the segment level asset (sales) and 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the firm level total assets (sales). The 
asset (sales) based Herfindahl index reflects the degree to which total assets (sales) are 
diversified across firm’s business segments with a range between zero to one. Focused firm 
has a Herfindahl index of one while the higher the firm diversifies, the lower the Herfindahl 
index is.  
We construct our abandonment option following Lawrence et al., (2017). We define the 
firm’s exercise abandonment option if both sales and the number of employees decrease 
compared to the previous period. We use the dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm exercises 
the abandonment option and 0 otherwise. 
𝐴𝐵_𝐷𝑡+1 = 1    𝑖𝑓 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡+1 < 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑡+1 < 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑡; 0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒.    (3) 
To further control for firm difference between diversified firms and focused firms, we 
include several control variables: leverage ratio, Tobin’s Q, investment and credit rating. First, 
leverage ratio (𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑡) is defined as total debt over total assets. Firms with high leverage 
ratio are likely to reduce their debt-financing costs by increasing the level of income-increasing 
accruals (Lim, Thong, and Ding 2008). Therefore, we control leverage ratio for any potential 
loss reversal due to earnings manipulation. Second,  𝑇_𝑄𝑡 is defined as market value of firm 
divided by the book value of total assets. Focused firms tend to have better investment 
opportunity due to more growth options (Wernerfelt and Montgomery 1988, Lang and Stulz 
1994, Berger and Ofek 1995, Servaes 1996, and Thomas 2002, Chen 2006). We use Tobin’s 
Q to control for differences in inefficient investment caused by firm characteristics. Third, 
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𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑋𝑡 is defined as the capital expenditure scaled by total asset. Focused firms have higher 
investment size comparing to diversified firms, as is widely documented in the literature (Denis, 
Denis, and Sarin 1997, Chen 2006). Fourth, we control for a financial constraint effect by using 
credit rating 𝐶𝑅𝑡  from Compustat. Firms with higher credit rating are much more easily 
financed through cheaper external funds than are lower credit rating firms. Following Almeida 
et al. (2004) we use 𝐶𝑅𝑡 to define firms with a credit rating during sample periods as financially 
unconstrained firms while firms are financially constrained if they have no credit rating during 
the sample period.  
Building on model (1), we add both dummy 𝐴𝐵_𝐷𝑡+1 and interactive variable 
𝐴𝐵_𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑡+1 = 𝐴𝐵_𝐷𝑡+1 ∗ 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑡  to capture the difference between diversified firms and 
focused firms in exercising abandonment option when suffering loss. 
𝑦𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝐴𝑆𝑇_𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑆𝑇𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆_𝑆𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑆𝑃𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑡
+ 𝛽11𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑋𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑇_𝑄𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐶𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽14𝐴𝐵_𝐷𝑡+1 + 𝛽15𝐴𝐵_𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑡+1




We first present the prevalence of firms’ reporting losses, followed by descriptive statistics. 
In our main analysis, we show the relation between firm diversification and loss reversal 
profitability using the full sample. Then we introduce our abandonment option analysis in 
explaining the loss reversal difference in firm diversification. We next investigate the condition 
when firms are likely to exercise their abandonment option by dividing our sample into groups, 
according to whether the firm is suffering over-investment due to the higher agency problem 
 75 
of diversified firms comparing to the focused firms. Finally, we employ four econometric 
methods to control for endogeneity. 
4.5.1 The prevalence of reporting loss by firm types 
Figure 4.1 plots the percentage of U.S. firms from COMPUSTAT reporting annual losses 
from 1979 to 2016 by firm diversification. Overall, focused firms have a higher percentage of 
firms reporting losses than for the diversified firms. Both types of firm show similar trends of 
reporting losses through the full period. There is an increase of firms reporting losses from 9% 
for focused firms and 17% for diversified firms to the peak of 58% for focused firms and 38% 
for diversified firms in 2002. The percentage of loss reporting for both types of firms decreases 
until the reversion of the trend in 2007. This is consistent with the evidence presented by Li 
(2011) for firms overall. The percentage of loss reporting peaks in 2009. The two sharp 

















Figure 4.1       
 
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
Figure 4.1 is based on data collected from Compustat over a period from 1979 to 2016. By distinguishing the 
firm's diversification, the figure demonstrates the percentage of firms reporting losses in each year. We define 
losses as income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations (annual Compustat data item #18). 
Firms with more than one segments are defined as diversified firms while focused firms are firms with only one 
segment. 
 
Loss reversal is when firms become profitable after a previous year’s losses. Figure 4.2 
plots the percentage of loss reversal occurrence by firm’s diversification. The percentage of 
loss reversal occurrence by each firm type is calculated from the number of firms that are loss-
making in the current year and become profitable in the next year, divided by the total number 
of loss making firms in the current year. Both types of firm show a downward trend from 1979 
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to 2016. Overall, diversified firms have higher percentage of loss reversal occurrence than 
focused firms. 
 
Figure 4.2       
 
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
Figure 4.2 is based on data collected from Compustat over the period 1979 to 2016. By distinguishing the firm's 
structure, the figure demonstrates the loss reversal occurrence in each year. We define losses as income before 
extraordinary items and discontinued operations (annual Compustat data item #18). Firms with more than one 
segments are defined as diversified firms while focused firms are firms with only one segment. Loss reversal is 




4.5.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 4.2 Panel A reports loss observations by firm type. We have 29290 focused firm-
years and 9254 diversified firm-years. We summarize the control variables statistical 
description used in our main regression as follows. First, diversified firms have median (mean) 
size of 4.16 (4) in logarithm which is higher than the size of focused firms, whose median 
(mean) is 3.53 (3.43). Tobin’s Q for focused firm is two times as high as for diversified firms. 
Capital expenditure to total asset are similar for diversified firms and focused firms. Diversified 
firms have higher leverage than focused firms (0.54 vs. 0.4) which is consistent with the prior 
finding that diversified firms have higher debt capacity due to the uncorrelated cash flows from 
different segments. Credit rating for diversified firm is better than for focused firms. Thus, it 
is necessary for us to include those variables to control any difference between diversified firms 
and focused firms.  
 
Table 4.2          
Data descriptive by the firm type               
 Focused firm  Diversified firm 
 Obs. Mean SD Median  Obs. Mean SD Median 
ROA 29290 -0.238 0.370 -0.118  9254 -0.125 0.237 -0.055 
PAST_ROA 29290 -0.179 0.386 -0.046  9254 -0.049 0.232 0.008 
SIZE 29290 3.533 1.992 3.429  9254 4.164 2.173 4.029 
SALESG 29290 0.101 0.686 -0.015  9254 0.062 0.536 -0.014 
FIRSTLOSS 29290 0.311 0.463 0.000  9254 0.450 0.498 0.000 
LOSS_SEQ 29290 2.224 2.045 2.000  9254 1.431 1.757 1.000 
DIVDUM 29290 0.224 0.417 0.000  9254 0.399 0.490 0.000 
SPECIAL_ITEM 29290 -0.033 0.074 0.000  9254 -0.038 0.071 -0.008 
LEVERAGE 29290 0.403 0.274 0.372  9254 0.540 0.244 0.566 
CAPX 29290 0.055 0.084 0.027  9254 0.056 0.077 0.033 
CREDIT 29290 0.393 0.488 0.000  9254 0.515 0.500 1.000 
TOBIN'S Q 29290 1.813 3.648 0.675  9254 0.871 2.142 0.388 
AB_D 29290 0.398 0.490 0.000  9254 0.465 0.499 0.000 
This table summarizes the variables data descriptive used in our regression analysis. Variable 
definitions are provided in the notes to Table 4.1. Diversified firm is defined as the firms with 
multiple business segments while focused firms operate only one business. 
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4.5.3 Loss reversal and firm’s structure 
Table 4.3 reports the results of the logit regression model of Eq.1. Coefficients of most 
predictors inherited from Joos and Plesko (2005) and Li (2011) are consistent with their 
findings. Firms with higher current profitability, firms with shorter loss sequence, dividend-
paying firms and firms with lower special items tend to have a higher probability of having a 
loss reversed in the next year. After introducing firm diversity related variables, the coefficient 
of firm size, first loss dummy variable and sales growth become insignificant. Loss sequences 
are negatively significant confirming that firms suffering shorter periods of loss are more likely 
to have losses reversed than for longer periods. The coefficients of the dividend payment 
dummy variable and the special items are all significant, consistent with Joos and Plesko (2005). 
Our new control variable credit rating is also positively significant, indicating that the higher 
the credit rating the higher the possibility to gain external funding to finance positive net 
present value projects and, as a result, higher possibility of achieving profits in the next period. 
Our key variables are the firm’s diversity related variables. Regression results (1) to (3) 
include the three versions of firm diversity. In equation (1), we include dummy variable equal 
to 1 if firms have more than one business segment and 0 otherwise. The coefficient is not 
significant, suggesting that there is no difference in the probability of reversal between 
diversified firms and focused firms. The marginal effects of firm diversification on the 
probability of loss reversal is 1.2% and significant at 90% level. One explanation of the 
insignificant coefficients of the firm diversification dummy variable is that firms with few 
segments (e.g. two segments) or multiple segments but running similar business lines (related 
diversifications) are close to the focused firms. Simply using a dummy variable to capture the 
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aggregate difference may not be effective.9 Therefore, we use a Herfindahl Index to capture 
the firm’s diversity through firm asset and sales in equation (2) and (3). This index can reflect 
the correlation between business segments of the diversified firms. The index has a range from 
0 to 1 and the higher the index, the lower the firm’s diversity level. Particularly, the index value 
equals 1 for focused firms. As expected from Hypothesis 1, we find negative and significant 
coefficients of both Herfindahl Index variables suggesting that the higher the degree of firm’s 
diversification, the higher probability of having a loss reversed in the following year. The 
marginal effect shows a consistent sign to further confirm the relation. The results suggest that 
the loss reversal difference between diversified firms and focused firms is not simply a fact of 
the difference in firm structure, but rather a matter of the diversity level of the firms’ business 
segments. Building on these findings, we proceed to our main analysis of how firm structure 
affects the efficiency of exercising the abandonment option in the next section.  
                                                 
9 We therefore use an alternative measure of diversification dummy which equals 1 if all the segments are 
operating in the same industry and 0 otherwise. We find this dummy variable is positive and significant which 
suggests that diversified firms have a higher probability of loss reversal than focused firms. As this alternative 
measure of diversity is consistent with the Herfindahl Index we used in the Regression (2) and (3), we drop this 
measure in the remaining tests. 
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Table 4.3             
Loss reversal probability and firm structure: logistic model              
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value 
 Coef. Std. Err. p-value  
INTERCEPT -0.247 0.072 0.001 *** -0.043 0.103 0.675  -0.006 0.104 0.956 
 
ROA 4.516 0.251 0.000 *** 4.502 0.250 0.000 *** 4.501 0.250 0.000 *** 
PAST_ROA 0.162 0.093 0.081 * 0.162 0.093 0.082 * 0.162 0.093 0.083 * 
SIZE -0.003 0.008 0.701  -0.006 0.008 0.510  -0.006 0.008 0.461  
SALESGROWTH 0.042 0.030 0.170  0.042 0.030 0.170  0.042 0.030 0.169  
FIRSTLOSS -0.005 0.046 0.909  -0.006 0.046 0.899  -0.006 0.046 0.897  
LOSS_SEQ -0.140 0.015 0.000 *** -0.139 0.015 0.000 *** -0.139 0.015 0.000 *** 
DIVDUM 0.159 0.035 0.000 *** 0.151 0.035 0.000 *** 0.150 0.035 0.000 *** 
LEVERAGE -0.092 0.068 0.177  -0.110 0.068 0.106  -0.113 0.068 0.097 * 
T_Q 0.013 0.009 0.161  0.013 0.009 0.157  0.013 0.009 0.151  
CAPX -0.323 0.204 0.114  -0.302 0.204 0.139  -0.302 0.204 0.139  
SPECIAL_ITEM -5.654 0.300 0.000 *** -5.646 0.300 0.000 *** -5.646 0.300 0.000 *** 
CREDIT_RATING 0.205 0.031 0.000 *** 0.203 0.031 0.000 *** 0.202 0.031 0.000  
DIVERSITY_D 0.033 0.035 0.347      
   
 
HERF_ASSET     -0.198 0.074 0.008 ***     
HERF_SALES         -0.229 0.075 0.002 *** 
             
Diversity marginal effect 0.012 0.006 0.055 * -0.05 0.013 0.000 *** -0.052 0.014 0.000 *** 
This table presents the results of loss reversal probability using the annual estimation of logistic regression. Dependent variable is loss reversal which takes value of 1 if firms 
becomes profitable in the next year, and 0 otherwise. Variable definitions are provided in the notes to Table 4.1. Three measures of diversification are used. In regression (1), 
diversification is dummy variable equals one if a firm has more than one segments and zero otherwise. In regression (2) and (3), diversification is calculated as Herfindahl 
Index based on asset and sales. Reported coefficients are the average coefficients over the estimation period from 1980 to 2016. The number of observation is 39362. Standard 
errors are clustered by firm and fiscal year. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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4.5.4 Loss reversal and abandonment option 
Table 4.4 presents the main analysis of our loss reversal model using the abandonment 
option. We follow Lawrence, Sloan and Sun (2017) in their measure of abandonment option 
dummy variable which equals 1 if both sales and number of employees decrease compared to 
the previous year. In Panel A, we present a descriptive statistical analysis to show the difference 
in frequency of exercising the abonnement option partitioned by firm structure. Consistent with 
our expectation in Hypothesis 2.1, we find that diversified firms have a significantly higher 
frequency of exercising the abandonment option than focused firms. For example, 39% of loss-
making diversified firms have a positive abandonment option indicator compared with 33% of 
loss-making focused firms. 
To compare the efficiency of exercising the abandonment option between diversified firms 
and focused firms (Hypothesis 2.2), we generate the interaction term of diversity variable and 
the abandonment option variable. In Table 4.4 Panel B, the results from regression (1) show 
significantly positive coefficients (0.23) of the interaction term, which suggests that diversified 
firms have higher probability of loss reversal using the abandonment option compared to the 
focused firms. The marginal effect noted in the table refers to the marginal effect of firm 
diversification when they exercise the abandonment option (AB_D=1). Holding other variables 
at their mean values, the predicted probability of loss reversal is 3.8% higher for diversified 
firms than focused firms when they both exercise the abandonment options. Similarly, using 
the Herfindahl diversity index in regression (2) and (3) we find consistent results (significant 
and negative coefficients of the interaction terms of -0.56 and -0.54) which means the higher 
the level of diversity the higher possibility that the firms to gain loss reversal through exercising 
abandonment options. The marginal effect at means of the Herfindahl index based interaction 





Table 4.4               
Loss reversal and firm structure 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for abandonment option variables by the firm structure 
  Diversified firms   Focused firms               
Variable N Mean Median  N Mean Median  Diff. in mean p-value  Diff. in median p-value                 
EMP_DEC 9254 0.609 1.000  29290 0.528 1.000  0.081 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 ***                
SALE_DEC 9254 0.485 0.000  29290 0.462 0.000  0.024 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 ***                
AB_D 9254 0.390 0.000   29290 0.333 0.000   0.057 0.000 ***  0.000 0.000  *** 
This table presents the statistical differences in means and medians for the abandonment options among loss firms by firm structure. Firms with more than one segment 
is defined as diversified firms and focused firms otherwise.  EMP_DEC is 1 if the number of employees is lower than the previous year and 0 otherwise. SALE_DEC is 
1 if sale is lower than previous year and 0 otherwise. AB_D (abandonment option) is dummy variable equals one if both sales and number of employees decrease 
comparing to the previous year, and zero otherwise. We use two-sided t-tests to obtain the differences in means between diversified and focused firms. We use Wilcoxon 











Table 4.4             
Loss reversal and firm structure                     
Panel B: Full logistic regression model                      
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  
INTERCEPT 0.063 0.075 0.405  0.175 0.117 0.135  0.210 0.117 0.072 * 
ROA 4.330 0.253 0.000 *** 4.316 0.252 0.000 *** 4.316 0.252 0.000 *** 
PAST_ROA 0.229 0.096 0.017 ** 0.229 0.096 0.018 ** 0.228 0.096 0.018 ** 
SIZE -0.016 0.009 0.059 * -0.019 0.009 0.027 ** -0.020 0.009 0.024 ** 
SALESGROWTH -0.002 0.033 0.942  -0.002 0.033 0.943  -0.002 0.033 0.944  
FIRSTLOSS -0.014 0.047 0.761  -0.016 0.047 0.737  -0.016 0.047 0.736  
LOSS_SEQ -0.157 0.015 0.000 *** -0.156 0.015 0.000 *** -0.156 0.015 0.000 *** 
DIVDUM 0.169 0.036 0.000 *** 0.160 0.036 0.000 *** 0.159 0.036 0.000 *** 
LEVERAGE 0.192 0.072 0.008 *** 0.173 0.072 0.016 ** 0.172 0.072 0.017 ** 
T_Q 0.003 0.010 0.771  0.003 0.010 0.765  0.003 0.010 0.750  
CAPX -0.785 0.214 0.000 *** -0.761 0.213 0.000 *** -0.761 0.213 0.000 *** 
SPECIAL_ITEM -6.314 0.315 0.000 *** -6.313 0.315 0.000 *** -6.313 0.315 0.000 *** 
CREDIT_RATING 0.232 0.032 0.000 *** 0.230 0.032 0.000 *** 0.229 0.032 0.000 *** 
DIVERSITY_D -0.009 0.044 0.845  
   
 
   
 
HERF_ASSET     -0.097 0.093 0.297  
   
 
HERF_SALES     
   
 -0.127 0.093 0.173  
AB_D -1.235 0.043 0.000 *** -0.678 0.139 0.000 *** -0.697 0.140 0.000 *** 
AB_D*DIVERSITY_D 0.234 0.075 0.002 ***     
   
 
AB_D*HERF_ASSET     -0.564 0.156 0.000 *** 
   
 
AB_D*HERF_SALES     
   
 -0.540 0.157 0.001 *** 
             
Diversified &AB_D=1 marginal effect 0.038 0.009 0.000 *** -0.105 0.017 0.000 *** -0.100 0.017 0.000 *** 
This table presents the results of loss reversal probability using the annual estimation of logistic regression. Dependent variable is loss reversal which takes value of 1 if firms 
becomes profitable in the next year, and 0 otherwise. Variable definitions are provided in the notes to Table 4.1. Three measures of diversification are used. In regression (1), 
diversification is dummy variable equals one if a firm has more than one segments and zero otherwise. In regression (2) and (3), diversification is calculated as Herfindahl 
Index based on asset and sales. AB_D (abandonment option) is dummy variable equals one if both sales and number of employees decrease comparing to the previous year, 
and zero otherwise. Reported coefficients are the average coefficients over the estimation period from 1980 to 2016. The number of observation is 38543. Standard errors are 
clustered by firm and fiscal year. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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4.5.5 Over-investment and abandonment option 
Diversified firms suffer more serious agency problems than focused firms. Managers may 
transfer resources from the profitable segments to the under-performing segments rather than 
abandoning those segments. We include a measure of the agency problem on the over-
investment in diversified firms. In the situation of over-investment, we predict a lower 
difference or no difference in loss reversal probability through the abandonment option 
between diversified firms and focused firms (Hypothesis 3). We use the level of Tobin’s Q as 
a proxy for over-investment. If a firm’s Tobin’s Q is lower than the median Tobin’s Q in the 
same industry, this firm’s asset generates less value than the industry which means the firms 
may engage in over-investments. We divide our sample into two groups by whether the firm’s 
Tobin’s Q is above or below the median industry Tobin’s Q. 
We estimate our regression by two groups and the results are reported in Table 4.5. For the 
firms engaging over-investment, we find that the coefficients of diversity-abandonment option 
interactive term (regression results (1), (2) and (3) in Table 4.5 A) are all insignificant. 
Although the marginal effects for Herfindahl Index diversity variable is significant at 95% 
level, both effects are much smaller than the marginal effect in the group with no over-
investment problems (Table4.5B). These results suggest that when firms are engaging in over-
investment, diversified firms cannot effectively liquidate their unprofitable assets to have 
losses reversed when compared to focused firms. In other words, when firms are suffering from 
agency problems, there is no difference in the firms’ structure in terms of the efficiency of 
exercising the abandonment options since managers from either diversified firms or focused 
firms are reluctant to exercise the abandonment options. 
In Table 4.5 B, we find that, in the group of firms not suffering from the over-investment 
problem, the coefficient and marginal effect of the interaction term of diversity and 
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abandonment option is significantly positive in the diversity dummy version regression in 
regression (1) and negatively significant in regression (2) and (3). These results confirm the 

















Table 4.5             
Loss reversal and firm structure: logistic model and agency problem        
Panel A: Loss reversal and firm structure under over-investment             
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  
INTERCEPT -0.002 0.130 0.990  -0.014 0.178 0.938  0.055 0.177 0.758  
ROA 5.476 0.394 0.000 *** 5.447 0.394 0.000 *** 5.440 0.393 0.000 *** 
PAST_ROA 0.407 0.163 0.013 ** 0.403 0.163 0.013 ** 0.401 0.163 0.014 ** 
SIZE -0.042 0.013 0.001 *** -0.046 0.013 0.000 *** -0.046 0.013 0.000 *** 
SALESGROWTH -0.038 0.055 0.494  -0.039 0.055 0.485  -0.039 0.055 0.482  
FIRSTLOSS 0.030 0.066 0.644  0.028 0.066 0.669  0.028 0.066 0.670  
LOSS_SEQ -0.145 0.021 0.000 *** -0.145 0.021 0.000 *** -0.145 0.021 0.000 *** 
DIVDUM 0.137 0.052 0.008 *** 0.129 0.052 0.012 ** 0.127 0.052 0.014 ** 
LEVERAGE 0.373 0.134 0.005 *** 0.357 0.134 0.008 *** 0.354 0.134 0.008 *** 
T_Q 0.241 0.087 0.006 *** 0.244 0.087 0.005 *** 0.246 0.087 0.005 *** 
CAPX -1.504 0.428 0.000 *** -1.472 0.427 0.001 *** -1.467 0.426 0.001 *** 
SPECIAL_ITEM -7.230 0.487 0.000 *** -7.220 0.487 0.000 *** -7.218 0.486 0.000 *** 
CREDIT_RATING 0.218 0.045 0.000 *** 0.217 0.045 0.000 *** 0.216 0.045 0.000 *** 
DIVERSITY_D -0.070 0.062 0.257  
   
 
   
 
HERF_ASSET     0.024 0.131 0.855  
   
 
HERF_SALES     
   
 -0.044 0.131 0.738  
AB_D -1.122 0.058 0.000 *** -0.743 0.184 0.000 *** -0.789 0.186 0.000 *** 
AB_D*DIVERSITY_D 0.148 0.101 0.142      
   
 
AB_D*HERF_ASSET     -0.389 0.207 0.061 * 
   
 
AB_D*HERF_SALES     
   
 -0.335 0.209 0.110  
             
Diversified & AB_D=1 0.012 0.012 0.37  -0.058 0.024 0.018 ** -0.051 0.025 0.044 ** 
 marginal effects             
This table presents the results of loss reversal probability with agency problems using the annual estimation of logistic regression. Over-investment is used as the 
proxy of agency problem which is defined as if the firm's Tobin's Q is below the Industry median in annual basis. Dependent variable is loss reversal which takes 
value of 1 if firms becomes profitable in the next year, and 0 otherwise. Variable definitions are provided in the notes to Table 4.1. Three measures of diversification 
are used. In regression (1), diversification is dummy variable equals one if a firm has more than one segments and zero otherwise. In regression (2) and (3), 
diversification is calculated as Herfindahl Index based on asset and sales. AB_D (abandonment option) is dummy variable equals one if both sales and number of 
employees decrease comparing to the previous year, and zero otherwise. Reported coefficients are the average coefficients over the estimation period from 1980 to 
2016.  The number of observation is 18293. Standard errors are clustered by firm and fiscal year. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 




Table 4.5             
Loss reversal and firm structure: logistic model and agency problem      
Panel B: Loss reversal and firm structure under no over-investment           
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  
INTERCEPT -0.063 0.103 0.541  0.139 0.167 0.405  0.151 0.168 0.368  
ROA 3.758 0.307 0.000 *** 3.751 0.306 0.000 *** 3.751 0.307 0.000 *** 
PAST_ROA 0.167 0.122 0.169  0.170 0.122 0.163  0.169 0.122 0.166  
SIZE -0.005 0.012 0.672  -0.008 0.012 0.525  -0.008 0.012 0.511  
SALESGROWTH -0.018 0.042 0.676  -0.017 0.042 0.684  -0.017 0.042 0.687  
FIRSTLOSS -0.095 0.069 0.167  -0.096 0.069 0.163  -0.096 0.069 0.161  
LOSS_SEQ -0.166 0.021 0.000 *** -0.165 0.021 0.000 *** -0.166 0.021 0.000 *** 
DIVDUM 0.190 0.051 0.000 *** 0.178 0.051 0.001 *** 0.180 0.051 0.000 *** 
LEVERAGE 0.556 0.121 0.000 *** 0.538 0.121 0.000 *** 0.540 0.120 0.000 *** 
T_Q -0.007 0.011 0.532  -0.007 0.011 0.537  -0.007 0.011 0.545  
CAPX -0.716 0.254 0.005 *** -0.696 0.254 0.006 *** -0.698 0.254 0.006 *** 
SPECIAL_ITEM -6.111 0.412 0.000 *** -6.108 0.412 0.000 *** -6.105 0.412 0.000 *** 
CREDIT_RATING 0.241 0.046 0.000 *** 0.237 0.046 0.000 *** 0.236 0.046 0.000 *** 
DIVERSITY_D 0.038 0.062 0.535  
   
 
   
 
HERF_ASSET    -0.193 0.135 0.153  
   
 
HERF_SALES     
   
 -0.197 0.136 0.147  
AB_D -1.374 0.067 0.000 *** -0.519 0.217 0.017 ** -0.511 0.220 0.021 ** 
AB_D*DIVERSITY_D 0.381 0.116 0.001 ***     
   
 
AB_D*HERF_ASSET    -0.854 0.243 0.000 *** 
   
 
AB_D*HERF_SALES    
   
 -0.860 0.246 0.000 *** 
            
Diversified &AB_D=1            
Marginal effects                                                   0.072 0.014 0.000 *** -0.191 0.008 0.000 *** -0.191 0.008 0.000 *** 
This table presents the results of loss reversal probability with no potential agency problems using the annual estimation of logistic regression. Over-
investment is used as the proxy of agency problem which is defined as if the firm's Tobin's Q is below the Industry median in annual basis. Dependent 
variable is loss reversal which takes value of 1 if firms becomes profitable in the next year, and 0 otherwise. Variable definitions are provided in the notes 
to Table 4.1. Three measures of diversification are used. In regression (1), diversification is dummy variable equals one if a firm has more than one segments 
and zero otherwise. In regression (2) and (3), diversification is calculated as Herfindahl Index based on asset and sales. AB_D (abandonment option) is 
dummy variable equals one if both sales and number of employees decrease comparing to the previous year, and zero otherwise.  The number of observation 
is 20249. Reported coefficients are the average coefficients over the estimation period from 1980 to 2016. Standard errors are clustered by firm and fiscal 
year. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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4.6. Endogeneity in firm diversification 
Firm diversification can be an endogenous choice by a firm (Campa and Kedia 2002, 
Graham et al., 2002). In this section, we introduce three econometric methods to control for 
endogeneity in our regression tests which are propensity score matching method, Heckman 
(1979) two-stage estimation and two-way fixed effect model. Each econometric method solves 
the endogeneity problem from a different perspective.  
4.6.1 Propensity-score matching 
We use propensity score matching model to control for sample selection bias due to 
observable characteristics. As noted earlier in this thesis, Roberts and Whited (2012) comment 
that propensity score matching is the most commonly used methodology to address 
endogeneity concerns due to its simplicity. Based on the one-equation system, the key benefit 
of using the matched sample for the regression analysis is that it avoids specification of the 
function Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang (2014). While the disadvantage is the that the 
potential outcomes are taken as independent of the treatment assignment is untestable. 
Therefore, we use propensity score matching as a robust test to control for the difference of 
loss reversal probabilities accompanying firm diversification. The propensity score match 
method conducts two stages to estimate the average treatment effect for the treated group 
(ATT). We define the treatment indicator equals 1 firm diversified firms and 0 for focused 
firms. The outcome variable is the loss reversal dummy equal 1 if loss firms becomes profitable 
in the next year and 0 otherwise. In the first stage, we predict the probability of diversifying by 
using a logit regression, where the dependent variable takes value of 1 for diversified firms and 
0 for focused firms. We use all the control variables that we use in our main regression as the 
independent variables in the logit regression. In the second step, based on the propensity scores 
obtained from the predicted probabilities in stage one, we construct the common support 
sample (matched sample) by using the nearest neighbourhood matching. This matching is a 
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one-to-one matching with replacement so that one diversified firm is matched with a focused 
firm with the nearest propensity score. Table 4.6 Panel A presents the statistic difference 
between diversified firms and focused firms using the matched sample. Compared with the 
unmatched sample, the mean difference of most control variables between diversified firms 
and focused firms becomes much smaller and statistically insignificant.  This indicates that our 
propensity score match process is quite successful. Both the abandonment option and the loss 
reversal dummy variables for diversified firm are significantly higher than focused firms under 
this matched sample which is consistent with our prior analyses. The further results of 
regression tests under propensity score matched sample are described in the following tables 
examining the interactive difference of firms exercising abandonment option by firm diversity. 
 
Table 4.6             
The effect of diversification on loss reversal: propensity score matching estimations 
Panel A: matched sample description       
 Diversified firms 
 Focused firms (Control firms)  Difference  
ROA -0.114  -0.122  0.008  
PAST_ROA -0.035  -0.042  0.007 * 
SIZE 4.002  3.946  0.056  
SALESG 0.079  0.057  0.022 * 
FIRSTLOSS 0.462  0.459  0.003  
LOSS_SEQ 1.341  1.378  -0.037  
DIVDUM 0.412  0.402  0.010  
SPECIAL_ITEM -0.035  -0.035  0.000  
LEVERAGE 0.555  0.551  0.004  
CAPX 0.058  0.06  -0.002 ** 
CREDIT 0.517  0.498  0.019 * 
AB_D 0.386  0.35  0.036 *** 
Loss reversal 0.385  0.36  0.025 *** 
TOBIN'S Q 0.822  0.925   -0.103  
This table reports the statistic difference between diversified firms and focused firms using the propensity matched 
sample to estimate the average treatment effect for the treated group. The treatment indicator equals 1 for diversified 
firms and 0 for focused firms. Difference is the mean difference between the diversified and focused (control) firms by 
using the paired T-tests. Detailed propensity score matched steps are described in the main content. Variable definitions 
are provided in the notes to Table 4.1. Diversified firm is defined as the firms with multiple business segments while 
focused firms operate only one business sectors. There are 17410 matches.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance 





Table 4.6         
Probit regression: first-stage of Heckman Test 
Panel B: Probability of diversify 
 Method 1  Method 2  
 Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  
ROA 0.163 0.071 0.022 ** 0.505 0.141 0.000 *** 
ROA(T-1)     0.282 0.082 0.001 *** 
ROA(T-2)     0.147 0.063 0.020 ** 
PAST_ROA 0.139 0.053 0.009 ***     
SIZE 0.095 0.005 0.000 *** 0.056 0.017 0.001 *** 
SIZE(T-1)     -0.003 0.013 0.850  
SIZE(T-2)     0.044 0.014 0.002 *** 
SALES_GROWTH 0.044 0.016 0.006 ***     
GDP     -1.953 1.137 0.086 * 
GDP_GROWTH     -0.009 0.001 0.000 *** 
FRAC_IDUSTRY 0.300 0.054 0.000 *** 0.068 0.054 0.206  
FRAC_DIVER 1.900 0.098 0.000 *** 2.567 0.101 0.000 *** 
DIVIDUM 0.254 0.022 0.000 ***     
LEVERAGE 0.941 0.046 0.000 ***     
SPECIAL_ITEM -0.377 0.151 0.012 **     
TOBIN'S Q -0.004 0.005 0.420      
CAPX -0.367 0.145 0.011 ** -0.211 0.158 0.181  
CAPX(T-1)     -0.087 0.084 0.300  
CAPX(T-2)     -0.098 0.072 0.172  
CREDIT_RATING 0.208 0.021 0.000 ***     
S&P     0.130 0.042 0.002 *** 
MAJOR_EXCHANGE     -0.068 0.023 0.003 *** 
FIRST_LOSS -0.015 0.031 0.625      
LOSS_SEQ -0.048 0.009 0.000 ***     
CONSTANT -2.134 0.054 0.000 *** -0.791 0.093 0.000 *** 
This table presents the estimates of probability of diversify through a probit model using two sets of 
variables. To fully capture the probability of diversify, firm level, year level and economy level factors are 
involved in the model. Method 1 focuses on the loss forecasting model while method 2 follows Campa 
and Kedia (2002)'s selection of variables from their first-stage Heckman probit model. Year dummies were 
included and not reported. The number of observation is 34820. Reported coefficients are the average 
coefficients over the estimation period from 1980 to 2016.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
4.6.2 Heckman two-stage estimation 
We use Heckman (1979) two-stage estimation tests to control for the self-selection problem. 
In the first stage, we use a probit regression to estimate the probability of a firm choose to 
diversify. The “treatment effect” is based on the difference between diversified firms and the 
matched focused firms with similar propensity scores of the “decision to diversify”. We use 
two sets of selection variables in the first stage of Heckman tests based on a probit regression. 
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We obtain the Inverse Mills ratio based on the first set of selection variables (Method 1) in our 
main content and report the results based on the second sets of selection variables (Method 2) 
in the Appendix 4.1 (Panel A, B and C)10.  
The first set of selection variables (Method1) builds on Berger and Ofek (1995) and 
Villalonga (2004). We include their control variables (size, profitability and capital expenditure) 
along with additional control variables: dividend, leverage ratio, Tobin’s Q, credit rating for a 
richer specification. These variables are consistent with all the control variables that are used 
in our main regression analysis11. We also include the two instruments used in Campa and 
Kedia (2002): Fraction of Diversified Firms in the Industry is the fraction of all the firms in the 
industry that are diversified firms (PNDIV). Fraction of Industry Sales by Diversified Firms is 
the fraction of industry sales accounted for by diversified firms (PSDIV).  
For the second sets of selection variables (Method 2) used in Inverse Mills Ratio, we follow 
Campa and Kedia (2002)’s choice.  We include lagged 1 and 2 years’ variables of ROA, capital 
expenditure and size. S&P is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm belongs to the 
S&P industrial index, and 0 otherwise. We create the dummy variable MAJOR_EXCHANGE 
that takes the value 1 when the firm is listed on NYSE, Nasdaq, or AMEX, and 0 otherwise. 
We also include year and economic factors. GDP is Gross Domestic Product. GDP Growth is 
the growth rate of Gross Domestic Product. 
We report the results of the first stage probit regression in Table 4.6A using the first set of 
selection variables. In the second-stage, based on the estimated probability of firms’ choice to 
diversity, we use the estimated coefficients to construct Inverse Mills Ratios as an additional 
control variable which include the treatment for a firms’ self-selection into diversification. 
4.6.3 Fixed effect model 
                                                 
10 The results based on the Inverse Mills ratio using the second set of selection variables are consistent with the 
results based on the first set of variables. 
11 Similar methodology can be found in Hann et al., (2013) for choice of variables in their Heckman tests. 
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We introduce a two-way fixed effect model using fixed firm effects to control for 
unobservable firm characteristics and year to control for time effects which affect the 
diversification decision. The fixed effect model can reduce the interfirm variability as 
explained by Campa and Kedia (2002).  
4.6.4 Results 
We present our results for the loss reversal model using three econometric methods in Table 
4.6 Panel B. Since these take up considerable space, we only report our results using a diversity 
dummy as a proxy of diversified or focused firms. In the unreported tables, we also use our 
two Herfindahl-based measures for the level of diversification, the results are consistent with 
our results using a diversity dummy variable.  Regression (1) shows the results using a 
propensity matched sample. Regression (2) reports the second-stage of Heckman estimation 
and Regression (3) presents the results of the two-way fixed effect model. We find the 
interaction term of diversity dummy with abandonment option dummy is positive and 
significant in all three regression models. The results suggest that diversified firms exercise 
abandonment option more efficiently than focused firms after controlling for endogeneity 
problems.  
Similarly, in Table 4.6 Panel C and Panel D, we report the results of loss reversal analysis 
after controlling endogeneity problems by splitting the sample as if firms have agency problem 
and no agency problem, respectively. In Panel C, we find that among the firms with agency 
problems, diversified firms are no longer significantly more efficient than focused firms in 
exercising abandonment options. The superiority of exercising abandonment options hold in 
the firms with no potential agency problems as results shown in Panel D. 
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Table 4.6             
Loss reversal and firm structure: logistic model with three econometric methods 
Panel C: Loss reversal and firm structure full sample 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Propensity score match  Heckman Estimation  Fixed effect model  
 Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  
INTERCEPT 0.288 0.125 0.021 ** 0.265 0.200 0.186      
ROA 4.986 0.483 0.000 *** 4.221 0.255 0.000 *** 4.240 0.164 0.000 *** 
PAST_ROA 0.138 0.175 0.429  0.216 0.097 0.026 ** 0.195 0.093 0.036 ** 
SIZE 0.001 0.012 0.953  -0.022 0.011 0.045 ** 0.010 0.009 0.305  
SALESGROWTH 0.002 0.050 0.966  -0.006 0.033 0.845  0.013 0.033 0.690  
FIRSTLOSS -0.008 0.065 0.902  -0.006 0.048 0.894  -0.003 0.048 0.944  
LOSS_SEQ -0.164 0.023 0.000 *** -0.154 0.015 0.000 *** -0.147 0.015 0.000 *** 
DIVDUM 0.195 0.045 0.000 *** 0.150 0.040 0.000 *** 0.122 0.037 0.001 *** 
LEVERAGE -0.231 0.114 0.043 ** 0.141 0.102 0.168  0.151 0.073 0.039 ** 
T_Q -0.018 0.028 0.525  0.004 0.010 0.677  -0.003 0.009 0.720  
CAPX -1.118 0.306 0.000 *** -0.751 0.218 0.001 *** -0.923 0.211 0.000 *** 
SPECIAL_ITEM -6.888 0.509 0.000 *** -6.104 0.316 0.000 *** -6.201 0.266 0.000 *** 
CREDIT_RATING 0.198 0.043 0.000 *** 0.233 0.034 0.000 *** 0.163 0.037 0.000 *** 
DIVERSITY_D -0.003 0.052 0.953  -0.022 0.045 0.630  0.001 0.044 0.983  
AB_D -1.171 0.068 0.000 *** -1.230 0.044 0.000 *** -1.218 0.044 0.000 *** 
AB_D*DIVERSITY_D 0.188 0.092 0.040 ** 0.221 0.076 0.004 *** 0.225 0.076 0.003 *** 
INVERSE MILLS RATIO     -0.107 0.092 0.245      
             
Diversified & AB_D=1             
Marginal effects 0.023 0.010 0.019 *** 0.020 0.007 0.003 *** 0.020 0.012 0.027 ** 
Number of observation 34820   18508    29789   
This table presents the results of loss reversal logistic regression using three econometric methods to control for endogeneity problem. Dependent variable is 
loss reversal which takes value of 1 if firms becomes profitable in the next year, and 0 otherwise. Variable definitions are provided in the notes to Table 4.1. 
Diversification is dummy variable equals one if a firm has more than one segments and zero otherwise. AB_D (abandonment option) is dummy variable 
equals one if both sales and number of employees decrease comparing to the previous year, and zero otherwise. Three measures of controlling for endogeneity 
problems are used. In regression (1), propensity score matched firms are selected based on propensity scores estimated from the model of probability of 
diversifying using all the variables in loss reversal model. In regression (2), we present the second-stage of Heckman Test with inverse Mills Ratio obtained 
from Table 6A using Method1. In regression (3), we use fixed effect model by controlling firm and year effects with firm and year effects unreported. Reported 
coefficients are the average coefficients over the estimation period from 1980 to 2016. Standard errors are clustered by firm and fiscal year. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4.6             
Loss reversal and firm structure: logistic model with three econometric methods  
Panel D: Loss reversal and firm structure under over-investment problem (high agency problem) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Propensity score match  Heckman Estimation  Fixed effect model  
 Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  
INTERCEPT 0.358 0.207 0.084  0.145 0.304 0.634  
   
 
ROA 6.508 0.642 0.000 *** 5.425 0.396 0.000 *** 5.465 0.291 0.000 *** 
PAST_ROA 0.060 0.270 0.824  0.385 0.164 0.019 ** 0.343 0.163 0.035 ** 
SIZE -0.026 0.016 0.114  -0.045 0.017 0.008 *** -0.022 0.014 0.106  
SALESGROWTH 0.009 0.075 0.902  -0.038 0.056 0.501  -0.005 0.057 0.936  
FIRSTLOSS -0.030 0.086 0.732  0.018 0.067 0.792  0.032 0.067 0.632  
LOSS_SEQ -0.171 0.030 0.000 *** -0.150 0.022 0.000 *** -0.141 0.022 0.000 *** 
DIVDUM 0.146 0.062 0.018 ** 0.132 0.057 0.021 ** 0.089 0.053 0.097 * 
LEVERAGE -0.131 0.207 0.525  0.359 0.172 0.036 ** 0.322 0.145 0.027 ** 
T_Q 0.223 0.138 0.106  0.249 0.088 0.004 *** 0.250 0.098 0.011 ** 
CAPX -1.317 0.562 0.019 ** -1.613 0.438 0.000 *** -1.793 0.422 0.000 *** 
SPECIAL_ITEM -8.071 0.725 0.000 *** -7.052 0.488 0.000 *** -7.143 0.420 0.000 *** 
CREDIT_RATING 0.132 0.058 0.024 ** 0.219 0.047 0.000 *** 0.175 0.052 0.001 *** 
DIVERSITY_D -0.056 0.072 0.439  -0.084 0.063 0.187  -0.066 0.063 0.297  
AB_D -1.070 0.088 0.000 *** -1.114 0.059 0.000 *** -1.106 0.059 0.000 *** 
AB_D*DIVERSITY_D 0.121 0.120 0.313  0.134 0.102 0.189  0.139 0.102 0.174  
INVERSE MILLS RATIO     -0.063 0.138 0.645      
             
Diversified & AB_D=1 -0.003 0.013 0.829  0.0004 0.011 0.969  -0.005 0.021 0.794  
Marginal effects             
Number of observation 16506   10084    18763   
This table presents the results of loss reversal logistic regression using three econometric methods to control for endogeneity problem with the firms having 
agency problems.  Over-investment is used as the proxy of agency problem which is defined as if the firm's Tobin's Q is below the Industry median in annual 
basis. Dependent variable is loss reversal which takes value of 1 if firms becomes profitable in the next year, and 0 otherwise. Variable definitions are provided 
in the notes to Table 4.1. AB_D (abandonment option) is dummy variable equals one if both sales and number of employees decrease comparing to the 
previous year, and zero otherwise. Three measures of controlling for endogeneity problems are used. In regression (1), propensity score matched firms are 
selected based on propensity scores estimated from the model of probability of diversifying using all the variables in loss reversal model. In regression (2), 
we present the second-stage of Heckman Test with inverse Mills Ratio obtained from Table 6A using Method1. In regression (3), we use fixed effect model 
by controlling firm and year effects with firm and year effects unreported. Reported coefficients are the average coefficients over the estimation period from 
1980 to 2016. Standard errors are clustered by firm and fiscal year. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4.6             
Loss reversal and firm structure: logistic model with three econometric methods           
Panel E: Loss reversal and firm structure under no over-investment problem (low agency problem)     
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Propensity score match  Heckman Estimation  Fixed effect model  
 Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  
INTERCEPT -0.054 0.179 0.764  0.041 0.273 0.881  
   
 
ROA 3.785 0.628 0.000 *** 3.640 0.308 0.000 *** 3.625 0.195 0.000 *** 
PAST_ROA 0.263 0.229 0.251  0.175 0.123 0.156  0.175 0.115 0.129  
SIZE 0.015 0.018 0.387  -0.008 0.015 0.583  0.025 0.014 0.063 * 
SALESGROWTH -0.060 0.071 0.398  -0.024 0.042 0.573  -0.007 0.042 0.863  
FIRSTLOSS -0.011 0.101 0.913  -0.068 0.070 0.332  -0.074 0.070 0.288  
LOSS_SEQ -0.148 0.036 0.000 *** -0.159 0.022 0.000 *** -0.152 0.021 0.000 *** 
DIVDUM 0.231 0.068 0.001 *** 0.177 0.058 0.002 *** 0.157 0.053 0.003 *** 
LEVERAGE 0.262 0.188 0.163  0.588 0.159 0.000 *** 0.510 0.121 0.000 *** 
T_Q -0.026 0.033 0.424  -0.006 0.011 0.598  -0.010 0.010 0.323  
CAPX -1.202 0.379 0.002 *** -0.676 0.260 0.009 *** -0.742 0.246 0.003 *** 
SPECIAL_ITEM -6.434 0.665 0.000 *** -5.921 0.413 0.000 *** -6.004 0.358 0.000 *** 
CREDIT_RATING 0.286 0.066 0.000 *** 0.247 0.048 0.000 *** 0.140 0.054 0.010 *** 
DIVERSITY_D 0.027 0.075 0.721  0.032 0.064 0.618  0.051 0.063 0.415  
AB_D -1.336 0.110 0.000 *** -1.374 0.068 0.000 *** -1.358 0.069 0.000 *** 
AB_D*DIVERSITY_D 0.335 0.145 0.021 ** 0.371 0.119 0.002 *** 0.383 0.119 0.001 *** 
INVERSE MILLS RATIO     -0.056 0.126 0.660      
             
Diversified & AB_D=1 0.057 0.015 0.000 *** 0.039 0.009 0.000 *** 0.030 0.021 0.014 ** 
marginal effects             
Number of observation 18281   8424    11026   
This table presents the results of loss reversal logistic regression using three econometric methods to control for endogeneity problem with the firms having no 
potential agency problems.  Over-investment is used as the proxy of agency problem which is defined as if the firm's Tobin's Q is below the Industry median in 
annual basis. Dependent variable is loss reversal which takes value of 1 if firms becomes profitable in the next year, and 0 otherwise. Variable definitions are 
provided in the notes to Table 4.1. AB_D (abandonment option) is dummy variable equals one if both sales and number of employees decrease comparing to the 
previous year, and zero otherwise. Three measures of controlling for endogeneity problems are used. In regression (1), propensity score matched firms are selected 
based on propensity scores estimated from the model of probability of diversifying using all the variables in loss reversal model. In regression (2), we present the 
second-stage of Heckman Test with inverse Mills Ratio obtained from Table 6A using Method 1. In regression (3), we use fixed effect model by controlling firm 
and year effects with firm and year effects unreported. Reported coefficients are the average coefficients over the estimation period from 1980 to 2016. Standard 
errors are clustered by firm and fiscal year. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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4.7. Robustness Tests 
4.7.1 Alternative measure of agency problem 
We introduce two alternative measures of agency problem proxy for robustness checking 
of our analyses which are institutional ownership and dividend payout ratio. First, several 
empirical studies discuss the important role of large shareholders such as institutional investors 
to decrease the agency problem by monitoring the firm (Shleifer and Vishny 1986, Coffee 1991, 
Crutchley, Jensen, Jahera, Raymond 1999). Institutional investors own large portion of stocks 
which can effectively obtain firm-specific information and influence the managers’ action 
through various methods such as using voting powers (Demsetz 1983, Graves and Waddock 
1990, Pozen 1994, Sundaramurthy, Rechner, and Wang 1996).  
Therefore, we use institutional ownership as an alternative proxy for the agency problem. 
We use a consistent methodology to define and split the sample into two groups. If a firm’s 
institutional ownership is below the industry median in a year, the firm is classified into the 
group with high agency problem, lacking external monitoring; and the converse for firms above 
the industry median.  
We report our results in Table 4.7. In Panel A, for the firms with low institutional ownership 
we find insignificant coefficients for the diversity and abandonment option interaction terms 
in all three regression models. In Panel B, for the sample of high institutional ownership, we 
find significant coefficients for the interaction term of diversity and abandonment option for 
all three diversity measures. Consistent with results from our main analysis, these findings 
suggest that without external monitoring, the superiority of abandonment options option 
exercise for diversified firms over focused firms is dissipated. 
The inclusion of agency problems to explain the dividend puzzle has a long history in the 
literature (Easterbrook 1984, Jensen 1986, Fluck 1998, Fluck 1999, Zwiebel 1996). La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2000) introduce two competing agency models of 
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dividends. One predicts that stronger minority shareholder rights are related to higher dividend 
payouts since the stronger rights empower minority shareholders to pressure insiders to 
disgorge cash. In the other, the relation is reversed and insiders pay dividends to establish a 
reputation for good treatment for weak investors. Either way, dividends can decrease agency 
problems.  
Therefore, we use firms’ payout ratios as another proxy for agency problems. Once again, 
we split the sample into two groups, defining those with high agency problems as firms whose 
payout is below the industry median during a year, and the rest as firms with low agency 
problems. In Appendix 4.2, we see the same broad outcomes and interpretations for Panel A 
and Panel B as we saw previously for Table 4.7. Thus, consistent with our prior findings, the 
efficiency of diversified firms exercising the abandonment option is dampened, due to agency 




Table 4.7             
Loss reversal and firm structure: logistic model and agency problem      
Panel A: Loss reversal and firm structure under low-external monitory (high agency problem)           
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  
INTERCEPT 0.174 0.152 0.250  -0.100 0.248 0.688  -0.039 0.248 0.876  
ROA 4.407 0.441 0.000 *** 4.418 0.442 0.000 *** 4.405 0.441 0.000 *** 
PAST_ROA 0.124 0.160 0.438  0.125 0.161 0.436  0.123 0.160 0.441  
SIZE -0.015 0.022 0.491  -0.014 0.022 0.528  -0.015 0.022 0.484  
SALESGROWTH -0.004 0.064 0.946  -0.005 0.064 0.943  -0.004 0.063 0.948  
FIRSTLOSS 0.044 0.096 0.645  0.046 0.096 0.635  0.044 0.096 0.644  
LOSS_SEQ -0.165 0.029 0.000 *** -0.165 0.029 0.000 *** -0.165 0.029 0.000 *** 
DIVDUM -0.031 0.077 0.687  -0.028 0.077 0.713  -0.033 0.077 0.673  
LEVERAGE 0.336 0.141 0.018 ** 0.342 0.141 0.015 ** 0.334 0.141 0.018 ** 
T_Q 0.022 0.018 0.203 *** 0.022 0.018 0.202  0.022 0.018 0.203  
CAPX -1.571 0.464 0.001 *** -1.588 0.464 0.001 *** -1.576 0.464 0.001 *** 
SPECIAL_ITEM -5.952 0.628 0.000 *** -5.973 0.628 0.000 *** -5.950 0.627 0.000 *** 
CREDIT_RATING 0.149 0.066 0.023 ** 0.149 0.066 0.023 ** 0.149 0.066 0.023 ** 
DIVERSITY_D -0.094 0.092 0.306  
   
 
   
 
HERF_ASSET     0.271 0.208 0.191  
   
 
HERF_SALES     
   
 0.213 0.207 0.303  
AB_D -1.293 0.086 0.000 *** -0.993 0.336 0.003 *** -0.803 0.333 0.016 ** 
AB_D*DIVERSITY_D 0.186 0.163 0.254      
   
 
AB_D*HERF_ASSET    -0.279 0.367 0.447  
   
 
AB_D*HERF_SALES    
   
 -0.494 0.364 0.175  
Diversified & AB_D=1            
marginal effects 0.002 0.014 0.356  -0.003 0.021 0.598  -0.03 0.020 0.436  
This table presents the results of loss reversal probability with agency problems using the annual estimation of logistic regression. Low external monitory is used 
as the proxy of high agency problem which is defined as if the firm's institution ownership is below the industry median in annual basis. Dependent variable is loss 
reversal which takes value of 1 if firms becomes profitable in the next year, and 0 otherwise. Variable definitions are provided in the notes to Table 4.1. Three 
measures of diversification are used. In regression (1), diversification is dummy variable equals one if a firm has more than one segments and zero otherwise. In 
regression (2) and (3), diversification is calculated as Herfindahl Index based on asset and sales. AB_D (abandonment option) is dummy variable equals one if both 
sales and number of employees decrease comparing to the previous year, and zero otherwise. Reported coefficients are the average coefficients over the estimation 
period from 1980 to 2016. The number of observation is 9513. Standard errors are clustered by firm and fiscal year. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance 




Table 7             
Loss reversal and firm structure: logistic model and agency problem 
Panel B: Loss reversal and firm structure under high external monitory (low agency problem) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  
INTERCEPT 0.296 0.149 0.047 ** 0.385 0.219 0.079 * 0.407 0.218 0.062 * 
ROA 6.779 0.580 0.000 *** 6.740 0.579 0.000 *** 6.741 0.579 0.000 *** 
PAST_ROA 0.374 0.218 0.085 * 0.377 0.218 0.084 * 0.374 0.218 0.085 * 
SIZE 0.023 0.018 0.209  0.016 0.018 0.365  0.017 0.018 0.356  
SALESGROWTH -0.021 0.063 0.735  -0.021 0.063 0.738  -0.021 0.063 0.738  
FIRSTLOSS -0.281 0.084 0.001 *** -0.282 0.085 0.001 *** -0.281 0.085 0.001 *** 
LOSS_SEQ -0.198 0.030 0.000 *** -0.197 0.030 0.000 *** -0.197 0.030 0.000 *** 
DIVDUM 0.278 0.063 0.000 *** 0.263 0.063 0.000 *** 0.264 0.063 0.000 *** 
LEVERAGE 0.012 0.140 0.934  -0.030 0.140 0.832  -0.028 0.140 0.843  
T_Q -0.001 0.025 0.972  0.000 0.025 0.994  0.000 0.025 0.995  
CAPX -1.155 0.434 0.008 *** -1.110 0.433 0.010 ** -1.112 0.433 0.010 ** 
SPECIAL_ITEM -8.279 0.607 0.000 *** -8.248 0.607 0.000 *** -8.255 0.606 0.000 *** 
CREDIT_RATING 0.341 0.057 0.000 *** 0.334 0.057 0.000 *** 0.336 0.057 0.000 *** 
DIVERSITY_D -0.054 0.077 0.478  
   
 
   
 
HERF_ASSET    -0.063 0.159 0.694  
   
 
HERF_SALES     
   
 -0.093 0.158 0.556  
AB_D -1.261 0.078 0.000 *** -0.598 0.221 0.007 *** -0.675 0.224 0.003 *** 
AB_D*DIVERSITY_D 0.277 0.126 0.028 **     
   
 
AB_D*HERF_ASSET    -0.675 0.253 0.008 *** 
   
 
AB_D*HERF_SALES    
   
 -0.580 0.256 0.023 ** 
Diversified & AB_D=1            
marginal effects 0.082 0.042 0.000 *** -0.178 0.023 0.000 *** -0.177 0.024 0.000 *** 
This table presents the results of loss reversal probability with no potential agency problems using the annual estimation of logistic regression. High external monitory is 
used as the proxy of low agency problem which is defined as if the firm's institution ownership is above the industry median in annual basis. Dependent variable is loss 
reversal which takes value of 1 if firms becomes profitable in the next year, and 0 otherwise. Variable definitions are provided in the notes to Table 4.1. Three measures of 
diversification are used. In regression (1), diversification is dummy variable equals one if a firm has more than one segments and zero otherwise. In regression (2) and (3), 
diversification is calculated as Herfindahl Index based on asset and sales. AB_D (abandonment option) is dummy variable equals one if both sales and number of employees 
decrease comparing to the previous year, and zero otherwise. Reported coefficients are the average coefficients over the estimation period from 1980 to 2016.  The number 
of observation is 11092. Standard errors are clustered by firm and fiscal year. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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4.7.2 Alternative abandonment option measures 
Our main measure for the abandonment option follows the method of Lawrence et al., 
(2017). As they note in their paper, there are limitations to the method. The biggest problem in 
using decrease in sales is that this decrease could also be caused by the improvement of 
efficiency of operations and sticky costs effects. To mitigate this problem, we introduce two 
alternative measures in place of the decrease in sales. The first uses decrease in total assets, the 
second the decrease in sales growth from a forecasting model. 
The first alternative measure is constructed as follows: 
𝐴𝐵_𝐷𝑡+1 = 1    𝑖𝑓 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑡+1 < 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑡+1
< 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑡; 0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒.    (5) 
The decrease in total assets can directly reflect the firm level abandonment activities 
including either disposing the entire segments or a fraction of the assets12.  The key findings 
from using this alternative are consistent with our primary measure of the abandonment option, 
that diversified firms have a significantly higher probability of loss reversal compared to 
focused firms (Table 4.8 Panel A). Similarly, the efficiency of using the abandonment option 
is reduced under the over-investment samples (Appendix 4.3 Panel A and B).  
The second measure is quite different from our primary measures. Returning to profitability 
from loss is a maintained hypothesis of financial reporting, embodied in “the going-concern” 
assumption (Joos and Plesko 2005). We use the possibility of exercising the abandonment 
option rather than the change in the numbers that have already happened. This method proceeds 
in two stages. 
                                                 
12 Note that a similar approach used by Lawrence et al., (2017) is the existence of discontinued operations (known 
as Compustat acronym do). The key limitation of using discontinued operations is that, although IFRS and US 
GAAP treat discontinued operations differently, both accounting standards require discontinued operations as an 
entire business segment not the scaling back of a business unit. 
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During the first stage, we perform a sales growth forecast using an industry-specific model. 
The strategic management literature (Myers and Majd 1990, Berger, Ofek and Swary 1996) 
models the abandonment option as an American put option. The option is exercised when a 
loss occurs and future performance is under expectation. Instead of benchmarking past 
performance, our sales growth forecasting model predicts the future sales condition. If the 
industry condition is expected to be bad, firms are likely to leave this unprofitable industry and 
enter a new profitable industry (Fama 2000). In the second stage, we construct the 
abandonment option dummy variable equal to one if the predicted sales growth is negative and 
the firm suffers a loss in the current year, zero otherwise. Restrictions on both the firms’ future 
and current performance are most consistent with the situation when firms will exercise the 
abandonment option. 
We use dummy variable 𝐴𝐵_𝐷 as an indicator of the existence of curtailments but using 
sales growth forecasting (𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐺𝑆𝐿).  
To construct 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐺𝑆𝐿 , we use the following simple first-order autoregressive model 
estimated by OLS regression on an industry-specific basis using 4-digits SIC (Standard 
Industry Code) as industry definition: 
𝐺𝑆𝐿𝑡+1 = 𝜇𝑗,𝑇 + 𝜈𝑗,𝑇𝐺𝑆𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡,                            (6) 
where 𝐺𝑆𝐿𝑇+1 is the growth in sales of firm i in year t, 𝜖𝑖,𝑡  is the error term, and 𝑡 = 𝑇 −
5, … , 𝑇 − 1 . The model parameters 𝜇𝑗,𝑇  and 𝜈𝑗,𝑇  are indexed by industry 𝑗  and year 𝑇  to 
highlight that the estimation is done on an industry-specific basis and for each year 𝑇 using the 
previous five years of data. We then use the calculated estimation coefficient to generate the 
𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐺𝑆𝐿 for each firm-year (𝑖, 𝑇 + 1). We use an industry-specific model because previous 
work by Fairfield, Ramnath, and Yohn (2009) finds that sales growth forecasts are more 
accurate using an industry-specific model over the standard pooling regression (economy-wide 
model). 
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Thus, we construct our dummy variable 𝐴𝐵_𝐷 to measure the existence of the curtailment, 
which is set to one when firms make losses during the current year and the predicted sales 
growth (𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐺𝑆𝐿) in the next year is smaller than 0. Formally: 
𝐴𝐵_𝐷𝑡+1 = 1    𝑖𝑓 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐺𝑆𝐿𝑡+1 < 0; 0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒.    (7) 
If a firm suffers loss and the predicted sales growth is negative, this provides a situation in 
which this firm should exercise its option to abandon the loss-making asset in order to prevent 
the loss from continuing in the next year. The key findings of using this alternative of an 
abandonment option are consistent with our primary measure of abandonment option that the 
diversified firms have a significantly higher probability of loss reversal compared to the 
focused firms (Table 4.8 Panel B). In addition, we find consistent results that the efficiency of 
diversified firms is reduced in the agency problem sample (Appendix 4.4 Panel A and B). 
4.7.3. Alternative loss reversal model 
In the second specification of our loss reversal model, we decompose ROA into two 
components: cash flow and accrual. Sloan (1996) shows that accrual component of earnings 
reflects the lower persistence of earnings comparing to the cash flow components. We define 
cash flow (CFO) as cash flow from operations as the difference between net income (annual 
Compustat item 172) and accruals. We define accruals (ACCR) as the change in current asset 
(Compustat item 4) – change in cash (Compustat item 1)-change in current liabilities 
(Compustat item 5) + change debt in current liabilities (Compustat item 34) + depreciation and 
amortizations (Compustat 14), deflated by the lagged total assets. We average the past five 
years CFO and ACCR as two additional control variables to capture the long-term effect of 
cash flow from operations and accruals on loss reversal following Joos and Plesko (2005). 
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𝑦𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝐴𝑆𝑇_𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑃𝐴𝑆𝑇_𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑆𝑇𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆_𝑆𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑆𝑃𝐼𝑡
+ 𝛽11𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑋𝑡 + 𝛽14𝑇_𝑄𝑡 + 𝛽15𝐶𝑅𝑡
+ 𝛽16𝐴𝐵_𝐷𝑡+1 + 𝛽17𝐴𝐵_𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑡+1
+ 𝜀𝑡+1                                                                                 (8)                                            
The findings in our alternative model analyses is consistent with our main regression’s 
results. First, in Appendix 4.5 Panel A, we see the loss reversal probability is positively related 
to the firm’s diversity level. Second, results suggest that diversified firms are more efficient 
than focused firms in exercising abandonment options in Appendix 4.5 Panel B. Third, this 
advantage of liquidating the loss-making assets in diversified firms over focused firms is 





Table 4.8             
Loss reversal and firm structure                    
Panel A: Logistic regression model with the asset-based abandonment option    
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  
INTERCEPT 0.125 0.058 0.032 ** 0.200 0.094 0.033 ** 0.245 0.094 0.009 *** 
ROA 4.272 0.189 0.000 *** 4.259 0.189 0.000 *** 4.261 0.189 0.000 *** 
PAST_ROA 0.252 0.089 0.004 *** 0.251 0.088 0.005 *** 0.248 0.088 0.005 *** 
SIZE -0.005 0.007 0.450  -0.008 0.007 0.248  -0.008 0.007 0.226  
SALESGROWTH 0.010 0.026 0.707  0.010 0.026 0.701  0.010 0.026 0.710  
FIRSTLOSS -0.021 0.037 0.562  -0.022 0.037 0.555  -0.022 0.037 0.550  
LOSS_SEQ -0.148 0.012 0.000 *** -0.147 0.012 0.000 *** -0.148 0.012 0.000 *** 
DIVDUM 0.185 0.028 0.000 *** 0.176 0.028 0.000 *** 0.175 0.028 0.000 *** 
LEVERAGE 0.287 0.057 0.000 *** 0.269 0.057 0.000 *** 0.269 0.057 0.000 *** 
T_Q -0.007 0.008 0.392  -0.007 0.008 0.404  -0.006 0.008 0.426  
CAPX -0.826 0.163 0.000 *** -0.805 0.163 0.000 *** -0.807 0.163 0.000 *** 
SPECIAL_ITEM -6.303 0.242 0.000 *** -6.301 0.242 0.000 *** -6.303 0.242 0.000 *** 
CREDIT_RATING 0.245 0.025 0.000 *** 0.242 0.025 0.000 *** 0.241 0.025 0.000 *** 
DIVERSITY_D -0.038 0.036 0.285  
   
 
   
 
HERF_ASSET     -0.075 0.077 0.334  
   
 
HERF_SALES     
   
 -0.123 0.077 0.113  
AB_D -1.377 0.032 0.000  -0.800 0.103 0.000 *** -0.852 0.104 0.000 *** 
AB_D*DIVERSITY_D 0.295 0.056 0.000 ***     
   
 
AB_D*HERF_ASSET     -0.564 0.115 0.000 *** 
   
 
AB_D*HERF_SALES     
   
 -0.502 0.116 0.000 *** 
             
Diversified & AB_D=1             
marginal effects 0.027 0.006 0.000 *** -0.065 0.011 0.000 *** -0.062 0.012 0.000 *** 
This table presents the results of loss reversal probability using the annual estimation of logistic regression. Dependent variable is loss reversal which takes value of 1 if 
firms becomes profitable in the next year, and 0 otherwise. Variable definitions are provided in the notes to Table 4.1. Three measures of diversification are used. In 
regression (1), diversification is dummy variable equals one if a firm has more than one segments and zero otherwise. In regression (2) and (3), diversification is calculated 
as Herfindahl Index based on asset and sales. AB_D (abandonment option) is dummy variable equals one if both total assets and number of employees decrease comparing 
to the previous year, and zero otherwise. Reported coefficients are the average coefficients over the estimation period from 1980 to 2016.  The number of observation is 
38332. Standard errors are clustered by firm and fiscal year. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4.8             
Loss reversal and firm structure                    
Panel B: Logistic regression model with abandonment option using GSL forecasting model   
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  
INTERCEPT -0.187 0.056 0.001 *** -0.011 0.081 0.894  0.024 0.082 0.771  
ROA 4.047 0.231 0.000 *** 4.040 0.230 0.000 *** 4.041 0.231 0.000 *** 
PAST_ROA 0.120 0.104 0.248  0.120 0.104 0.249  0.119 0.104 0.253  
SIZE 0.004 0.009 0.667  0.002 0.009 0.831  0.002 0.009 0.869  
SALESGROWTH 0.014 0.030 0.633  0.015 0.030 0.630  0.015 0.030 0.627  
FIRSTLOSS -0.101 0.051 0.047 ** -0.102 0.051 0.045 ** -0.102 0.051 0.044 ** 
LOSS_SEQ -0.142 0.016 0.000 *** -0.141 0.016 0.000 *** -0.141 0.016 0.000 *** 
DIVDUM 0.178 0.038 0.000 *** 0.168 0.038 0.000 *** 0.169 0.038 0.000 *** 
LEVERAGE 0.275 0.087 0.002 *** 0.255 0.087 0.003 *** 0.256 0.087 0.003 *** 
T_Q 0.000 0.008 0.965  0.000 0.008 0.967  0.001 0.008 0.948  
CAPX -0.283 0.181 0.119  -0.260 0.182 0.152  -0.266 0.181 0.142  
SPECIAL_ITEM -5.845 0.300 0.000 *** -5.841 0.300 0.000 *** -5.843 0.300 0.000 *** 
CREDIT_RATING 0.193 0.034 0.000 *** 0.190 0.034 0.000 *** 0.189 0.034 0.000 *** 
DIVERSITY_D 0.071 0.041 0.083 *     
   
 
HERF_ASSET     -0.295 0.088 0.001 *** 
   
 
HERF_SALES     
   
 -0.306 0.089 0.001 *** 
AB_D -0.155 0.081 0.056 * 0.519 0.280 0.064 * 0.593 0.277 0.032 ** 
AB_D*DIVERSITY_D 0.397 0.145 0.006 ***     
   
 
AB_D*HERF_ASSET     -0.637 0.311 0.041 ** 
   
 
AB_D*HERF_SALES     
   
 -0.724 0.308 0.019 ** 
             
Diversified & AB_D=1             
Marginal effect 0.030 0.007 0.002 *** -0.071 0.015 0.000 *** -0.070 0.015 0.000 *** 
This table presents the results of loss reversal probability using the annual estimation of logistic regression. Dependent variable is loss reversal which takes value of 1 if 
firms becomes profitable in the next year, and 0 otherwise. Variable definitions are provided in the notes to Table 4.1. Three measures of diversification are used. In 
regression (1), diversification is dummy variable equals one if a firm has more than one segments and zero otherwise. In regression (2) and (3), diversification is calculated 
as Herfindahl Index based on asset and sales. AB_D (abandonment option) is dummy variable equals one if model-predicted sales growth decreases comparing to the 
previous year, and zero otherwise. Reported coefficients are the average coefficients over the estimation period from 1980 to 2016. The number of observation is 39257. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm and fiscal year. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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4.8.  Conclusion 
We address the role of firm structure in explaining a firm’s loss reversal probability using 
U.S. firms over the period 1980 to 2016. Compared to focused firms, firms with higher 
diversity level have higher probability of returning to profit after suffering losses. 
Inspired by Hayn (1995) on the abandonment option for loss-making firms, we find that 
diversified firms have higher efficiency in exercising their abandonment options in order to 
reverse losses in the next period. Diversified firms have multiple business segments where cash 
flows are not perfectly correlated. After abandoning their loss-making assets or segments, they 
can still generate profit through other segments. Focused firms on the other hand are less likely 
to return to profit after liquidating their unprofitable assets because of their undiversified 
business lines.  
However, diversified firms tend to have agency problems, leading to over-investment in 
unprofitable projects. The second part of our analysis provides clear evidence that over-
investment impairs the efficiency of diversified firms in exercising their abandonment options. 
Due to the higher agency problems, managers from diversified firms tend to not abandon all 
the over-invested and loss-making projects (while engaged in empire building) making it more 
difficult for the firms to return to profit in the next period. 
This chapter considers the real actions of firms dealing with loss. It extends the loss reversal 
model by including a firm’s diversity as an important factor. More importantly, we explain the 
importance of firms’ structures and show how their abandonment options are related to firm 
performance. In other words, given the irreversible nature of the abandonment option, we 
investigate how efficient firms can use this option to avoid losses in a going-concern strategic 
view. We show that a firm’s diversification level is an important factor that determines this 
efficiency whereby diversified firms have higher flexibility in liquidating under-performing 
assets than focused firms. 
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More generally, we highlight the diversification discount literature by indicating that 
agency problems can be influential in the efficiency of firms’ decisions to exercise their real 
options. The higher level of reluctance among managers for acting to liquidate in the diversified 

































Firm diversification and dividend payout policy 
 
5.1. Introduction 
Study of firm diversification has a long history. Early studies focus on the relationships 
between diversification and the firm’s performance. Evidence is found that product 
diversification cannot increase profitability (Grant, Jammine and Thomas 1988). Much 
empirical work investigates how firm structure differences affect the ways of distributing 
earnings, especially how firms make use of their retained earnings. Diversified firms tend to 
hold less cash (Opler et al., 1999, Subramaniam et al., 2011, Tong 2011), or over-invest (Berger 
et al., 1995). The effect of firm structure on dividend policy remains an interesting question.  
The classic work by Modigliani and Miller (Modigliani and Miller 1958, Miller and 
Modigliani 1961) models a firms’ dividend payout policy as having no influence on its capital 
structure or shareholders’ wealth, with a constant investment policy in a frictionless world. 
Once we move way from this idealized perfect market and enter the real world of taxes, 
bankruptcy costs and other frictions, the question of how firms choose their dividend policy 
becomes open again and has been discussed in a voluminous literature.  
One explanation of the dividend puzzle is the signalling hypothesis. Paying dividends can 
be used as a signal of the firm’s future performance (Bhattacharya 1979, John and Williams 
1985, Miller and Rock 1985, Ambarish, John, and Williams 1987). In general, dividend 
changes are positively associated with a firm’s stock returns. However, studies show mixed 
results which do not support the relation between dividend changes and future profitability 
(DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner 1996, Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler 1997). 
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The use of agency problems to explain the dividend puzzle has become popular 
(Easterbrook 1984, Jesen 1986, Fluck 1998, Fluck 1999, Zwiebel 1996). La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2000) introduce two competing agency models of dividends. On 
the one hand, the outcome model predicts stronger minority shareholder rights are related to 
higher dividend payout since the stronger rights empower minority shareholders to pressure 
insiders to distribute cash. On the other hand, the relation is reversed under the substitute model. 
Insiders pay dividends in order to establish a reputation for weak-investor protections.   
We contribute to the dividend payout literature by exploring an un-researched area where 
a firm’s structure can affect dividend policy. The contributions of our study to the literature are 
threefold.  First, prior studies on firm diversification investigate how a firm’s structure affects 
performance (Lang and Stultz 1994, Palich, Cardinal and Miller 2000), investment opportunity 
(Berger, et al 1995), and cash holding (Opler et al., 1999). Our study considers the dividend 
policy as an alternative channel whereby the firm is distributing its excess earnings.  
Second, dividend policy is closely related to agency problems. Since diversified firms are 
more likely to have severe agency problems because managers from sub-divisions are involved 
in over-investment due to empire building (Jesen and Mackling 1976, Jensen 1986, Berger et 
al., 1995) and inefficient use of resources due to cross-subsidization (Shin and Stulz 1998, 
Rajan et al., 2000, Berger et al., 1995). Two widely-used competing models by Porta et al., 
(1995) predict the opposite relation between agency problem and dividend payout. Our 
research complements the agency literature on firm diversification by investigating the ratio of 
dividend payout.  
Third, dividend payout serves a crucial role in the firm’s financing strategy. Miller and 
Modigliani (1961) point out that investors interpret a dividend change as a signal of the change 
in manager’s view of the firms’ future performance. The dividend signaling model supposes 
that a reduction in dividend conveys the managerial pessimism about the firm’s future (John 
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and William 1985, Left and Zmijewski 1994, Jensen, Lundstrum and Miller 2010).  The classic 
pecking order model of Myers (1984) points out there are financing costs concerns such as 
transactions costs and asymmetric information problem, especially for firms that are financed 
externally with risky debt or securities. Increased dividends can raise the transaction cost of 
external financing (Rozeff, 1982). Diversified firms have lower issue with financing shortage 
since segments have sufficient internal capital and positive NPV investment projects can be 
cross-financed with capitals within segments. In addition, internal capital markets can create 
firm value if firms are externally financial constrained. By investigating the financially 
constrained firms, our study supports the evidence of the efficient internal capital market for 
diversified firms in dividend policy. 
To understand how dividend payout policies are related to firm structure, we use a sample 
of firm-years from 1980 to 2016. In general, we find that diversified firms have significantly 
higher dividend payout ratios than focused firms. 
To find out why diversified firms pay higher dividends than focused firms, we test two 
hypotheses. First, firm diversification is associated with higher agency problems due to empire 
building (Jensen 1986) or over-investment (Berger et al., 1995). We divide our sample into 
groups by the level of agency problems using free cash flow and Tobin’s Q as two alternative 
measures. We find that among the firms with high agency problems, diversified firms pay 
significantly higher dividends than focused firms which fits with the substitute hypothesis of 
Porta et al., (1995).  
Second, we test the hypothesis that diversified firms pay higher dividends because of their 
large and efficient internal capital (Weston 1970, Stulz 1990, Stein 1997) especially when firms 
are financially constrained. We use coverage rate ratio and cash flow volatility as two proxies 
for financial constraint. Our results suggest that in the group of financially constraint firms, 
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diversified firms pay higher dividends than focused firms, indicating that this excess dividend 
is generated through their large internal capital market. 
Our regression models are controlled for firm and year effects. In the robustness tests, we 
use propensity score match and Heckman two-stage tests to control for endogeneity problems. 
We use two additional proxies for agency problem measures which are firm size and age. Large 
and mature firms are more likely to have fewer good investment opportunities than the small 
young firms. Therefore, managers in the large and mature firms are more likely to concoct 
agency problems. We find that among the large and mature firms, diversified firms have higher 
dividend payout ratios than focused firms, supporting the substitute hypothesis. 
We review the relevant literature on firm diversification and dividend policy in Section 2. 
In Section 3, we present our two main hypotheses. We introduce our sample and explain the 
empirical model in Section 4. In Section 5 we assess our findings. We include robustness tests 
to support our findings in Section 6. In Section 7 we conclude.  
5.2. Hypothesis design 
Our primary goal in this chapter is to investigate the importance of firm structure in payout 
policy. If diversification plays a crucial role in a firm’s performance as well as the managers’ 
strategic decision, whether firms are diversified should have a significant impact on the firms’ 
dividend policy. There should be at least two impacts of firm diversification on payout policy 
which are the agency problems and the internal capital market.  
5.2.1 Agency problem hypothesis 
Conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders can be at the centre of agency 
problems. Managers can use free cash flows to invest in unprofitable projects for personal 
benefit (Jensen and Meckling 1976) and divert corporate resources to themselves (Jensen 1986). 
Therefore, shareholders may insist that managers have the firm pay dividends to reduce 
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discretionary cash under managers’ control. This can force firms to seek external funding and 
become exposed by monitoring in the external market (Rozeff 1982, Esterbrook 1984), 
consistent with the substitute hypothesis referred by Parta et al., (2000). 
Firm diversification is associated with increased agency problems, with segment managers 
tending to lobby and grab more firm-level resources to suit their self-interests (Rajan et al. 
2000). Top management in the diversified firms might overinvest since they have higher 
opportunities to undertake projects and resources (Stulz 1990, Berger et al., 1995, Matsusaka 
and Nanda 1997). Consequently, agency problems destroy firms’ value. Subranmaniam, Tang, 
Yue, and Zhou (2011) find that diversified firms hold less cash in order to mitigate the agency 
costs. It is called as the influence cost theory suggesting that diversified firms take effective 
actions to reduce cash holding which eliminates the fight over resources due to the empire 
building. If the diversified firms intend to hold less cash due to reducing the agency costs, we 
would also expect an increase of dividend payout ratio which is consistent with the substitute 
theory by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2000). Substitute theory argues 
that managers payout dividend in order to establish repuations for good treatment of minority 
shareholders. To test this hypothesis, we use two agency proxies to dividend the sample into 
subgroups. First, we classify firms free cash flow. High free cash flow (if firms free cash flow 
is above the industry median) increase the marginal agency costs by providing the incentives 
for firms to use the excess resources to engage additional investments (more likely to over-
investmnet). Second, we use Tobin’s Q as an alternative measure of agency problem. Firms 
with low Tobin’s Q (if firm’s Tobin’s Q is below the industry median) face less promising 
investment opportunities. Therefore, we expect that diversified firms eliminate cash holdings 
by distributing higher dividend payouts than focused firms in order to release the agency. 
We proceed to our first hypothesis as follows: 
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H1: Firm diversification increases the level of dividend pay-out ratio to reduce the agency 
costs. 
5.2.2 Internal capital market hypothesis 
Compared to focused firms, diversified firms have a larger and more efficient internal 
capital market for transferring more resources to the divisions with higher investment 
opportunities (Li and Li 1996, Weston 1970, Stulz 1990, Stein 1997). This pooled internal 
capital markets suggests that diversification creates value since it can avoid the problem of 
foregone good investment opportunities due to the insufficient funds. 
Chay and Suh (2009) argue that firms with high cash flow volatility are expected to rely 
more on internal funds and to pay low dividends due to costly external financing and the fear 
of future cash shortfall. We expect, therefore, that among financially constrained firms, 
diversified firms can fund more good investment projects through internal capital market and 
pay higher dividends than focused firms. This hypothesis is also consistent with the dividend 
signalling hypothesis. Firms pursue the stability of their stocks while firms can pay high 
dividends, to signal future strong performance and stabilize their stocks. On the other hand, 
among the financially unconstrained firms, either diversified firms or focused firms can more 
readily obtain external funds for their good investment projects. Therefore, dividends can be 
paid with sufficient financing internally and externally. We use two proxies, coverage ratio and 
cash flow volatility, to measure the firm’s level of internal and external financial constraint, 
respectively. We expect for either proxy, diversified firms can still pay higher dividend for the 
firms that are facing financial constraint issues. 
Therefore, we proceed to our second hypothesis as follows: 
H2: Firm diversification increase the level of dividend payout ratio in financially 
constrained firms through internal capital market. 
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5.3. Data and sample selection 
We collect data from three sources via Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). Firm 
level and business segment data are obtained from Compustat North America annual 
fundamentals file and segment files. Stock returns data used in portfolio constructions come 
from the Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) monthly stock file. We sample for our 
model from 1979 to 2016. Firms were required to report segment information after December 
15, 1977 by Statement of Financial Accounting Standard (SFAS) No.14.  
We exclude financial firms (SIC from 600 to 6799). The segment data are merged with the 
firm level data to construct our matched samples. We remove any mismatched observations 
which have the summation of segment sales (segment asset) more than 101% or less than 99% 
(more than 125% or less than 75%) of the firm’s total sales (total assets). A detailed description 
of our variables is provided in Table 5.1. For all the balance sheet data constructing accruals, 
we replace the missing values with zero following Ball et al. (2006). For all our empirical tests, 
we trim all continuous-value variables to the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
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TABLE 5.1   
Variable definitions 
Variable name Description Computation / WRDS mnemonic 
(USD million)     
IB Income before extraordinary items  IB 
TA Total assets AT 
NI Net income NI 
DIV Total dividend DIV 
SALES Sales/Turnover (net) SALE 
DIV Dividend payout ratio Total dividend (DIV) scaled by net income (NI) 
ROA Return on asset Income before extraordinary item (IB) scaled by Total assets (AT) lagged by one year 
MV Market value of firm Price_Fiscal Year_Close (PRCC_F) * Common shares oustanding (CSHO) 
SIZE Firm size Log of MV 
LEVERAGE Leverage level  [Long- term debt (DLTT) + Current liabilities (LCT) ] / [Long-term debt (DLTT) +  Current liabilities 
(LCT) + Market value (MV)] 
T_Q Tobin's Q Market value (MV) / Total assets (TA) lagged by one year 
CRD Credit Rating Equal to one if firm has a credit rating, zero otherwise  
RD Research and development expense Research and development (RD) scaled by Total asset (AT) lagged by one year 
CHE Cash Holding Cash holding (CHE) scaled by Total assets (AT) lagged by one year 
RE Retained earning Retained earning (RE) scaled by Total assets (AT) lagged by one year 
CFO volatility Cash flow from operating activities Standard deviation of CFOs from past five years 
FCF Free cash flow Operating income before depreciation (OIBDP)- interest expense(XINT)- taxes(TXT-Change in 
TXDITC)-  preferred dividends (DVP)- common dividends (DVC) 
COVERAGE ratio Coverage ratio Net income (NI)/ interest expense (XINT) 
HERF(TA) Herfindahl index by total asset 
 
HERF(SALE) Herfindahl index by sales 
 
Diver_D Diversity dummy variable Equal to one if firm has more than one business segments, zero otherwise 
† If the data items for preferred stock, long-term debt, debt in current liabilities, minority interest and cash and short-term investments are not available, they are assumed to 
equal zero. 
‡ If the data items from balance sheet accounts are not available, they are assumed to equal zero. 
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5.4. Empirical model 
Our empirical model investigates the relation between dividend payout ratio and firm 
structure by including all the necessary firm level control variables as follows: 
𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑋𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝑇_𝑄𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷_𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑅𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑅&𝐷𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑡+1                                                                        
where our dependent variable 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑡 is the dividend payout ratio which is, the total dividend 
divided by net income. 𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑡is the firm’s profitability measurement using return on asset 
(ROA). This is defined as annual income before extraordinary items and discontinued 
operations (annual Compustat item #18) deflated by lagged total asset (annual Compustat item 
#6). 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 is the logarithm of market value of equity (annual Compustat data item#199*annual 
Compustat data item#25).  𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑡 is the percentage growth in sales over year t; 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑡 
is defined as total debt over total asset. 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑋𝑡 is defined as the capital expenditure scaled by 
lagged total asset. 𝑇_𝑄𝑡 is defined as market value of firm divided by the book value of total 
assets. We include two dummy variables: 𝑅&𝐷𝑡 is equal to one if the firms have research and 
development expense and zero otherwise. 𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷_𝑅𝑡 is equal to one if firms have a credit rating 
and zero otherwise. We also include two additional important variables to control dividend 
payments which are cash holding (𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑡  ), retained earnings (𝑅𝐸𝑡 ), and cash flow from 
operating activities (𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡) all scaled by lagged total assets. 
To distinguish the dividend payout ratio between diversified firms and focused firms, we 
include variable 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑡  which represents the firm’s diversity level. We use three ways to 
define 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑡. First, we use a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has more than one 
business segment and zero otherwise. The dummy variable captures the aggregation difference 
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between one-segment firms and multiple-segment firms. The second and third measurement 
focus on the level of firms’ segments diversity level and we use Herfindal index (AT) and 
Herfindal index (Sales). The Herfindal index is calculated across N segment for each firm j as 
the sum of the squares of each segment i’s total asset (sales) as a proportion of the firm level 
total asset (sales): 






)                                     (2) 
where 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the segment level asset (sales) and 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the firm level total assets (sales). The 
asset (sales) based Herfindahl index reflects the degree to which total assets (sales) are 
diversified across firm’s business segments with a range between zero to one. Focused firm 
has a Herfindahl index of one while the higher the firm diversifies, the lower the Herfindahl 
index is.  
5.5. Empirical results 
5.5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 5.2 presents summary statistics for key variables used in our model and the difference 
between the group of firms that are diversified and the group of focused firms. First, diversified 
firms have mean dividend payment of 22% of their net income which is much higher than the 
dividend payout ratio for the focused firms (mean 10%). In addition, diversified firms and 
focused firms differ in possible determinants of dividend payout ratio. Diversified firms have 
lower cash holdings than focused firms (mean cash holding of 8% of their asset for diversified 
firms versus 19% for focused firms). This difference in cash holdings is consistent with 
previous studies (Opler 1999, Subramaniam, Tang, Yue and Zhou 2011, Tong 2011). 
Conversely, diversified firms hold higher retained earnings than focused firms (median of 22% 
for diversified firms comparing to 8%). We also find that statistically diversified firms and 
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focused firms have similar investment with a median of 6% for diversified firms and 5% for 
focused firms. 
Table 5.2                             
Data descriptive by firm type 
 Focused firm (N= 57065) 
 Diversified firm (N= 26075)  Difference  
 Mean SD 
 Median Mean SD  Median Mean  
DIV PAYOUT 0.097  0.298  0.00  0.219  0.385  0.074  -0.122 *** 
ROA -0.071  0.374  0.03  0.016  0.183  0.043  -0.087 *** 
SIZE 4.183  2.084  4.038  5.182  2.219  5.224  -0.999 *** 
SALESGROWTH 0.212  0.633  0.10  0.156  0.441  0.087  0.056 *** 
LEVERAGE 0.375  0.243  0.338  0.452  0.214  0.445  -0.077 *** 
CAPX 0.087  0.110  0.051  0.078  0.082  0.056  0.009 *** 
T_Q 1.790  3.033  0.900  0.988  1.524  0.629  0.802 *** 
CASH HOLDING 0.189  0.320  0.078  0.08  0.128  0.042  0.109 *** 
RETAINED 
EARNINGS 
-0.705  2.956  0.08  0.013  1.358  0.215  -0.718 *** 
CFO -0.159   0.426   -0.052   -0.057   0.216   -0.019   -0.102 *** 
This table summarizes the variables data descriptive used in our regression analysis including number of observations 
(Obs.), mean, standard deviation (SD) and median. Variable definitions are provided in the notes to Table 5.1. 
Diversified firm is defined as the firms with multiple business segments while focused firms operate only one 
business sectors. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
For firm level control variables, we find that diversified firms have a slightly higher 
leverage ratio (median of 0.4 versus 0.3) and size (median of 5.2 versus 4.0) while much lower 
Tobin’s Q (median 0.6 versus 0.9) and sales growth (median of 9% versus 10%) than focused 
firms. 
5.5.2 Regression evidence 
In this section, we test whether diversified firms have higher dividend payout ratio than 
focused firms after controlling for firms’ specific characteristics and the previously found 
determinants of dividend payments 
5.5.2.1 Firms structure and dividend payout ratio 
Table 5.3 presents the main regression analysis of the relationship between dividend payout 
ratio and diversification. We use the double fixed effect model to control for firm and year 
effects. We calculate standard errors by clustering firm and year. Table 5.3 Regression (1) uses 
a diversification dummy, which is one for diversified firms and zero for focused firms. This 
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shows that diversified firms have a significantly higher dividend payout ratio than focused 
firms after controlling all the previously established determinants of dividend payout ratio such 
as cash holding, retained earnings, investment as well as the firm level variables such as 
leverage, Tobin’s Q, size and credit rating. 
For Table 5.3 Regression (2) and Regression (3), we use an alternative firm structure 
variable in place of a diversity dummy variable. We use a Herfindahl Index based on either 
assets and sales to determine the firms’ level of diversify which means the higher the index, 
the lower the diversify level. Consistent with the findings in Regression (1), we find that firms 
with higher level of diversify have significantly higher level of dividend payout ratios.  
From the three regressions’ results of Table 5.3 we confirm that earnings, size and CFO 
have positive and significant effect on the dividend payout ratios. Firms with high leverage, 
high Tobin’s Q and high credit rating pay lower dividend relative to their earnings which are 
all consistent with the previous studies. 
Overall, we find that diversified firms pay higher dividends relative to their earnings than 
do focused firms. These findings are consistent with the substitute theory of dividend policy 
from the previous studies. 
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Table 5.3             
Dividend payout ratio and firm structure: double fixed effect model        
 Full sample                         
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  
ROA 0.031 0.005 0.000 *** 0.031 0.005 0.000 *** 0.031 0.005 0.000 *** 
SIZE 0.007 0.002 0.006 *** 0.006 0.002 0.010 ** 0.006 0.002 0.009 *** 
SALESGROWTH -0.003 0.002 0.123  -0.003 0.002 0.118  -0.003 0.002 0.121  
LEVERAGE -0.072 0.011 0.000 *** -0.074 0.011 0.000 *** -0.074 0.011 0.000 *** 
CAPX -0.007 0.013 0.623  -0.007 0.013 0.623  -0.007 0.013 0.620  
T_Q -0.002 0.000 0.000 *** -0.002 0.000 0.000 *** -0.002 0.000 0.000 *** 
CREDIT_RATING -0.019 0.007 0.005 *** -0.018 0.007 0.006 *** -0.018 0.007 0.006 *** 
CASH HOLDING 0.006 0.005 0.196  0.006 0.005 0.181  0.006 0.005 0.182  
RETAINED EARNINGS 0.000 0.001 0.703  0.000 0.001 0.713  0.000 0.001 0.701  
R&D 0.000 0.000 0.268  0.000 0.000 0.270  0.000 0.000 0.269  
CFO 0.011 0.004 0.005 *** 0.011 0.004 0.005 *** 0.011 0.004 0.004 *** 
DIVERSITY_D 0.013 0.005 0.011 **     
   
 
HERF_ASSET     -0.041 0.011 0.000 *** 
   
 
HERF_SALES     
   
 -0.038 0.012 0.001 *** 
             
R^2  0.396    0.396    0.396   
This table presents the results of dividend payout ratio and firm structure. Three measures of diversification are used. In regression (1), diversification is dummy 
variable equals one if a firm has more than one segments and zero otherwise. In regression (2) and (3), diversification is calculated as Herfindahl Index based on 
asset and sales. Dependent variable is the dividend payout ratio defined as total dividend divided by net income. Definitions of independent variables are 
provided in the notes to Table 5.1. Reported coefficients are the average coefficients over the estimation period from 1980 to 2016. Firm and year fixed effect 
are controlled in the regression. The number of observation is 60049. Standard errors are clustered by firm and fiscal year. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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5.5.2.2 Agency problem hypothesis 
To test our agency problem hypothesis, we use two proxies of agency problems which are 
free cash flow and Tobin’s Q. We divide our sample into two groups based on whether free 
cash flow (Tobin’s Q) is higher than the industry median every year. We use two-digits 
Standard Industry Code (SIC) as our industry classification. 
We show the results using free cash flow as the agency problem criterion in Table 5.4 Panel 
A. We find that among the group with high free cash flows, all three measures of diversification 
variable are highly significant. In other words, for firms with high agency problems, diversified 
firms pay higher dividends than focused firms. In addition, firms with higher diversification 
levels make higher dividend payouts. In Panel B, there is no significant difference in payout 
ratio between diversified firms and focused firms.  
Using Tobin’s Q as an alternative proxy for agency problem, we find similar results in 
Panel C and D. Overall, the results are consistent to the agency problem hypothesis that 





Table 5.4             
Dividend payout ratio and firm structure: agency hypothesis        
Panel A: Group by Free-Cash Flow                     
        High Agency Problem         
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  
ROA 0.054 0.012 0.000 *** 0.055 0.012 0.000 *** 0.055 0.012 0.000 *** 
SIZE 0.011 0.003 0.000 *** 0.011 0.003 0.000 *** 0.011 0.003 0.000 *** 
SALESGROWTH -0.007 0.004 0.074 * -0.007 0.004 0.073 * -0.007 0.004 0.072 * 
LEVERAGE -0.043 0.014 0.003 *** -0.044 0.014 0.002 *** -0.044 0.014 0.002 *** 
CAPX -0.054 0.018 0.003  -0.054 0.018 0.003 *** -0.054 0.018 0.003 *** 
T_Q -0.005 0.001 0.000 *** -0.005 0.001 0.000 *** -0.005 0.001 0.000 *** 
CREDIT_RATING 0.016 0.006 0.010 *** 0.016 0.006 0.009 *** 0.016 0.006 0.010 *** 
CASH HOLDING 0.008 0.008 0.333  0.008 0.008 0.334  0.007 0.008 0.339  
RETAINED EARNINGS 0.002 0.001 0.114  0.002 0.001 0.106  0.002 0.001 0.106  
R&D 0.000 0.000 0.683  0.000 0.000 0.666  0.000 0.000 0.676  
CFO 0.019 0.007 0.007  0.019 0.007 0.007 *** 0.019 0.007 0.007 *** 
DIVERSITY_D 0.014 0.006 0.028 **     
   
 
HERF_ASSET     -0.037 0.013 0.006 *** 
   
 
HERF_SALES     
   
 -0.036 0.014 0.009 *** 
             
R^2  0.471    0.471    0.471   
This table presents the results by agency problem. The regressions are presented across the groups of high agency and low agency problems. The criteria for agency 
problem are free cash flow (Panel A &B) and Tobin's Q (Panel C &D). Three measures of diversification are used. In regression (1), diversification is dummy variable 
equals one if a firm has more than one segments and zero otherwise. In regression (2) and (3), diversification is calculated as Herfindahl Index based on asset and sales. 
Dependent variable is the dividend payout ratio defined as total dividend divided by net income. Definitions of independent variables are provided in the notes to Table 
5.1. Reported coefficients are the average coefficients over the estimation period from 1980 to 2016. Firm and year fixed effect are controlled in the regression. The 





Table 5.4             
Dividend payout ratio and firm structure: agency hypothesis   
Panel B: Group by Free-Cash Flow     
        Low Agency Problem      
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  
ROA 0.030 0.007 0.000 *** 0.030 0.007 0.000 *** 0.030 0.007 0.000 *** 
SIZE 0.021 0.004 0.000 *** 0.021 0.004 0.000 *** 0.021 0.004 0.000 *** 
SALESGROWTH -0.003 0.002 0.145  -0.003 0.002 0.129  -0.003 0.002 0.138  
LEVERAGE -0.063 0.019 0.001 *** -0.066 0.019 0.001 *** -0.065 0.019 0.001 *** 
CAPX 0.036 0.027 0.172  0.036 0.027 0.171  0.037 0.027 0.169  
T_Q -0.003 0.001 0.000 *** -0.003 0.001 0.000 *** -0.003 0.001 0.000 *** 
CREDIT_RATING 0.011 0.011 0.293  0.011 0.011 0.297  0.011 0.011 0.299  
CASH HOLDING 0.004 0.006 0.561  0.004 0.006 0.512  0.004 0.006 0.519  
RETAINED EARNINGS -0.002 0.001 0.022 ** -0.002 0.001 0.021 ** -0.002 0.001 0.022 ** 
R&D 0.000 0.000 0.556  0.000 0.000 0.554  0.000 0.000 0.555  
CFO 0.008 0.006 0.157  0.008 0.006 0.143  0.008 0.006 0.145  
DIVERSITY_D 0.006 0.009 0.521  
   
     
HERF_ASSET     -0.039 0.022 0.076 *     
HERF_SALES                 -0.033 0.023 0.143   
             
R^2  0.390    0.390    0.390   
This table presents the results by agency problem. The regressions are presented across the groups of high agency and low agency problems. The criteria for agency problem 
are free cash flow (Panel A &B) and Tobin's Q (Panel C &D). Three measures of diversification are used. In regression (1), diversification is dummy variable equals one if a 
firm has more than one segments and zero otherwise. In regression (2) and (3), diversification is calculated as Herfindahl Index based on asset and sales. Dependent variable is 
the dividend payout ratio defined as total dividend divided by net income. Definitions of independent variables are provided in the notes to Table 5.1. Reported coefficients are 
the average coefficients over the estimation period from 1980 to 2016. Firm and year fixed effect are controlled in the regression. The number of observation is 21158. Standard 
errors are clustered by firm and fiscal year. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5.4             
Dividend payout ratio and firm structure: agency hypothesis        
Panel C: Group by Tobin's Q               
        High Agency Problem         
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  
ROA 0.100 0.011 0.000 *** 0.100 0.011 0.000 *** 0.101 0.011 0.000 *** 
SIZE 0.020 0.003 0.000 *** 0.019 0.003 0.000 *** 0.019 0.003 0.000 *** 
SALESGROWTH 0.001 0.003 0.662  0.001 0.003 0.693  0.001 0.003 0.682  
LEVERAGE -0.106 0.015 0.000 *** -0.108 0.015 0.000 *** -0.108 0.015 0.000 *** 
CAPX 0.009 0.023 0.701  0.009 0.023 0.692  0.009 0.023 0.693  
T_Q -0.030 0.004 0.000 *** -0.029 0.004 0.000 *** -0.029 0.004 0.000 *** 
CREDIT_RATING 0.025 0.006 0.000 *** 0.026 0.006 0.000 *** 0.025 0.006 0.000 *** 
CASH HOLDING -0.008 0.012 0.510  -0.007 0.012 0.536  -0.007 0.012 0.540  
RETAINED EARNINGS -0.004 0.001 0.000  -0.004 0.001 0.000 *** -0.004 0.001 0.000 *** 
R&D 0.000 0.000 0.943  0.000 0.000 0.941  0.000 0.000 0.941  
CFO 0.015 0.008 0.070  0.015 0.008 0.067 * 0.015 0.008 0.069 * 
DIVERSITY_D 0.011 0.006 0.055 *         
HERF_ASSET     -0.039 0.014 0.004 ***     
HERF_SALES     
   
 -0.035 0.014 0.010 ** 
             
R^2  0.37    0.37    0.37   
This table presents the results by agency problem. The regressions are presented across the groups of high agency and low agency problems. The criteria for agency problem 
are free cash flow (Panel A &B) and Tobin's Q (Panel C &D). Three measures of diversification are used. In regression (1), diversification is dummy variable equals one 
if a firm has more than one segments and zero otherwise. In regression (2) and (3), diversification is calculated as Herfindahl Index based on asset and sales. Dependent 
variable is the dividend payout ratio defined as total dividend divided by net income. Definitions of independent variables are provided in the notes to Table 5.1. Reported 
coefficients are the average coefficients over the estimation period from 1980 to 2016. The number of observation is 37407. Firm and year fixed effect are controlled in 






Table 5.4             
Dividend payout ratio and firm structure: agency hypothesis       
Panel D: Group by Tobin's Q                     
        Low Agency Problem      
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  
ROA -0.001 0.006 0.861  -0.001 0.006 0.861  -0.001 0.006 0.860  
SIZE -0.002 0.004 0.685  -0.002 0.004 0.656  -0.002 0.004 0.649  
SALESGROWTH -0.004 0.002 0.065 * -0.004 0.002 0.063 * -0.004 0.002 0.062 * 
LEVERAGE 0.040 0.024 0.098 * 0.039 0.024 0.104  0.039 0.024 0.107  
CAPX -0.047 0.023 0.039 ** -0.047 0.023 0.039 ** -0.047 0.023 0.039 ** 
T_Q 0.001 0.001 0.248  0.001 0.001 0.242  0.001 0.001 0.241  
CREDIT_RATING -0.011 0.009 0.225  -0.011 0.009 0.224  -0.011 0.009 0.224  
CASH HOLDING 0.004 0.005 0.445  0.004 0.005 0.435  0.004 0.005 0.430  
RETAINED EARNINGS 0.003 0.001 0.003 *** 0.003 0.001 0.003 *** 0.003 0.001 0.004 *** 
R&D 0.000 0.000 0.466  0.000 0.000 0.465  0.000 0.000 0.464  
CFO 0.006 0.005 0.245  0.006 0.005 0.242  0.006 0.005 0.237  
DIVERSITY_D 0.004 0.011 0.707  
   
     
HERF_ASSET     -0.015 0.024 0.525      
HERF_SALES         -0.018 0.024 0.442  
             
R^2  0.53    0.53    0.53   
This table presents the results by agency problem. The regressions are presented across the groups of high agency and low agency problems. The criteria for agency 
problem are free cash flow (Panel A &B) and Tobin's Q (Panel C &D). Three measures of diversification are used. In regression (1), diversification is dummy variable 
equals one if a firm has more than one segments and zero otherwise. In regression (2) and (3), diversification is calculated as Herfindahl Index based on asset and sales. 
Dependent variable is the dividend payout ratio defined as total dividend divided by net income. Definitions of independent variables are provided in the notes to Table 
5.1. Reported coefficients are the average coefficients over the estimation period from 1980 to 2016. Firm and year fixed effect are controlled in the regression. The 





5.5.2.3 Financial Constraint hypothesis 
We include two measures of financial constraints, coverage ratio and cash flow volatility, 
in Table 5.5 to proceed our internal capital market hypothesis.  
We use coverage ratio and cash flow volatility to measure the firm’s financial constraints. 
We use coverage ratio to measure if firms are internally constraint as it directly measures the 
availability of internal funds which is consistent with several prior literatures (Cleary 1999, 
and Guariglia 2008). We define coverage ratio as net income dividend by interest expenses. A 
high coverage ratio indicates sufficient internal funds. We select firms as internally constraint 
firms if their coverage ratio is below the median coverage ratio with the same industry 
membership (2-digits SIC codes) in yearly basis.  
Cash flow volatility is another common measure of financial constraint since higher cash 
flow volatility implies that firms are more likely to experience cash shortfall internally. Minton 
and Schrand (1999) shows that cash flow volatility is associated with lower investment and 
higher cost of accessing external financing. We construct the cash flow volatility as the 
standard deviation of firm’s past 5 years’ cash flows from operating activities. We select the 
firms into high financial constraint group in yearly basis as if the firms cash flow volatility is 
below the median cash flow volatility by the same industry membership (2-digit SIC code) and 
firms belongs to the low financial constraint groups if the cash flow volatility is above this 
industry median benchmark. 
In Panel A and B, we present the results of a firm’s structure’s relation to dividend payout 
in the financially constrained sub-group and the unconstrained sub-group. We see the diversity 
dummy variable and two alternative diversity level variables are highly significant for the firms 
with financial constraint, but not in the unconstrained firms.  
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Similar findings are found in Panel C and D using cash flow volatility as a criterion of 
financial constraint. Overall, the results suggest that among the firms with the financial 
constraint condition, diversified firms can pay higher dividends to earnings than focused firms. 
This is consistent with our hypothesis that diversified firms can pay higher dividends through 
their efficient internal capital market when they are financially constrained.
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Table 5.5             
Dividend payout ratio and firm structure: financial constraint hypothesis    
Panel A: Group by coverage ratio             
        Unconstraint Firms         
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  
ROA 0.001 0.010 0.909  0.001 0.010 0.903  0.001 0.010 0.906  
SIZE 0.005 0.004 0.155  0.005 0.004 0.171  0.005 0.004 0.152  
SALESGROWTH -0.003 0.003 0.239  -0.003 0.003 0.238  -0.003 0.003 0.241  
LEVERAGE -0.078 0.019 0.000 *** -0.079 0.019 0.000 *** -0.078 0.019 0.000 *** 
CAPX -0.052 0.025 0.038  -0.052 0.025 0.037 ** -0.052 0.025 0.038 ** 
T_Q -0.003 0.001 0.000 *** -0.003 0.001 0.000 *** -0.003 0.001 0.000 *** 
CREDIT_RATING 0.013 0.008 0.115  0.013 0.008 0.114  0.013 0.008 0.114  
CASH HOLDING 0.005 0.007 0.476  0.005 0.007 0.473  0.005 0.007 0.486  
RETAINED EARNINGS 0.000 0.001 0.835  0.000 0.001 0.834  0.000 0.001 0.846  
R&D 0.000 0.000 0.261  0.000 0.000 0.261  0.000 0.000 0.261  
CFO 0.023 0.007 0.001  0.023 0.007 0.001 *** 0.023 0.007 0.001 *** 
DIVERSITY_D 0.007 0.008 0.428          
HERF_ASSET 
   
 -0.021 0.019 0.268      
HERF_SALES 
   
 
   
 -0.012 0.018 0.521  
             
R^2  0.384    0.384    0.384   
This table presents the results by financial constraint problem. The regressions are presented across the groups of financially unconstraint and constraint. The criteria 
for financial constraint are coverage ratio (Panel A &B) and cash flow volatility (Panel C &D). Three measures of diversification are used. In regression (1), 
diversification is dummy variable equals one if a firm has more than one segments and zero otherwise. In regression (2) and (3), diversification is calculated as 
Herfindahl Index based on asset and sales. Dependent variable is the dividend payout ratio defined as total dividend divided by net income. Definitions of independent 
variables are provided in the notes to Table 5.1. Reported coefficients are the average coefficients over the estimation period from 1980 to 2016. Firm and year fixed 
effect are controlled in the regression. The number of observation is 38144. Standard errors are clustered by firm and fiscal year. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 




Table 5.5             
Dividend payout ratio and firm structure: financial constraint hypothesis     
Panel B: Group by coverage ratio       
        Constraint firms      
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  
ROA 0.031 0.006 0.000 *** 0.031 0.006 0.000 *** 0.031 0.006 0.000 *** 
SIZE 0.019 0.003 0.000 *** 0.019 0.003 0.000 *** 0.019 0.003 0.000 *** 
SALESGROWTH -0.004 0.002 0.036 ** -0.004 0.002 0.035 ** -0.004 0.002 0.037 ** 
LEVERAGE -0.036 0.014 0.013 ** -0.037 0.014 0.009 *** -0.037 0.014 0.010 *** 
CAPX -0.013 0.016 0.431  -0.013 0.016 0.441  -0.013 0.016 0.438  
T_Q -0.003 0.001 0.000 *** -0.003 0.001 0.000 *** -0.003 0.001 0.000 *** 
CREDIT_RATING 0.013 0.007 0.068 * 0.013 0.007 0.067 * 0.013 0.007 0.068 * 
CASH HOLDING 0.008 0.006 0.187  0.008 0.006 0.180  0.008 0.006 0.176  
RETAINED EARNINGS -0.001 0.001 0.233  -0.001 0.001 0.240  -0.001 0.001 0.239  
R&D 0.000 0.000 0.130  0.000 0.000 0.128  0.000 0.000 0.126  
CFO 0.006 0.005 0.269  0.006 0.005 0.273  0.006 0.005 0.262  
DIVERSITY_D 0.016 0.006 0.012 ** 
   
     
HERF_ASSET 
   
 -0.043 0.014 0.003 ***     
HERF_SALES                 -0.042 0.015 0.004 *** 
             
R^2  0.46    0.46    0.46   
This table presents the results by financial constraint problem. The regressions are presented across the groups of financially unconstraint and constraint. The criteria 
for financial constraint are coverage ratio (Panel A &B) and cash flow volatility (Panel C &D). Three measures of diversification are used. In regression (1), 
diversification is dummy variable equals one if a firm has more than one segments and zero otherwise. In regression (2) and (3), diversification is calculated as 
Herfindahl Index based on asset and sales. Dependent variable is the dividend payout ratio defined as total dividend divided by net income. Definitions of independent 
variables are provided in the notes to Table 5.1. Reported coefficients are the average coefficients over the estimation period from 1980 to 2016. Firm and year fixed 
effect are controlled in the regression. The number of observation is 17025. Standard errors are clustered by firm and fiscal year. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 





Table 5.5             
Dividend payout ratio and firm structure: financial constraint hypothesis      
Panel C. Group by cash flow volatility                   
        Unconstraint Firms         
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  
ROA 0.031 0.012 0.011 ** 0.031 0.012 0.011 ** 0.031 0.012 0.011 ** 
SIZE 0.020 0.006 0.001 *** 0.020 0.006 0.001 *** 0.020 0.006 0.001 *** 
SALESGROWTH -0.001 0.004 0.885  0.000 0.004 0.903  0.000 0.004 0.906  
LEVERAGE -0.041 0.026 0.116  -0.041 0.026 0.114  -0.041 0.026 0.119  
CAPX -0.011 0.036 0.768  -0.011 0.036 0.768  -0.011 0.036 0.769  
T_Q -0.002 0.001 0.018 ** -0.002 0.001 0.018 ** -0.002 0.001 0.018 ** 
CREDIT_RATING 0.010 0.013 0.416  0.010 0.013 0.417  0.010 0.013 0.417  
CASH HOLDING -0.013 0.010 0.206  -0.013 0.010 0.204  -0.013 0.010 0.201  
RETAINED EARNINGS -0.002 0.001 0.206  -0.002 0.001 0.209  -0.002 0.001 0.210  
R&D 0.000 0.000 0.370  0.000 0.000 0.370  0.000 0.000 0.373  
CFO 0.013 0.010 0.187  0.013 0.010 0.188  0.013 0.010 0.188  
DIVERSITY_D 0.010 0.013 0.437          
HERF_ASSET     -0.020 0.028 0.479      
HERF_SALES     
   
 -0.016 0.030 0.588  
             
R^2  0.405    0.405    0.405   
This table presents the results by financial constraint problem. The regressions are presented across the groups of financially unconstraint and constraint. The criteria 
for financial constraint are coverage ratio (Panel A &B) and cash flow volatility (Panel C &D). Three measures of diversification are used. In regression (1), 
diversification is dummy variable equals one if a firm has more than one segments and zero otherwise. In regression (2) and (3), diversification is calculated as 
Herfindahl Index based on asset and sales. Dependent variable is the dividend payout ratio defined as total dividend divided by net income. Definitions of independent 
variables are provided in the notes to Table 5.1. Reported coefficients are the average coefficients over the estimation period from 1980 to 2016. Firm and year fixed 
effect are controlled in the regression. The number of observation is 41294. Standard errors are clustered by firm and fiscal year. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 




Table 5.5             
Dividend payout ratio and firm structure: financial constraint hypothesis 
Panel D. Group by cash flow volatility         
        Constraint firms      
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  
ROA 0.043 0.012 0.000 *** 0.044 0.012 0.000 *** 0.044 0.012 0.000 *** 
SIZE 0.021 0.004 0.000 *** 0.020 0.004 0.000 *** 0.020 0.004 0.000 *** 
SALESGROWTH -0.005 0.004 0.228  -0.005 0.004 0.220  -0.005 0.004 0.228  
LEVERAGE -0.062 0.018 0.000 *** -0.065 0.018 0.000 *** -0.065 0.018 0.000 *** 
CAPX -0.069 0.025 0.006 *** -0.068 0.025 0.007 *** -0.069 0.025 0.007 *** 
T_Q -0.008 0.001 0.000 *** -0.008 0.001 0.000 *** -0.008 0.001 0.000 *** 
CREDIT_RATING 0.009 0.008 0.292  0.009 0.008 0.281  0.008 0.008 0.295  
CASH HOLDING 0.011 0.011 0.330  0.011 0.011 0.312  0.011 0.011 0.323  
RETAINED EARNINGS -0.001 0.001 0.338  -0.001 0.001 0.353  -0.001 0.001 0.350  
R&D 0.000 0.000 0.179  0.000 0.000 0.182  0.000 0.000 0.183  
CFO 0.018 0.009 0.054 * 0.018 0.009 0.054 * 0.018 0.009 0.055 * 
DIVERSITY_D 0.018 0.007 0.008 *** 
   
     
HERF_ASSET 
   
 -0.056 0.016 0.000 ***     
HERF_SALES 
   
     -0.051 0.016 0.001 *** 
             
R^2  0.341    0.341    0.341   
This table presents the results by financial constraint problem. The regressions are presented across the groups of financially unconstraint and constraint. The criteria 
for financial constraint are coverage ratio (Panel A &B) and cash flow volatility (Panel C &D). Three measures of diversification are used. In regression (1), 
diversification is dummy variable equals one if a firm has more than one segments and zero otherwise. In regression (2) and (3), diversification is calculated as 
Herfindahl Index based on asset and sales. Dependent variable is the dividend payout ratio defined as total dividend divided by net income. Definitions of independent 
variables are provided in the notes to Table 5.1. Reported coefficients are the average coefficients over the estimation period from 1980 to 2016. Firm and year fixed 
effect are controlled in the regression. The number of observation is 14538. Standard errors are clustered by firm and fiscal year. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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5.6. Robustness tests and additional analyses 
Firm diversification can be an endogenous choice by a firm (Campa and Kedia 2002, 
Graham et al., 2002). In this section, we introduce three econometric methods to control for 
any endogeneity problem in our regression tests. These are the propensity score matching 
method and the Heckman (1979) two-stage estimation and fixed effect model. 
5.6.1. Methodology 
In this section, we present the estimation of the probability of diversifying. The results are 
reported in Table 6 and will be used in the propensity score matching method and Heckman’s 
self-selection model. 
5.6.2. Propensity-score matching 
We use propensity score matching model to control for sample selection bias due to 
observable characteristics. As noted earlier in this thesis, Roberts and Whited (2012) comment 
that propensity score matching is the most commonly used methodology to address 
endogeneity concerns due to its simplicity. Based on the one-equation system, the key benefit 
of using the matched sample for the regression analysis is that it avoids specification of the 
function Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang (2014). While the disadvantage is the that the 
potential outcomes are taken as independent of the treatment assignment is untestable. 
Therefore, we use propensity score matching as a robust test to control for the difference of 
dividend payout accompanying firm diversification. The propensity score match method 
conducts two stages to estimate the average treatment effect for the treated group (ATT). We 
define the treatment indicator equals 1 firm diversified firms and 0 for focused firms. The 
outcome variable is the dividend payout ratio. In the first stage, we predict the probability of 
diversifying by using  a logit regression, where the dependent variable takes value of 1 for 
diversified firms and 0 for focused firms. We use all the control variables that we use in our 
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main regression as the independent variables in the logit regression. In the second step, based 
on the propensity scores obtained from the predicted probabilities in stage one, we construct 
the common support sample (matched sample) by using the nearest neighbourhood matching. 
This matching is a one-to-one matching with replacement so that one diversified firm is 
matched with a focused firm with the nearest propensity score. Table 5.6 Panel A presents the 
statistic difference between diversified firms and focused firms using the matched sample. 
Compared with the unmatched sample, the mean difference of control variables between 
diversified firms and focused firms becomes much smaller and statistically insignificant. This 
indicates that our propensity score match tests are generally successful. In addition, we find 
that the diversified firms have significantly higher dividend payout than focused firm under 
this propensity matched sample.  
Table 5.6             
The effect of diversification on dividend payout: propensity score matching estimations 
Panel A: matched sample description       
 Diversified firm  
 Focused firm (Control firms)  Difference  
 Mean 
 Mean  Mean  
DIV PAYOUT 0.228  0.167  0.061 *** 
ROA 0.027  0.021  0.006 * 
SIZE 5.419  5.007  0.412  
SALESGROWTH 0.13  0.127  0.003  
LEVERAGE 0.454  0.456  -0.002  
CAPX 0.076  0.078  -0.002 ** 
T_Q 0.896  0.937  -0.041 * 
CRD 0.526  0.492  0.034  
CASH HOLDING 0.071  0.076  -0.005  
RETAINED 
EARNINGS 
0.082  0.039  0.043 * 
CFO -0.039   -0.048   0.009 ** 
This table reports the statistic difference between diversified firms and focused firms using the propensity matched 
sample to estimate the average treatment effect for the treated group. The treatment indicator equals 1 for diversified 
firms and 0 for focused firms. Detailed propensity score matched steps are described in the main content. Difference 
is the mean difference between diversified firms and the focused firms (the control group) using the paired T-tests. 
Variable definitions are provided in the notes to Table 5.1. Diversified firm is defined as the firms with multiple 
business segments while focused firms operate only one business sectors. There are 19721 matches.  ***, **, and 
* indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 5.6 Panel B re-examines our tests of firm diversification and dividend payout ratio 
using the propensity-matched sample. For all three specifications of diversification 
measurements, diversified firms have significantly higher dividend payout ratio than focused 
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firms. In Appendix 5.1, we find that in both criteria of agency problems using free cash flow 
(results reported in Panel A and B) and Tobin’s Q (results reported in Panel C and D), 
diversified firms pay higher dividend relative to their earnings comparing to focused firms 
when these firms are in the agency problem groups and there is no difference in firm structure 
and dividend payout ratios when firms are not suffering agency problems. 
In the rest of the tables of Appendix 5.1, we test our efficient internal capital market 
hypothesis by classifying whether firms are suffering financial constraints. Firms with higher 
CFO volatility (results reported in Panel E and F) or coverage ratio (results reported in Panel 
G and H) have higher possibility of suffering financial constraints. Results suggest that under 
the sample of financial constraints firms, diversified firms pay higher dividends relative to their 
earnings and this difference is much weaker or insignificant under the group of financially 
unconstrained groups.  
Overall, under the propensity matching method, using the matched sample, our findings are 
consistent with our main regression analysis and hypothesis.  
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Table 5.6             
Dividend payout ratio and firm structure: double-fixed effect regression model under propensity matched sample 
Panel B: Full regression                       
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  
ROA 0.091 0.025 0.000 *** 0.091 0.025 0.000 *** 0.092 0.025 0.000 *** 
SIZE 0.003 0.004 0.461  0.002 0.004 0.560  0.002 0.004 0.578  
SALESGROWTH 0.001 0.006 0.818  0.001 0.006 0.848  0.001 0.006 0.843  
LEVERAGE -0.127 0.022 0.000 *** -0.130 0.022 0.000 *** -0.130 0.022 0.000 *** 
CAPX 0.022 0.029 0.436  0.022 0.029 0.439  0.022 0.029 0.449  
T_Q -0.010 0.002 0.000 *** -0.009 0.002 0.000 *** -0.009 0.002 0.000 *** 
CREDIT_RATING -0.026 0.009 0.003 *** -0.025 0.009 0.005 *** -0.025 0.009 0.005 *** 
CASH HOLDING -0.047 0.017 0.007 *** -0.046 0.017 0.008 *** -0.046 0.017 0.008 *** 
RETAINED EARNINGS 0.003 0.002 0.279  0.003 0.002 0.273  0.003 0.002 0.282  
R&D 0.011 0.005 0.025 ** 0.012 0.005 0.019 ** 0.011 0.005 0.040 ** 
CFO 0.021 0.014 0.150  0.020 0.014 0.153  0.021 0.014 0.139  
DIVERSITY_D 0.018 0.007 0.013 ** 
   
 
   
 
HERF_ASSET 
   
 -0.054 0.015 0.000 *** 
   
 
HERF_SALES 
   
 
   
 -0.055 0.016 0.001 *** 
             
R^2  0.384    0.384    0.384   
This table presents the results of dividend payout ratio and firm structure under propensity score matched sample. Propensity score matched firms are selected based 
on propensity scores estimated using our regression model parameters. Three measures of diversification are used. In regression (1), diversification is dummy 
variable equals one if a firm has more than one segments and zero otherwise. In regression (2) and (3), diversification is calculated as Herfindahl Index based on 
asset and sales. Dependent variable is the dividend payout ratio defined as total dividend divided by net income. Definitions of independent variables are provided 
in the notes to Table 5.1. Reported coefficients are the average coefficients over the estimation period from 1980 to 2016. Firm and year fixed effect are controlled 
in the regression. The number of observation is 39442. Standard errors are clustered by firm and fiscal year. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 




5.6.3. Heckman two-stage estimation 
We use Heckman (1979) two-stage estimation tests to solve the self-selection problem. In 
the first stage, we use a probit regression to estimate the probability of a firm choosing to 
diversify. The “treatment effect” is based on the difference between diversified firms and the 
matched focused firms with similar propensity scores of the “decision to diversify”. We follow 
the selections of Campa and Kedia (2002) for variables used in their first-stage Heckman test 
(a probit model to investigate the firms’ decisions to diversify). First, firms’ characteristics are 
used in the probit model. They include current as well as past two year’s firm size, EBIT, 
capital expenditure as the key factors for firms’ decision to diversify. They also add two 
dummy variables whether firms are listed on major stock exchange (listed on Nasdaq, NYSE 
or AMEX) and whether firms belong to S&P index. Second, they include industry level 
variables: Fraction of Diversified Firms in the Industry is the fraction of all the firms in the 
industry that are diversified firms. Fraction of Industry Sales by Diversified Firms is the 
fraction of industry sales accounted for by diversified firms. Third, year and economic factors 
are also controlled. GDP is Gross Domestic Product. GDP Growth is the growth rate of Gross 
Domestic Product. We report the probit estimation in Table 5.7 Panel A. In the second-stage 
of Heckman test, based on the estimated probability of firms’ choice to diversity from Panel A, 
we use the estimated coefficients to construct Inverse Mills Ratios as an additional control 
variable which include the treatment effects for firms’ self-selection into diversification in our 




Table 5.7     
Dividend payout ratio and firm structure: Heckman test 
Panel A. First stage of Heckman estimation: probit regression 
 
Coef. Std. Err. p-value 
 
(Intercept) -1.323 0.040 0.000 *** 
EBIT 0.261 0.032 0.000 *** 
EBIT.L1 0.000 0.000 0.029 ** 
EBIT.L2 0.056 0.018 0.002 *** 
CAPX.L1 -0.001 0.003 0.689  
CAPX.L2 -0.033 0.014 0.020 ** 
CAPX -0.846 0.063 0.000 *** 
MSE 0.027 0.012 0.033 ** 
GDPG 0.211 0.378 0.578  
GDP.L1 -0.006 0.000 0.000 *** 
SP 0.088 0.017 0.000 *** 
PNDIV 0.260 0.027 0.000 *** 
PSDIV 2.570 0.048 0.000 *** 
SIZE.L2 0.018 0.008 0.030 ** 
SIZE 0.043 0.009 0.000 *** 
SIZE.L1 0.068 0.011 0.000 *** 
This table presents probit estimates of the first stage of Heckman test. The dependent variable is firm 
diversification which is 1 if firms have more than one segments and 0 otherwise. EBIT is the earnings before 
interests and taxes deflated by total assets. CAPX is capital expenditure to assets. MSE is dummy variable 
which equal to 1 if the firm is listed on Nasdaq, NYSE, or AMEX, and 0 otherwise. GDP and GDP are Gross 
Domestic Product and the growth rate of GDP. SP is a dummy variable taking value of 1 if the firms is part of 
S&P index and 0 otherwise. PNDIV is the fraction of diversified firms in the industry is the fraction of all firms 
in the industry that are diversified firms. PSDIV is the fraction of industry sales accounted for by diversified 
firms. The number of observation is 64331. Standard errors are clustered by firms. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
We repeat our full tests of relationship between firm diversification and dividend payout 
ratio by including this Inverse Mills Ratio as a control for selection bias. In Table 5.7 Panel B, 
Consistent with our earlier findings, we find that diversified firms have significantly higher 
dividend payout ratio compared to focused firms.   
In Appendix 5.2, we also test our analysis by dividing firms into groups based on whether 
they have agency problems. For Panel A and B, we use free cash flow as the criteria of agency 
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problem. For Panel C and D, we use Tobin’s Q as the agency problem proxy. Under the second 
stage of Heckman test, we find that diversified firms pay in a significantly higher dividend 
payout ratio than focused firms under the agency problem groups. In addition, there is no 
difference in dividend payout ratio in the groups with no agency problems.  
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Table 5.7             
Dividend payout ratio and firm structure: double-fixed effect regression model with second stage of Heckman test 
Panel B. Full regression                       
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  
ROA 0.031 0.009 0.001 *** 0.031 0.009 0.001 *** 0.031 0.009 0.001 *** 
SIZE 0.019 0.003 0.000 *** 0.018 0.003 0.000 *** 0.018 0.003 0.000 *** 
SALESGROWTH -0.003 0.003 0.309  -0.003 0.003 0.306  -0.003 0.003 0.313  
LEVERAGE -0.062 0.016 0.000 *** -0.064 0.016 0.000 *** -0.064 0.016 0.000 *** 
CAPX -0.032 0.019 0.082 * -0.032 0.018 0.085 * -0.032 0.018 0.085 * 
T_Q -0.005 0.001 0.000 *** -0.005 0.001 0.000 *** -0.005 0.001 0.000 *** 
CREDIT_RATING 0.011 0.008 0.151  0.011 0.008 0.143  0.011 0.008 0.149  
CASH HOLDING -0.001 0.008 0.880  -0.001 0.008 0.904  -0.001 0.008 0.896  
RETAINED EARNINGS -0.002 0.001 0.030 ** -0.002 0.001 0.032 ** -0.002 0.001 0.032 ** 
R&D 0.000 0.000 0.176  0.000 0.000 0.179  0.000 0.000 0.180  
CFO 0.020 0.006 0.002 *** 0.020 0.006 0.002 *** 0.020 0.006 0.002 *** 
INVERSE MILLS RATIO -0.004 0.006 0.512  -0.004 0.006 0.531  -0.004 0.006 0.508  
DIVERSITY_D 0.019 0.006 0.004 *** 
   
 
   
 
HERF_ASSET 
   
 -0.050 0.014 0.000 *** 
   
 
HERF_SALES 
   
 
   
 -0.049 0.015 0.001 *** 
             
R^2  0.361    0.361    0.361   
This table presents the results of dividend payout ratio and firm structure under the second stage of Heckman test. We obtain Inverse Mills Ratio from the first stage of 
Heckman test using a probit model in Table 8 Panel A. Three measures of diversification are used. In regression (1), diversification is dummy variable equals one if a 
firm has more than one segments and zero otherwise. In regression (2) and (3), diversification is calculated as Herfindahl Index based on asset and sales. Dependent 
variable is the dividend payout ratio defined as total dividend divided by net income. Definitions of independent variables are provided in the notes to Table 5.1. Reported 
coefficients are the average coefficients over the estimation period from 1980 to 2016. The number of observation is 55368. Firm and year fixed effect are controlled in 
the regression. Standard errors are clustered by firm and fiscal year. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Similar tests are summarized in Appendix 5.2 by dividing the firms into whether or not they 
are financially constrained. Panels E and F uses the coverage ratio and Panels G and H uses 
operating cash flow volatility as the criteria of financial constraints separately. Both criteria 
grouping methods show consistent findings. For the financially constrained firms, diversified 
firms pay higher dividends relative to their earnings comparing to focused firms and there is 
no significant difference in dividend payout ratio under the financially unconstraint groups. 
For all the above analysis, the Inverse Mills Ratios are all insignificant in all the analysis 
and our results are robust after controlling for self-selection problems. 
 
5.7. Additional tests 
5.7.1. Alternative measures of dividend payment 
We define dividend payout ratio as the total dividend scaled by net income as our dependent 
variable. We use different dividend payout ratios measures as in our model for robustness 
checks. First, in unreported tests, we define our dependent variable as total cash dividends paid 
to common and preferred shareholders scaled by earnings after taxes and interest but before 
extraordinary items.  Second, we use whether to pay dividend as an additional proxy for 
dividend policy and alternatively, we use a logit regression model with fixed effect to test our 
main analysis.  
Overall, we find results consistent with our main regression analyses testing our agency 




5.7.2. Financial Life-cycle dividend theory 
Prior empirical studies suggest that mature and established firms usually pay dividends 
(DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz 2006, Chay and Suh 2009). Firms at their mature stage 
usually have large cumulative profits and are, therefore, more likely to pay dividends. In 
addition, firms at the maturity stage tend to have lower investment opportunities and higher 
levels of free cash flows. This can lead to higher agency problems. We use firm age and size 
as two proxies for the firm’s maturity. We predict that diversified firms pay higher dividends 
than focused firms when they are at the maturity stage. 
In Table 5.8, we present the results of our main regression across the group of mature (large) 
firms and young (small) firms. In Panel A and B, we find that for young firms, there is no 
difference in the dividend payout13 between diversified firms and among the firms that have 
reached maturity, diversified firms have higher dividend payout ratio than focused firms. 
Similarly, in Panel C and D, we find significantly higher dividend payout ratio for diversified 
firms than for focused firms in the large firms’ sample, but no firm structure difference of the 
payout in the small firms’ group. This is consistent with the business-life cycle theory of 
dividend payment, where firms pay dividends when they are at maturity since there are fewer 
investment opportunities than at the start-up stage. Due to the higher level of free cash flows 
held by the mature firms, diversified firms pay higher dividends than focused firms, in line 




                                                 




Table 5.8             
Dividend payout ratio and firm structure: business-cycle theory        
Panel A: Group by firm age                       
        Old firms         
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  
ROA 0.028 0.014 0.039 ** 0.029 0.014 0.035 ** 0.029 0.014 0.035 ** 
SIZE 0.027 0.005 0.000 *** 0.026 0.005 0.000 *** 0.026 0.005 0.000 *** 
SALESGROWTH 0.001 0.006 0.849  0.001 0.006 0.860  0.001 0.006 0.848  
LEVERAGE -0.064 0.026 0.013 ** -0.067 0.026 0.009 *** -0.067 0.026 0.009 *** 
CAPX -0.067 0.032 0.035 ** -0.067 0.032 0.035 ** -0.067 0.032 0.034 ** 
T_Q -0.007 0.001 0.000 *** -0.007 0.001 0.000 *** -0.007 0.001 0.000 *** 
CREDIT_RATING 0.010 0.010 0.308  0.011 0.010 0.299  0.010 0.010 0.308  
CASH HOLDING -0.002 0.011 0.841  -0.002 0.011 0.866  -0.002 0.011 0.846  
RETAINED EARNINGS -0.003 0.002 0.031 ** -0.003 0.002 0.033 ** -0.003 0.002 0.035 ** 
R&D 0.000 0.000 0.268  0.000 0.000 0.269  0.000 0.000 0.273  
CFO 0.024 0.011 0.032 ** 0.024 0.011 0.033 ** 0.024 0.011 0.032 ** 
DIVERSITY_D 0.026 0.008 0.002 ***     
   
 
HERF_ASSET     -0.065 0.017 0.000 *** 
   
 
HERF_SALES     
   
 -0.063 0.017 0.000 *** 
             
R^2  0.40    0.40    0.40   
This table presents the results by firm's maturity. The regressions are presented across the groups of maturities. The criteria for agency problem are firm age (Panel A 
&B) and firm size (Panel C &D). Three measures of diversification are used. In regression (1), diversification is dummy variable equals one if a firm has more than 
one segments and zero otherwise. In regression (2) and (3), diversification is calculated as Herfindahl Index based on asset and sales. Dependent variable is the dividend 
payout ratio defined as total dividend divided by net income. Definitions of independent variables are provided in the notes to Table 5.1. Reported coefficients are the 
average coefficients over the estimation period from 1980 to 2016. The number of observation is 49093. Firm and year fixed effect are controlled in the regression. 








Table 5.8             
Dividend payout ratio and firm structure: business-cycle theory   
Panel B: Group by firm age     
        Young firms      
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  
ROA 0.028 0.006 0.000 *** 0.028 0.006 0.000 *** 0.028 0.006 0.000 *** 
SIZE 0.004 0.003 0.144  0.004 0.003 0.151  0.004 0.003 0.128  
SALESGROWTH -0.002 0.001 0.127  -0.002 0.001 0.124  -0.002 0.001 0.135  
LEVERAGE -0.060 0.013 0.000 *** -0.060 0.013 0.000 *** -0.058 0.013 0.000 *** 
CAPX 0.006 0.014 0.644  0.006 0.014 0.644  0.006 0.014 0.646  
T_Q -0.001 0.000 0.017 ** -0.001 0.000 0.016 ** -0.001 0.000 0.016 ** 
CREDIT_RATING 0.006 0.007 0.401  0.006 0.007 0.398  0.006 0.007 0.394  
CASH HOLDING 0.006 0.005 0.168  0.006 0.005 0.166  0.006 0.005 0.181  
RETAINED EARNINGS 0.000 0.001 0.606  0.000 0.001 0.612  0.000 0.001 0.587  
R&D 0.000 0.000 0.267  0.000 0.000 0.267  0.000 0.000 0.267  
CFO 0.006 0.004 0.105  0.006 0.004 0.103  0.006 0.004 0.111  
DIVERSITY_D -0.003 0.006 0.618  
   
     
HERF_ASSET 
   
 0.006 0.015 0.685      
HERF_SALES              0.019 0.015 0.215   
             
R^2  0.215    0.215    0.215   
This table presents the results by firm's maturity. The regressions are presented across the groups of maturities. The criteria for agency problem are firm age (Panel A 
&B) and firm size (Panel C &D). Three measures of diversification are used. In regression (1), diversification is dummy variable equals one if a firm has more than one 
segments and zero otherwise. In regression (2) and (3), diversification is calculated as Herfindahl Index based on asset and sales. Dependent variable is the dividend 
payout ratio defined as total dividend divided by net income. Definitions of independent variables are provided in the notes to Table 5.1. Reported coefficients are the 
average coefficients over the estimation period from 1980 to 2016. The number of observation is 2561. Firm and year fixed effect are controlled in the regression. 






Table 5.8             
Dividend payout ratio and firm structure: business-cycle theory        
Panel C: Group by firm size                       
        Large firms         
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  
ROA 0.012 0.016 0.453  0.012 0.016 0.437  0.013 0.016 0.429  
SIZE 0.021 0.005 0.000 *** 0.020 0.005 0.000 *** 0.020 0.005 0.000 *** 
SALESGROWTH -0.007 0.004 0.112  -0.007 0.004 0.113  -0.007 0.004 0.110  
LEVERAGE -0.001 0.021 0.949  -0.004 0.021 0.865  -0.004 0.021 0.841  
CAPX -0.092 0.029 0.001 *** -0.092 0.029 0.001 *** -0.092 0.029 0.001 *** 
T_Q -0.003 0.001 0.001 *** -0.003 0.001 0.001 *** -0.003 0.001 0.001 *** 
CREDIT_RATING 0.023 0.010 0.018 ** 0.023 0.010 0.018 ** 0.023 0.010 0.019 ** 
CASH HOLDING 0.019 0.007 0.009 *** 0.019 0.007 0.010 ** 0.019 0.007 0.009 *** 
RETAINED EARNINGS 0.000 0.002 0.936  0.000 0.002 0.938  0.000 0.002 0.954  
R&D 0.000 0.000 0.024 ** 0.000 0.000 0.025 ** 0.000 0.000 0.026 ** 
CFO 0.026 0.008 0.001 *** 0.026 0.008 0.001 *** 0.026 0.008 0.001 *** 
DIVERSITY_D 0.023 0.008 0.004 ***     
   
 
HERF_ASSET 
   
 -0.056 0.018 0.001 *** 
   
 
HERF_SALES 
   
 
   
 -0.055 0.018 0.002 *** 
             
R^2  0.381    0.381    0.381   
This table presents the results by firm's maturity. The regressions are presented across the groups of maturities. The criteria for agency problem are firm age (Panel A &B) 
and firm size (Panel C &D). Three measures of diversification are used. In regression (1), diversification is dummy variable equals one if a firm has more than one segments 
and zero otherwise. In regression (2) and (3), diversification is calculated as Herfindahl Index based on asset and sales. Dependent variable is the dividend payout ratio 
defined as total dividend divided by net income. Definitions of independent variables are provided in the notes to Table 5.1. Reported coefficients are the average 
coefficients over the estimation period from 1980 to 2016. The number of observation 28283. Firm and year fixed effect are controlled in the regression. Standard errors 







Table 5.8             
Dividend payout ratio and firm structure: business-cycle theory   
Panel D: Group by firm size     
        Small firms      
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  
ROA 0.036 0.006 0.000 *** 0.036 0.006 0.000 *** 0.036 0.006 0.000 *** 
SIZE 0.010 0.003 0.000 *** 0.010 0.003 0.000 *** 0.010 0.003 0.000 *** 
SALESGROWTH -0.002 0.002 0.291  -0.002 0.002 0.281  -0.002 0.002 0.298  
LEVERAGE -0.070 0.012 0.000 *** -0.071 0.012 0.000 *** -0.070 0.012 0.000 *** 
CAPX 0.011 0.014 0.447  0.011 0.014 0.440  0.011 0.014 0.443  
T_Q -0.002 0.001 0.001 *** -0.002 0.001 0.001 *** -0.002 0.001 0.001 *** 
CREDIT_RATING 0.000 0.005 0.961  0.000 0.005 0.960  0.000 0.005 0.965  
CASH HOLDING 0.003 0.006 0.652  0.003 0.006 0.625  0.003 0.006 0.654  
RETAINED EARNINGS 0.000 0.001 0.527  0.000 0.001 0.528  0.000 0.001 0.532  
R&D 0.000 0.000 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 0.000 *** 
CFO 0.003 0.005 0.494  0.003 0.005 0.485  0.003 0.005 0.493  
DIVERSITY_D 0.008 0.006 0.188  
   
     
HERF_ASSET     -0.028 0.014 0.050 *     
HERF_SALES              -0.019 0.014 0.170   
             
R^2  0.384    0.384    0.384   
This table presents the results by firm's maturity. The regressions are presented across the groups of maturities. The criteria for agency problem are firm age (Panel A 
&B) and firm size (Panel C &D). Three measures of diversification are used. In regression (1), diversification is dummy variable equals one if a firm has more than one 
segments and zero otherwise. In regression (2) and (3), diversification is calculated as Herfindahl Index based on asset and sales. Dependent variable is the dividend 
payout ratio defined as total dividend divided by net income. Definitions of independent variables are provided in the notes to Table 5.1. Reported coefficients are the 
average coefficients over the estimation period from 1980 to 2016. The number of observation is 27862. Firm and year fixed effect are controlled in the regression. 





We document evidence that firm diversification is an important determinant of payout 
policy. Specifically, we analyze the effects of the firm diversification on firm’s dividend policy 
using 10,000 firm-year observations for diversified and focused firms from 1980 to 2017. 
Furthermore, we introduce two hypotheses deviated from firm diversification to support our 
analyses. 
Our main finding suggests that diversified firms pay, on average, higher dividends 
comparing to focused firms, which corroborates the substitute hypothesis of La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2000). To explain our main findings, we proceed with two 
additional tests. First, we group our sample by agency. We find that among the firms with 
agency problems, diversified firms pay significantly higher dividends than focused firms which 
confirms the substitute hypothesis in our main finding. Second, we group firms according to 
their financial constraints. Our results suggest that among the financially constrained group, 
diversified firms pay higher dividends than focused firms, which lends s support to the 
hypothesis that an efficient internal capital market affects dividend policy. 
Our work calls attention to the role played by firm structure in payout policy. It aligns with 
empirical studies of the diversification discount puzzle, especially those which try to solve this 
puzzle by removing the endogeneity of self-selection (see Campa and Kedia 2002, Graham et 
al., 2002). Our findings are consistent with Villalonga’s (2004), of significant impact of 
dividend payment on firms’ decisions to diversify. Although Villalonga (2004) implicitly 
inserts dividend payment as one of the additional variables in the self-selection model of 
Campa and Kedia (2002), no explanations are given. Our empirical study provides solid 




In this section, we summarize the findings and contributions of three essays. 
6.1. Main findings 
The principal findings of this dissertation are threefold. In the first essay, we show that 
median forecasting based on quantile regression performs significantly better than mean 
forecasting based on OLS in predicting a firm’s profitability. Our forecasting comparison is 
based on actual profitability data including gross profitability (GP), operating profit (one 
common method, two methods adjusted for accruals following Ball et al., 2016), RNOA, ROE, 
and ROA. The finding is robust to the use of different models:  the forecasting model by 
parsimonious AR (1) model, the model of Fairfield et al. (2009) and both the earning’s 
decomposition models of Sloan (1996). The results still hold for different forecasting periods: 
pre financial crisis and post financial crisis. We confirm this finding by performing long-term 
forecasting from 2 years ahead forecasting to 5 years ahead forecasting. Overall, our results 
suggest that median forecasting based on quantile regression delivers a better central tendency 
than mean forecasting based on OLS regression. 
Our findings shed light on those of Schröder and Yim (2017). We confirm that an industry-
specific model is more accurate than an economy-wide model if we use a broader industry 
identification code such as the 2-digit SIC and Fama and French 12 Industry classification. 
Compared to a narrowly defined industry classification, broad industry classification produces 
more accurate in-sample estimation with sufficient number of observations. In the unreported 
analyses, we replicate the findings of Fairfield et al. (2009) of no incremental advantages from 
using an industry-specific model over economy-wide model, using their industry classification. 
Overall, the implication is that mean reversion can be different across industries. By using an 
industry-specific forecasting model with broader industry classification, we can obtain more 
accurate profitability forecasting than using the economy-wide forecasting model. 
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We perform a hedge portfolio analysis based on the information advantage of quantile 
regression over OLS regression. We sort stocks based on the difference of predicted 
profitability based on quantile regression and OLS regression models and construct the hedged 
portfolios. For all profitability measures used in the analyses, there are positive and significant 
abnormal returns from the portfolios. This means that the market participants do not fully price 
stocks by using the incremental information picked up by quantile regression. Our findings are 
robust to various stock screening criteria. 
In essay 2, we investigate the relationship between firm diversification and loss reversal 
profitability. Loss reversal indicates a special perspective on a firm’s performance which is 
that loss-making firms become profitable in the following year. We find empirically a 
significant and positive relationship between the loss reversal profitability and the firm’s 
diversity level. Inspired by the real option theory raised by Hayn (1995), our study attempts to 
use an abandonment option to explain the difference of loss reversal profitability difference 
between firms with different structures. Our results suggest that diversified firms have 
significantly higher loss reversal profitabilities through exercising their abandonment options. 
This is consistent with the hypothesis that diversified firms hold a selection of options allowing 
them to abandon loss-making assets or segment more efficiently than focused firms. In 
additional work, we find results fitting agency theory where, among the firms with high agency 
problems, managers are reluctant to abandon their loss-making business lines because of a 
desire to maintain professional reputations. This reduces the effect of exercising abandonment 
options, between diversified firms and focused firms. These results are consistent after 
controlling for endogeneity problems by using propensity score matching, Heckman test and 
two-way fixed effect model. We also demonstrate robustness by using different proxies of 
agency problems and our our definitions ofabandonment option measures. 
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In essay three, we conduct cross-sectional analyses by investigating the relation between 
firm diversification and dividend payout policy. Overall, diversified firms have significantly 
higher dividend payout ratios than focused firms. To push this further, we test two hypotheses: 
an agency problem hypothesis and an efficient internal market hypothesis. On the one hand, 
we find that diversified firms pay much higher dividends than focused firms among those firms 
with agency problems, which is consistent with the substitute hypothesis raised by La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2000). On the other hand, we find that diversified firms 
pay higher dividends than focused firms among firms with financial constraints. Overall, the 
results are consistent with diversified firms paying higher dividends than focused firms because 
of a necessity to reduce the agency problem. Efficient internal capital markets within 
diversified firms can be used to distribute dividends if firms are externally constrained. Our 
results are robust to different agency problem proxies and financial constraint measures. 
Several econometric methodologies are applied to our analyses. 
 
6.2. Contributions 
Summing up, under three inter-related empirical investigations, we make the following 
contributions.  
In Essay One we address the importance of median forecast based on quantile regression, 
especially forecasting a sample with skewness such as firm’s profitability. First, we shed light 
on the importance of quantile regression as a counterpart of OLS regression in forecasting 
firm’s profitability, constructing forecasting models, using various profitability measures with 
short term and long-term analyses in demonstrating the better forecasting accuracy of quantile 
regression. In addition, we show that positive abnormal returns can be generated through hedge 
portfolio analyses based on the incremental advantages of quantile regression. This confirms 
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that market participants do not fully impound the information contained in the quantile 
regression. 
In Essay Two, we contribute to the literature on the performance of loss-making firms by 
showing how firm structure (diversified vs. focused firms) is related to loss reversal 
probabilities. Particularly, we demonstrate how important a firm’s structure is, related to the 
firm’s strategy and performance when suffering losses. In addition, we consider how the 
efficiency of exercising an abandonment option might change when agency problem occurs 
among the managers. Finally, we propose several robustness checks on our findings, including 
the new abandonment option proxies we created.  
In Essay Three, we explore the dividend puzzle by demonstrating how firm structure is 
related to dividend policy. We generalize the main tests as well as identifying the incentives 
that cause the difference of dividend policy by firm structure. Finally, we conduct empirical 
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Appendix 3.1               
Long-term profitability forecast improvements of economy-wide quantile regression over economy-wide OLS regression 
 
2 years ahead  3 years ahead  4 years ahead  5 years ahead 
  Value   p-Value  Value   p-Value  Value    Value   p-Value 
GP               
Mean 0.342% *** 0.000  0.365% *** 0.000  0.361% ***  0.393% *** 0.000 
Median 0.365% *** 0.000  0.379% *** 0.000  0.377% ***  0.409% *** 0.000 
OP               
Mean 0.076% *** 0.000  0.054% *** 0.000  0.042% ***  0.032% *** 0.000 
Median 0.066% *** 0.000  0.047% *** 0.000  0.042% ***  0.034% *** 0.000 
CbOP_BS               
Mean 0.081% *** 0.000  0.075% *** 0.000  0.059% ***  0.057% *** 0.000 
Median 0.088% *** 0.000  0.087% *** 0.000  0.068% ***  0.065% *** 0.000 
CbOP_CF               
Mean 0.096% *** 0.000  0.087% *** 0.000  0.073% ***  0.069% *** 0.000 
Median 0.101% *** 0.000  0.095% *** 0.000  0.083% ***  0.077% *** 0.000 
RNOA               
Mean 0.139% *** 0.000  0.111% *** 0.000  0.094% ***  0.079% *** 0.000 
Median 0.126% *** 0.000  0.112% *** 0.000  0.093% ***  0.071% *** 0.000 
ROE               
Mean 0.338% *** 0.000  0.288% *** 0.000  0.267% ***  0.231% *** 0.000 
Median 0.127% *** 0.000  0.106% *** 0.000  0.102% ***  0.093% *** 0.000 
                              
This table reports the 2 years to 5 years ahead profitability forecast improvements of economy-wide quantile regression (the alternative approach) over economy-wide 
OLS regression (the benchmark approach). The forecast improvement (FI) is measured through a matched-pair comparison of the absolute forecast errors (AFE) from 
the two competing approaches. A positive FI means the AFE from the benchmark approach is larger than that from the alternative approach. Both forecasting approaches 
use the same set of predictor variables like those in Fairfield et al (2009). Regardless of the forecasting approaches, the underlying predictor variable PREDGSL (i.e., 
the predicted growth in sales) is constructed in the same way by industry-specific OLS regression. Industries are defined using the first-digit Standard Industry 
Classification (SIC). Firm-specific forecasts are obtained in two steps. First, the coefficients of a forecasting model are estimated for each year from 1989 to 2016 on a 
rolling basis using data of the previous 10 years. Next, the estimated coefficients for a year are applied on a firm's data of the previous year to obtain a firm-specific 
forecast for the current year. The mean and median FIs of all firm-years in the sample are reported for different profitability measures (see table 1 for the definitions of 
the measures). The test on the mean FI is a regression-based t-test using robust standard errors controlling for two-way clustering by firm and year. The test on the 






Appendix 3.2             
Profitability forecast improvements of economy-wide quantile regression over economy-wide OLS regression by using the decomposition model 
  
  2003   
 
  2006      2017   
    Value   p-Value   Value   p-Value  Value   p-Value 
Model 1             
Mean  0.045% *** 0.000  0.074% *** 0.000  0.078% *** 0.000 
Median   0.069% *** 0.000   0.094% *** 0.000  0.103% *** 0.000 
Model 2             
Mean  0.044% *** 0.000  0.072% *** 0.000  0.076% *** 0.000 
Median   0.070% *** 0.000   0.092% *** 0.000  0.095% *** 0.000 
Model 3              
Mean  0.044% *** 0.000  0.070% *** 0.000  0.072% *** 0.000 
Median   0.067% *** 0.000   0.088% *** 0.000   0.088% *** 0.000 
             
This table reports the profitability forecast improvements of economy-wide quantile regression (the alternative approach) over economy-wide OLS 
regression (the benchmark approach). The forecast improvement (FI) is measured through a matched-pair comparison of the absolute forecast errors (AFE) 
from the two competing approaches. A positive FI means the AFE from the benchmark approach is larger than that from the alternative approach. The basic 
model of both forecasting approaches use the same set of predictor variables like those in Sloan (2006) by decomposing ROA into ACCRUAL and CFO. 
Regardless of the forecasting approaches, the underlying predictor variable PREDGSL (i.e., the predicted growth in sales) is constructed in the same way by 
industry-specific OLS regression. Industries are defined using the first-digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC). Firm-specific forecasts are obtained in 
two steps. The basic model and the models with additional predictive variables are as below:                                                                                                                                                 
Model 1: ROA ~ Accrual.L1 + CFO.L1,                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Model 2: ROA~ Accrual.L1 + CFO.L1 + LOSS_D.L1,                                                                                                                                                                                                
Model 3: ROA~  Accrual.L1 +CFO.L1 + LOSS_D.L1 + PREDGSL,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
First, the coefficients of a forecasting model are estimated for each year from 1989 to 2016 on a rolling basis using data of the previous 10 years. Next, the 
estimated coefficients for a year are applied on a firm's data of the previous year to obtain a firm-specific forecast for the current year. The mean and 
median FIs of all firm-years in the sample are reported for different profitability measures (see table 1 for the definitions of the measures). The test on the 
mean FI is a regression-based t-test using robust standard errors controlling for two-way clustering by firm and year. The test on the median FI is the 







Appendix 3.3                    
Hedged portfolio robustness tests based on negative DIFF             
Panel A: Portfolio returns based on profitabiliy forecasts and forecast improvements: Economy-wide quantile versus economy-wide OLS regression  
Long portfolio:  
 
Short portfolio:  
 














  Return   p-Value   Return   p-Value   Return   p-Value   Return   p-Value   Return   p-Value 
                    
GP 0.585% ** 0.036  0.601% ** 0.031  -0.016%  0.940  -0.038%  0.856  -0.077%  0.706                     
OP 0.069%  0.850  0.379%  0.241  -0.311% * 0.079  -0.417% ** 0.015  -0.420% ** 0.015                     
CbOP_BS 0.308%  0.326  0.520% * 0.090  -0.211%  0.207  -0.232%  0.166  -0.394% ** 0.022                     
CbOP_CF 0.214%  0.508  0.464%  0.115  -0.250%  0.119  -0.290% * 0.066  -0.377% ** 0.020                     
RNOA 0.017%  0.963  0.333%  0.250  -0.316%  0.121  -0.334% * 0.069  -0.391% ** 0.042                     
ROE -0.037%  0.926  0.276%  0.302  -0.313%  0.192  -0.448% ** 0.031  -0.391% * 0.060 
                                        
This table reports value-weighted excess returns, Carhart (1997) 4-factor alphas, and Fama and French (2015) 5-factor alphas for portfolios sorted by the DIFF variable, 
defined as the benchmark-approach forecast in excess of the alternative-approach forecast, after confining to firms with negative forecast improvements. For this table, 
the alternative forecasting approach is economy-wide quantile regression, whereas the benchmark approach is economy-wide OLS regression. Firms with positive forecast 
improvements are those with the absolute forecast error from the benchmark approach larger than that from the alternative approach. At the end of each June, we sort stocks 











Appendix 3.3   
Hedged portfolio robustness tests based on negative DIFF    
Panel B: Portfolio returns based on profitabiliy forecasts and forecast improvements: Industry-specific quantile versus industry-specific OLS regression  
Long portfolio:  
 
Short portfolio:  
 













5-factor alpha                     
  Return   p-Value   Return   p-Value   Return   p-Value   Return   p-Value   Return   p-Value 
                    
GP 0.516% * 0.071  0.546% ** 0.046  -0.030%  0.888  -0.058%  0.779  -0.021%  0.917 
                    
OP 0.080%  0.808  0.342%  0.326  -0.262%  0.177  -0.321%  0.108  -0.231%  0.257 
                    
CbOP_BS 0.292%  0.335  0.462%  0.104  -0.170%  0.295  -0.194%  0.224  -0.284% * 0.084 
                    
CbOP_CF 0.469%  0.119  0.480% * 0.083  -0.011%  0.947  -0.103%  0.536  -0.130%  0.443 
                    
RNOA 0.313%  0.306  0.276%  0.391  0.037%  0.849  -0.014%  0.940  -0.089%  0.644 
                    
ROE -0.001%  0.998  0.118%  0.727  -0.119%  0.599  -0.230%  0.270  -0.184%  0.396 
                                        
This table reports value-weighted excess returns, Carhart (1997) 4-factor alphas, and Fama and French (2015) 5-factor alphas for portfolios sorted by the -DIFF variable, 
defined as the benchmark-approach forecast in excess of the laternative-approach forecast, after confining to firms with negative forecast improvements. For this table, 
the alternative forecasting approach is industry-specific quantile regression, whereas the benchmark approach is industry-specific OLS regression. Firms with positive 
forecast improvements are those with the absolute forecast error from the benchmark approach larger than that from the alternative approach. At the end of each June, we 










Appendix 3.4     
Hedged portfolio robustness tests: full sample     
Panel A: Portfolio returns based on profitabiliy forecasts and forecast improvements: Economy-wide quantile versus economy-wide OLS regression full sample  
Long portfolio:  
 
Short portfolio:  
 













5-factor alpha                     
  Return   p-Value   Return   p-Value   Return   p-Value   Return   p-Value   Return   p-Value 
                    
GP 0.767% *** 0.002  0.334%  0.195  0.433% *** 0.009  0.408% *** 0.004  0.420% *** 0.003 
                    
OP 0.870% *** 0.000  0.164%  0.635  0.706% *** 0.000  0.678% *** 0.000  0.678% *** 0.000 
                    
CbOP_BS 0.802% *** 0.002  0.267%  0.354  0.535% *** 0.000  0.553% *** 0.000  0.665% *** 0.000 
                    
CbOP_CF 0.846% *** 0.001  0.218%  0.447  0.627% *** 0.000  0.628% *** 0.000  0.676% *** 0.000 
                    
RNOA 0.804% *** 0.001  0.185%  0.583  0.619% *** 0.003  0.596% *** 0.000  0.601% *** 0.000 
                    
ROE 0.809% *** 0.000  0.054%  0.876  0.755% *** 0.000  0.761% *** 0.000  0.755% *** 0.000 
                                        
This table reports value-weighted excess returns, Carhart (1997) 4-factor alphas, and Fama and French (2015) 5-factor alphas for portfolios sorted by the DIFF variable, defined 
as the alternative-approach forecast in excess of the benchmark-approach forecast, without confining to firms with positive forecast improvements. For this table, the alternative 
forecasting approach is economy-wide quantile regression, whereas the benchmark approach is economy-wide OLS regression. Firms with positive forecast improvements are 
those with the absolute forecast error from the benchmark approach larger than that from the alternative approach. At the end of each June, we sort stocks of the firms with 









Appendix 3.4    
Hedged portfolio robustness tests: full sample    
Panel B: Portfolio returns based on profitabiliy forecasts and forecast improvements: Industry-specific quantile versus industry-specific OLS regression  
Long portfolio:  
 
Short portfolio:  
 













5-factor alpha                     
  Return   p-Value   Return   p-Value   Return   p-Value   Return   p-Value   Return   p-Value 
                    
GP 0.774% *** 0.002  0.452%  0.116  0.321% * 0.056  0.342% ** 0.016  0.387% *** 0.009 
                    
OP 0.837% *** 0.001  0.251%  0.432  0.586% *** 0.001  0.526% *** 0.001  0.536% *** 0.001 
                    
CbOP_BS 0.805% *** 0.001  0.260%  0.379  0.546% *** 0.001  0.551% *** 0.000  0.593% *** 0.000 
                    
CbOP_CF 0.840% *** 0.000  0.239%  0.427  0.601% *** 0.000  0.592% *** 0.000  0.603% *** 0.000 
                    
RNOA 0.796% *** 0.001  0.341%  0.230  0.454% *** 0.005  0.404% *** 0.007  0.395% ** 0.011 
                    
ROE 0.734% *** 0.002  0.292%  0.253  0.443% *** 0.005  0.448% *** 0.002  0.513% *** 0.000 
                                        
This table reports value-weighted excess returns, Carhart (1997) 4-factor alphas, and Fama and French (2015) 5-factor alphas for portfolios sorted by the DIFF variable, 
defined as the alternative-approach forecast in excess of the benchmark-approach forecast, without confining to firms with positive forecast improvements. For this 
table, the alternative forecasting approach is industry-specific quantile regression, whereas the benchmark approach is industry-specific OLS regression. Firms with 
positive forecast improvements are those with the absolute forecast error from the benchmark approach larger than that from the alternative approach. At the end of each 
June, we sort stocks of the firms with positive forecast improvements into quartiles and hold the portfolio for the following year. The sample starts in July 1989 and ends 









Appendix 3.5            
Sample selection and descriptive statistics, 1985-2016             
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for quarterly forecasts             
 Q1  Q2 
Variable N Mean Median Std. Dev. Skewness   N Mean Median Std. Dev. Skewness 
IBES_EPS_P 46846 0.9% 1.1% 0.03 -1.90  44960 1.2% 1.4% 0.03 -1.02 
Analysts Mean Consensus 46846 0.9% 1.1% 0.03 -2.62  44960 1.3% 1.4% 0.03 -0.66 
Analysts Median Consensus 46846 0.9% 1.1% 0.03 -2.85  44960 1.3% 1.4% 0.03 -0.74 
IBES_EPS_CH_SEQ 49189 2.3% 2.3%  0.08  -1.07   46831 3.1% 2.8%  0.08  -0.61 
Analysts Mean Consensus 49189 2.3% 2.2%  0.07  -1.03  46831 3.5% 2.9%  0.07  0.16 
Analysts Median Consensus 49189 2.3% 2.2%  0.07  -1.11   46831 3.5% 2.9%  0.07  0.09 
This panel gives an overview of the data used to compute the forecast improvements for the period from 1985 to 2016. For quarterly forecasts, IBES_EPS_P is the actual 
quarterly earnings per share (EPS) from I/B/E/S deflated by stock price. Stock price is lagged two years’ fiscal annual closing price collected from I/B/E/S. 
IBES_EPS_CH_SEQ is the actual quarterly earnings per share (EPS) from I/B/E/S multiple by number of shares outstanding in the previous year deflated by average of book 
value of equity of the previous one year and two years. Similarly, Analysts Mean (Median) Consensus is the mean (median) of analysts’ forecasts of EPS and deflate the same 












Appendix 3.5 (continued)           
Sample selection and descriptive statistics, 1985-2016 
                  
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for quarterly forecasts        
 Q3  Q4 
Variable N Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. Skewness   N Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. Skewness 
IBES_EPS_P 44843 1.6% 1.4% 0.03 -0.61  46021 1.2% 1.4% 0.04 -1.59 
Analysts Mean Consensus 44843 1.6% 1.6% 0.02 1.42  46021 1.8% 1.7% 0.03 1.98 
Analysts Median Consensus 44843 1.3% 1.6% 0.02 1.45  46021 1.8% 1.7% 0.03 2.03 
IBES_EPS_CH_SEQ 46552 3.2% 2.9%  0.09  -0.55   47753 3.0% 2.9%  0.10  -1.03 
Analysts Mean Consensus 46552 4.2% 3.4%  0.07  0.52  47753 4.8% 3.6%  0.08  1.17 
Analysts Median Consensus 46552 4.2% 3.4%  0.07  0.53   47753 4.8% 3.6%  0.08  1.12 
This panel gives an overview of the data used to compute the forecast improvements for the period from 1985 to 2016. For quarterly forecasts, IBES_EPS_P is the actual 
quarterly earnings per share (EPS) from I/B/E/S deflated by stock price. Stock price is lagged two years’ fiscal annual closing price collected from I/B/E/S. 
IBES_EPS_CH_SEQ is the actual quarterly earnings per share (EPS) from I/B/E/S multiple by number of shares outstanding in the previous year deflated by average of 
book value of equity of the previous one year and two years. Similarly, Analysts Mean (Median) Consensus is the mean (median) of analysts’ forecasts of EPS and deflate 













Appendix 3.5                                   
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for long-term forecasts             
 Y1  Y2  Y3 
Variable N Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. Skewness   N Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. Skewness   N Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. Skewness 
IBES_EPS_P 52190 4.2% 5.4% 0.10 -1.11  46692 5.0% 5.7% 0.11 -0.81  16384 5.8% 6.4% 0.11 -0.25 
Analysts Mean 
Consensus 52190 5.3% 6.0% 0.08 -1.24  46692 6.5% 7.1% 0.07 -2.83  16384 7.7% 7.2% 0.09 -0.33 
Analysts Median 
Consensus 52190 5.3% 6.0% 0.08 -1.23  46692 6.5% 7.0% 0.07 -2.79  16384 7.7% 7.2% 0.09 -0.28 
IBES_EPS_CH_SEQ 53222 10.6% 10.4%  0.22  -0.55   43732 11.4% 10.8%  0.21  -0.46   15031 14.5% 13.1%  0.22  -0.31 
Analysts Mean 
Consensus 53222 13.5% 11.7%  0.20  -0.19  43732 16.5% 14.0%  0.18  0.11  15031 18.7% 16.1%  0.17  0.14 
Analysts Median 
Consensus 53222 13.5% 11.7%  0.20  -0.20   43732 16.4% 13.9%  0.18  0.10   15031 18.6% 16.1%  0.17  0.10 
This panel gives an overview of the data used to compute the forecast improvements for the period from 1985 to 2016. For annual forecasts, IBES_EPS_P is the actual annual 
earnings per share (EPS) from I/B/E/S deflated by stock price. Stock price is lagged two years’ fiscal annual closing price collected from I/B/E/S. IBES_EPS_CH_SEQ is the 
actual quarterly earnings per share (EPS) from I/B/E/S multiple by number of shares outstanding in the previous year deflated by average of book value of equity of the previous 
one year and two years. Similarly, Analysts Mean (Median) Consensus is the mean (median) of analysts’ forecasts of EPS and deflate the same deflators which is consistent with 













Appendix 3.5 (continued)                     
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for long-term forecasts       
 Y4  Y5 
Variable N Mean Median Std. Dev. Skewness  N Mean Median Std. Dev. Skewness 
IBES_EPS_P 5638 6.5% 7.2% 0.12 -0.50   3021 7.1% 7.6% 0.12 -0.02 
Analysts Mean Consensus 5638 8.8% 7.7% 0.10 1.04  3021 10.2% 8.0% 0.11 1.90 
Analysts Median Consensus 5638 8.7% 7.7% 0.10 0.71   3021 10.1% 8.0% 0.11 1.69 
IBES_EPS_CH_SEQ 5070 15.5% 13.9%  0.22  -0.49  2721 16.1% 14.1%  0.22  -0.26 
Analysts Mean Consensus 5070 19.3% 15.9%  0.17  0.46  2721 19.8% 15.7%  0.17  1.16 
Analysts Median Consensus 5070 19.3% 15.9%  0.17  0.44   2721 19.7% 15.6%  0.17  1.07 
This panel gives an overview of the data used to compute the forecast improvements for the period from 1985 to 2016. For annual forecasts, IBES_EPS_P is the actual quarterly 
earnings per share (EPS) from I/B/E/S deflated by stock price. Stock price is lagged two years’ fiscal annual closing price collected from I/B/E/S. IBES_EPS_CH_SEQ is the 
actual quarterly earnings per share (EPS) from I/B/E/S multiple by number of shares outstanding in the previous year deflated by average of book value of equity of the previous 
one year and two years. Similarly, Analysts Mean (Median) Consensus is the mean (median) of analysts’ forecasts of EPS and deflate the same deflators which is consistent with 





Appendix 3.6              
Profitability forecast improvements of economy-wide quantile regression over economy-wide OLS regression: 
IBES-based ROE by Method 2 
Panel A: Quarterly forecasting                 
Q1 
 
Analysts' mean consensus 
 
Analysts' median consensus 
 
PRED_OLS 
    Value   p-Value  Value  p-Value  Value  p-Value 
PRED_QR                      
Mean  -1.504% *** 0.000  -1.515% *** 0.000  0.046% *** 0.000 
Median   -0.820% *** 0.000  -0.826% *** 0.000  0.040% *** 0.000 
PRED_OLS                      
Mean  -1.551% *** 0.000  -1.562% *** 0.000     
Median   -0.890% *** 0.000   -0.895% *** 0.000         
                          
Q2 
 
Analysts’ mean consensus 
 
Analysts’ median consensus 
 
PRED_OLS 
    Value   p-Value  Value  p-Value  Value  p-Value 
PRED_QR                      
Mean  -1.161% *** 0.000  -1.155% *** 0.000  0.035% *** 0.000 
Median   -0.612% *** 0.000  -0.610% *** 0.000  0.032% *** 0.000 
PRED_OLS                        
Mean  -1.196% *** 0.000  -1.189% *** 0.000     
Median   -0.663% *** 0.000   -0.661% *** 0.000         
                          
Q3 
 
Analysts’ mean consensus 
 
Analysts’ median consensus 
 
PRED_OLS 
    Value   p-Value  Value  p-Value  Value  p-Value 
PRED_QR                      
Mean  -0.856% *** 0.000  -0.858% *** 0.000  0.041% *** 0.000 
Median   -0.473% *** 0.000  -0.476% *** 0.000  0.039% *** 0.000 
PRED_OLS                       
Mean  -0.898% *** 0.000  -0.899% *** 0.000     
Median   -0.537% *** 0.000   -0.537% *** 0.000         
                          
Q4 
 
Analysts' mean consensus 
 
Analysts' median consensus 
 
PRED_OLS 
    Value   p-Value  Value  p-Value  Value  p-Value 
PRED_QR                      
Mean  -0.597% *** 0.000  -0.604% *** 0.000  0.090% *** 0.000 
Median   -0.392% *** 0.000  -0.394% *** 0.000  0.094% *** 0.000 
PRED_OLS                       
Mean  -0.688% *** 0.000  -0.694% *** 0.000     
Median   -0.513% *** 0.000   -0.515% *** 0.000         
This table reports the short-term quarterly profitability forecast improvements of economy-wide model-based forecast 
model (the alternative approach by row) over analysts’ consensus forecasts (the benchmark approach by column). See 
the main texts for the detailed description of the IBES-based ROE by Method 1 and Method 2. The forecast 
improvement (FI) is measured through a matched-pair comparison of the absolute forecast errors (AFE) from the two 
competing approaches which equals the AFE by using the column approach minus the AFE by using the row approach. 
A positive FI means the AFE from the benchmark approach is larger than that from the alternative approach. Both 
model-based forecasting approaches use the same forecasting steps like those in Fairfield et al (2009) but simply based 
on a parsimonious AR (1) model. Firm-specific forecasts are obtained in two steps. First, the coefficients of a 
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forecasting model are estimated for each year from 1989 to 2016 on a rolling basis using data of the previous 10 years. 
Next, the estimated coefficients for a year are applied on a firm's data of the previous year to obtain a firm-specific 
forecast for the current year. The mean and median FIs of all firm-years in the sample are reported for different 
profitability measures (see main texts for the definitions of the measures). The test on the mean FI is a regression-based 
t-test using robust standard errors controlling for two-way clustering by firm and year. The test on the median FI is the 






Appendix 3.6             
Profitability forecast improvements of economy-wide quantile regression over economy-wide OLS regression: 
IBES-based ROE by Method 2 
Panel B: Long-term forecasting                 
Y1 
 
Analysts' mean consensus 
 
Analysts' median consensus 
 
PRED_OLS 
    Value   p-Value  Value  p-Value  Value  p-Value 
PRED_QR                      
Mean  -2.254% *** 0.000  -2.260% *** 0.000  0.367% *** 0.000 
Median  -1.285% *** 0.000  -1.285% *** 0.000  0.393% *** 0.000 
PRED_OLS                         
Mean  -2.621% *** 0.000  -2.627% *** 0.000     
Median   -1.792% *** 0.000   -1.793% *** 0.000         
                          
Y2 
 
Analysts' mean consensus 
 
Analysts' median consensus 
 
PRED_OLS 
    Value   p-Value  Value  p-Value  Value  p-Value 
PRED_QR                      
Mean  1.405% *** 0.000  1.406% *** 0.000  0.305% *** 0.000 
Median   0.545% *** 0.000  0.546% *** 0.000  0.340% *** 0.000 
PRED_OLS                      
Mean  1.100% *** 0.000  1.101% *** 0.000     
Median   0.263% *** 0.000   0.265% *** 0.000         
                          
Y3 
 
Analysts' mean consensus 
 
Analysts' median consensus 
 
PRED_OLS 
    Value   p-Value  Value  p-Value  Value  p-Value 
PRED_QR                      
Mean  1.913% *** 0.000  1.894% *** 0.000  0.436% *** 0.000 
Median   0.813% *** 0.000  0.798% *** 0.000  0.433% *** 0.000 
PRED_OLS                        
Mean  1.477% *** 0.000  1.458% *** 0.000     
Median   0.476% *** 0.000   0.468% *** 0.000         
                          
Y4 
 
Analysts' mean consensus 
 
Analysts' median consensus 
 
PRED_OLS 
    Value   p-Value  Value  p-Value  Value  p-Value 
PRED_QR                      
Mean  2.313% *** 0.000  2.310% *** 0.000  0.388% *** 0.000 
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Median   0.855% *** 0.000  0.855% *** 0.000  0.365% *** 0.000 
PRED_OLS                       
Mean  1.926% *** 0.000  1.922% *** 0.000     
Median   0.585% *** 0.000   0.586% *** 0.000         
                          
Y5 
 
Analysts' mean consensus 
 
Analysts' median consensus 
 
PRED_OLS 
    Value   p-Value  Value  p-Value  Value  p-Value 
PRED_QR                      
Mean  2.470% *** 0.000  2.469% *** 0.000  2.113% *** 0.000 
Median  0.924% *** 0.000  0.952% *** 0.000  0.323% *** 0.000 
PRED_OLS                        
Mean  2.112% *** 0.000  0.357% *** 0.000     
Median   0.732% *** 0.000   0.764% *** 0.000         
This table reports the long-term annual profitability forecast improvements of economy-wide model-based forecast 
model (the alternative approach by row) over analysts’ consensus forecasts (the benchmark approach by column). See 
the main texts for the detailed description of the IBES-based ROE by Method 1 and Method 2. The forecast 
improvement (FI) is measured through a matched-pair comparison of the absolute forecast errors (AFE) from the two 
competing approaches which equals the AFE by using the column approach minus the AFE by using the row approach. 
A positive FI means the AFE from the benchmark approach is larger than that from the alternative approach. Both 
model-based forecasting approaches use the same forecasting steps like those in Fairfield et al (2009) but simply based 
on a parsimonious AR (1) model. Firm-specific forecasts are obtained in two steps. First, the coefficients of a 
forecasting model are estimated for each year from 1989 to 2016 on a rolling basis using data of the previous 10 years. 
Next, the estimated coefficients for a year are applied on a firm's data of the previous year to obtain a firm-specific 
forecast for the current year. The mean and median FIs of all firm-years in the sample are reported for different 
profitability measures (see main texts for the definitions of the measures). The test on the mean FI is a regression-based 
t-test using robust standard errors controlling for two-way clustering by firm and year. The test on the median FI is the 
Wilcoxon signed rank test. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Appendix 4.1            
Loss reversal and firm structure: logistic model under Second- Stage of Heckman Test      
Panel A: Loss reversal and firm structure full sample             
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  
INTERCEPT 0.415 0.139 0.003 *** 0.426 0.158 0.007 *** 0.456 0.158 0.004 *** 
ROA 4.086 0.266 0.000 *** 4.084 0.265 0.000 *** 4.084 0.265 0.000 *** 
PAST_ROA 0.191 0.101 0.057 * 0.197 0.101 0.051 * 0.196 0.101 0.052 * 
SIZE -0.029 0.010 0.005 *** -0.030 0.010 0.003 *** -0.030 0.010 0.003 *** 
SALESGROWTH 0.014 0.034 0.674  0.014 0.034 0.687  0.014 0.034 0.689  
FIRSTLOSS -0.024 0.049 0.629  -0.024 0.049 0.625  -0.024 0.049 0.629  
LOSS_SEQ -0.159 0.015 0.000 *** -0.158 0.015 0.000 *** -0.158 0.015 0.000 *** 
DIVDUM 0.165 0.038 0.000 *** 0.157 0.038 0.000 *** 0.156 0.038 0.000 *** 
LEVERAGE 0.175 0.076 0.022 ** 0.160 0.076 0.036 ** 0.158 0.076 0.038 ** 
T_Q 0.000 0.010 0.967  0.001 0.010 0.954  0.001 0.010 0.941  
CAPX -0.707 0.224 0.002 *** -0.687 0.223 0.002 *** -0.686 0.223 0.002 *** 
SPECIAL_ITEM -6.051 0.325 0.000 *** -6.056 0.325 0.000 *** -6.057 0.325 0.000 *** 
CREDIT_RATING 0.250 0.033 0.000 *** 0.246 0.033 0.000 *** 0.245 0.033 0.000 *** 
DIVERSITY_D -0.044 0.046 0.334          
HERF_ASSET    -0.047 0.098 0.634      
HERF_SALES         -0.082 0.098 0.404  
AB_D -1.241 0.044 0.000 *** -0.732 0.145 0.000 *** -0.768 0.147 0.000 *** 
AB_D*DIVERSITY_D 0.211 0.078 0.007 ***         
AB_D*HERF_ASSET    -0.516 0.162 0.001 ***     
AB_D*HERF_SALES        -0.473 0.164 0.004 *** 
INVERSE MILLS RATIO -0.235 0.072 0.001 *** -0.208 0.072 0.004 *** -0.206 0.072 0.004 *** 
Diversified & AB_D=1             
marginal effects 0.020 0.007 0.003 *** -0.06 0.012 0.000 *** -0.056 0.012 0.000 *** 
This table presents the results of loss reversal probability using the annual estimation of logistic regression under the second stage of Heckman test. Dependent variable 
is loss reversal which takes value of 1 if firms becomes profitable in the next year, and 0 otherwise. Variable definitions are provided in the notes to Table 4.1. Three 
measures of diversification are used. In regression (1), diversification is dummy variable equals one if a firm has more than one segments and zero otherwise. In 
regression (2) and (3), diversification is calculated as Herfindahl Index based on asset and sales. AB_D (abandonment option) is dummy variable equals one if both 
sales and number of employees decrease comparing to the previous year, and zero otherwise. Reported coefficients are the average coefficients over the estimation 
period from 1980 to 2016. The number of observation is 34820. Standard errors are clustered by firm and fiscal year. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 




Appendix 4.1            
Loss reversal and firm structure: logistic model under Second- Stage of Heckman Test      
Panel B: Loss reversal and firm structure under over-investment problem (High agency problem)           
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  
INTERCEPT 0.111 0.223 0.620  0.017 0.247 0.944  0.082 0.246 0.738  
ROA 5.450 0.407 0.000 *** 5.430 0.406 0.000 *** 5.425 0.405 0.000 *** 
PAST_ROA 0.415 0.170 0.014 ** 0.418 0.170 0.014 ** 0.418 0.170 0.014 ** 
SIZE -0.040 0.016 0.010 ** -0.042 0.016 0.007 *** -0.042 0.016 0.007 *** 
SALESGROWTH -0.021 0.059 0.720  -0.023 0.059 0.702  -0.023 0.059 0.697  
FIRSTLOSS 0.009 0.068 0.890  0.008 0.068 0.910  0.008 0.068 0.905  
LOSS_SEQ -0.154 0.022 0.000 *** -0.154 0.022 0.000 *** -0.154 0.022 0.000 *** 
DIVDUM 0.141 0.054 0.009 *** 0.133 0.054 0.013 ** 0.131 0.054 0.015 ** 
LEVERAGE 0.331 0.143 0.020 ** 0.321 0.143 0.024 ** 0.319 0.142 0.025 ** 
T_Q 0.177 0.093 0.058 * 0.179 0.093 0.055 * 0.180 0.093 0.052 * 
CAPX -1.636 0.453 0.000 *** -1.607 0.452 0.000 *** -1.603 0.451 0.000 *** 
SPECIAL_ITEM -7.102 0.496 0.000 *** -7.095 0.496 0.000 *** -7.092 0.496 0.000 *** 
CREDIT_RATING 0.238 0.047 0.000 *** 0.236 0.047 0.000 *** 0.235 0.047 0.000 *** 
DIVERSITY_D -0.086 0.065 0.186          
HERF_ASSET    0.056 0.138 0.685      
HERF_SALES         -0.025 0.137 0.856  
AB_D -1.116 0.060 0.000 *** -0.794 0.193 0.000 *** -0.876 0.194 0.000 *** 
AB_D*DIVERSITY_D 0.104 0.105 0.321          
AB_D*HERF_ASSET    -0.337 0.217 0.121      
AB_D*HERF_SALES        -0.241 0.218 0.268  
INVERSE MILLS RATIO -0.046 0.108 0.668  -0.022 0.107 0.837  -0.016 0.107 0.880  
Div&AB_D=1 marginal effect 0.0004 0.011 0.969  -0.033 0.022 0.138  -0.024 0.023 0.282  
This table presents the results of loss reversal probability using the annual estimation of logistic regression under the second stage of Heckman test with the firms having 
agency problems.  Over-investment is used as the proxy of agency problem which is defined as if the firm's Tobin's Q is below the Industry median in annual basis. Dependent 
variable is loss reversal which takes value of 1 if firms becomes profitable in the next year, and 0 otherwise. Variable definitions are provided in the notes to Table 4.1. Three 
measures of diversification are used. In regression (1), diversification is dummy variable equals one if a firm has more than one segments and zero otherwise. In regression 
(2) and (3), diversification is calculated as Herdial Index based on asset and sales. AB_D (abandonment option) is dummy variable equals one if both sales and number of 
emplyees decrease comparing to the previous year, and zero otherwise. Reported coefficients are the average coefficients over the estimation period from 1980 to 2016. The 




Appendix 4.1            
Loss reversal and firm structure: logistic model under Second- Stage of Heckman Test 
Panel C: Loss reversal and firm structure under no over-investment problem (no agency problem)     
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  
INTERCEPT 0.362 0.191 0.059 * 0.447 0.217 0.040 ** 0.452 0.218 0.038 ** 
ROA 3.447 0.322 0.000 *** 3.455 0.322 0.000 *** 3.454 0.322 0.000 *** 
PAST_ROA 0.120 0.128 0.347  0.128 0.128 0.319  0.126 0.128 0.324  
SIZE -0.021 0.014 0.131  -0.022 0.014 0.106  -0.023 0.014 0.101  
SALESGROWTH -0.002 0.042 0.969  -0.002 0.042 0.960  -0.002 0.042 0.960  
FIRSTLOSS -0.090 0.071 0.208  -0.088 0.071 0.218  -0.088 0.071 0.215  
LOSS_SEQ -0.161 0.022 0.000 *** -0.160 0.022 0.000 *** -0.160 0.022 0.000 *** 
DIVDUM 0.184 0.054 0.001 *** 0.173 0.054 0.001 *** 0.175 0.054 0.001 *** 
LEVERAGE 0.558 0.129 0.000 *** 0.543 0.129 0.000 *** 0.543 0.129 0.000 *** 
T_Q -0.010 0.012 0.402  -0.010 0.012 0.408  -0.009 0.012 0.413  
CAPX -0.569 0.264 0.031 ** -0.555 0.264 0.035 ** -0.556 0.264 0.035 ** 
SPECIAL_ITEM -5.827 0.426 0.000 *** -5.837 0.426 0.000 *** -5.834 0.426 0.000 *** 
CREDIT_RATING 0.248 0.048 0.000 *** 0.243 0.048 0.000 *** 0.242 0.048 0.000 *** 
DIVERSITY_D -0.016 0.065 0.808          
HERF_ASSET    -0.126 0.142 0.375      
HERF_SALES         -0.127 0.143 0.376  
AB_D -1.404 0.069 0.000 *** -0.568 0.227 0.012 ** -0.548 0.231 0.018 ** 
AB_D*DIVERSITY_D 0.392 0.121 0.001 ***         
AB_D*HERF_ASSET    -0.829 0.254 0.001 ***     
AB_D*HERF_SALES        -0.848 0.257 0.001 *** 
INVERSE MILLS RATIO -0.289 0.103 0.005 *** -0.257 0.104 0.013 ** -0.259 0.103 0.012 ** 
Diversified & AB_D=1             
marginal effects 0.039 0.009 0.000 *** -0.081 0.014 0.000 *** -0.081 0.014 0.000 *** 
This table presents the results of loss reversal probability using the annual estimation of logistic regression under the second stage of Heckman test with the firms having 
no potential agency problems.  Over-investment is used as the proxy of agency problem which is defined as if the firm's Tobin's Q is below the Industry median in 
annual basis. Dependent variable is loss reversal which takes value of 1 if firms becomes profitable in the next year, and 0 otherwise. Variable definitions are provided 
in the notes to Table 4.1. Three measures of diversification are used. In regression (1), diversification is dummy variable equals one if a firm has more than one segments 
and zero otherwise. In regression (2) and (3), diversification is calculated as Herdial Index based on asset and sales. AB_D (abandonment option) is dummy variable 
equals one if both sales and number of emplyees decrease comparing to the previous year, and zero otherwise. Reported coefficients are the average coefficients over 
the estimation period from 1980 to 2016. The number of observation is 18298. Standard errors are clustered by firm and fiscal year. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 





Appendix 4.2             
Loss reversal and firm structure: logistic model and agency problem        
Panel A: Loss reversal and firm structure among low payout firms (high agency problem)               
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  
INTERCEPT -0.012 0.307 0.969  0.057 0.336 0.865  0.053 0.336 0.874  
ROA 5.079 0.829 0.000 *** 5.057 0.826 0.000 *** 5.061 0.826 0.000 *** 
PAST_ROA 0.029 0.281 0.919  0.028 0.281 0.921  0.028 0.281 0.919  
SIZE 0.022 0.019 0.241  0.019 0.019 0.329  0.019 0.019 0.324  
SALESGROWTH -0.009 0.090 0.920  -0.009 0.090 0.921  -0.008 0.090 0.929  
FIRSTLOSS 0.099 0.104 0.342  0.099 0.104 0.341  0.099 0.104 0.342  
LOSS_SEQ -0.174 0.038 0.000 *** -0.172 0.038 0.000 *** -0.173 0.038 0.000 *** 
DIVDUM 0.416 0.247 0.093 * 0.422 0.247 0.088 * 0.420 0.247 0.089 * 
LEVERAGE -0.548 0.165 0.001 *** -0.564 0.165 0.001 *** -0.564 0.165 0.001 *** 
T_Q -0.058 0.029 0.043 ** -0.057 0.029 0.044 ** -0.057 0.029 0.044 ** 
CAPX -1.105 0.460 0.016 *** -1.050 0.459 0.022 ** -1.063 0.459 0.021 ** 
SPECIAL_ITEM -8.275 0.872 0.000 *** -8.260 0.870 0.000 *** -8.263 0.871 0.000 *** 
CREDIT_RATING 0.256 0.070 0.000 *** 0.253 0.070 0.000 *** 0.254 0.070 0.000 *** 
DIVERSITY_D -0.005 0.088 0.952  
   
 
   
 
HERF_ASSET     -0.123 0.173 0.476  
   
 
HERF_SALES     
   
 -0.107 0.173 0.536  
AB_D -1.181 0.097 0.000 *** -0.907 0.238 0.000 *** -0.899 0.240 0.000 *** 
AB_D*DIVERSITY_D 0.153 0.145 0.291      
   
 
AB_D*HERF_ASSET     -0.262 0.282 0.353  
   
 
AB_D*HERF_SALES     
   
 -0.271 0.283 0.339  
Diversified & AB_D=1 0.003 0.014 0.921  -0.041 0.023 0.213  -0.038 0.024 0.386  
marginal effects             
This table presents the results of loss reversal probability with agency problems using the annual estimation of logistic regression. Low payout is used as the proxy of 
agency problem which is defined as if the firm’s payout ratio is below the industry median in annual basis. Dependent variable is loss reversal which takes value of 1 if 
firms becomes profitable in the next year, and 0 otherwise. Independent variables follow Joos and Plesko (2005) with additional firm level control variables and definitions 
are provided in the notes to Table 4.1. Three measures of diversification are used. In regression (1), diversification is dummy variable equals one if a firm has more than 
one segments and zero otherwise. In regression (2) and (3), diversification is calculated as Herfindahl Index based on asset and sales. AB_D (abandonment option) is 
dummy variable equals one if both sales and number of employees decrease comparing to the previous year, and zero otherwise. Reported coefficients are the average 
coefficients over the estimation period from 1980 to 2016. The number of observation is 7585. Standard errors are clustered by firm and fiscal year. ***, **, and * indicate 







Appendix 4.2             
Loss reversal and firm structure: logistic model and agency problem      
Panel B: Loss reversal and firm structure among high payout firms (no agency problem)             
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  
INTERCEPT 0.051 0.091 0.574  0.082 0.149 0.583  0.149 0.150 0.319  
ROA 4.125 0.260 0.000 *** 4.113 0.260 0.000 *** 4.111 0.259 0.000 *** 
PAST_ROA 0.248 0.102 0.015 ** 0.247 0.102 0.015 ** 0.246 0.102 0.016 ** 
SIZE -0.028 0.010 0.005 *** -0.030 0.010 0.002 *** -0.031 0.010 0.002 *** 
SALESGROWTH 0.002 0.035 0.952  0.002 0.035 0.952  0.002 0.035 0.960  
FIRSTLOSS -0.062 0.053 0.249  -0.063 0.053 0.239  -0.063 0.053 0.238  
LOSS_SEQ -0.155 0.016 0.000 *** -0.155 0.016 0.000 *** -0.155 0.016 0.000 *** 
DIVDUM 0.095 0.064 0.139  0.080 0.064 0.212  0.079 0.064 0.222  
LEVERAGE 0.367 0.080 0.000 *** 0.348 0.080 0.000 *** 0.345 0.080 0.000 *** 
T_Q 0.015 0.010 0.128 *** 0.015 0.010 0.130  0.015 0.010 0.124 *** 
CAPX -0.679 0.240 0.005 *** -0.669 0.240 0.005 *** -0.666 0.240 0.005 *** 
SPECIAL_ITEM -5.813 0.337 0.000 *** -5.812 0.337 0.000 *** -5.813 0.337 0.000 *** 
CREDIT_RATING 0.207 0.037 0.000 *** 0.205 0.037 0.000 *** 0.204 0.037 0.000 *** 
DIVERSITY_D -0.010 0.051 0.841  
   
 
   
 
HERF_ASSET    -0.075 0.113 0.502  
   
 
HERF_SALES     
   
 -0.137 0.113 0.226  
AB_D -1.257 0.048 0.000 *** -0.610 0.174 0.000 *** -0.642 0.177 0.000 *** 
AB_D*DIVERSITY_D 0.246 0.090 0.006 ***     
   
 
AB_D*HERF_ASSET    -0.660 0.192 0.001 *** 
   
 
AB_D*HERF_SALES    
   
 -0.621 0.194 0.001 *** 
Diversified & AB_D=1            
marginal effects 0.042 0.010 0.000 *** -0.079 0.012 0.000 *** -0.079 0.012 0.000 *** 
This table presents the results of loss reversal probability with no potential agency problems using the annual estimation of logistic regression. Low payout is used as 
the proxy of agency problem which is defined as if the firm's payout ratio is below the industry median in annual basis. Dependent variable is loss reversal which takes 
value of 1 if firms becomes profitable in the next year, and 0 otherwise. Variables definitions are provided in the notes to Table 4.1. Three measures of diversification 
are used. In regression (1), diversification is dummy variable equals one if a firm has more than one segments and zero otherwise. In regression (2) and (3), diversification 
is calculated as Herfindahl Index based on asset and sales. AB_D (abandonment option) is dummy variable equals one if both sales and number of employees decrease 
comparing to the previous year, and zero otherwise. Reported coefficients are the average coefficients over the estimation period from 1980 to 2016. The number of 




Appendix 4.3          
Loss reversal and firm structure: logistic model and agency problem   
Panel A: Loss reversal (alternative asset-based abandonment option) and firm structure under over-investment (high agency problem) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  
INTERCEPT 0.027 0.102 0.791  -0.004 0.144 0.975  0.086 0.144 0.549  
ROA 5.197 0.299 0.000 *** 5.172 0.299 0.000 *** 5.169 0.298 0.000 *** 
PAST_ROA 0.425 0.153 0.005 *** 0.421 0.153 0.006 *** 0.417 0.153 0.006 *** 
SIZE -0.026 0.010 0.011 ** -0.028 0.010 0.005 *** -0.030 0.010 0.003 *** 
SALESGROWTH -0.037 0.046 0.411  -0.038 0.046 0.405  -0.039 0.046 0.396  
FIRSTLOSS 0.014 0.052 0.781  0.013 0.052 0.801  0.012 0.052 0.817  
LOSS_SEQ -0.132 0.017 0.000 *** -0.131 0.017 0.000 *** -0.131 0.017 0.000 *** 
DIVDUM 0.147 0.040 0.000 *** 0.139 0.040 0.001 *** 0.136 0.041 0.001 *** 
LEVERAGE 0.392 0.106 0.000 *** 0.376 0.106 0.000 *** 0.375 0.105 0.000 *** 
T_Q 0.244 0.070 0.000 *** 0.246 0.070 0.000 *** 0.249 0.070 0.000 *** 
CAPX -1.659 0.327 0.000 *** -1.635 0.326 0.000 *** -1.633 0.326 0.000 *** 
SPECIAL_ITEM -6.979 0.378 0.000 *** -6.968 0.378 0.000 *** -6.968 0.378 0.000 *** 
CREDIT_RATING 0.234 0.035 0.000 *** 0.233 0.035 0.000 *** 0.232 0.035 0.000 *** 
DIVERSITY_D -0.074 0.052 0.155  
   
 
   
 
HERF_ASSET    0.031 0.109 0.776  
   
 
HERF_SALES     
   
 -0.067 0.109 0.542  
AB_D -1.202 0.043 0.000 *** -0.857 0.139 0.000 *** -0.941 0.141 0.000 *** 
AB_D*DIVERSITY_D 0.148 0.076 0.050 **     
   
 
AB_D*HERF_ASSET    -0.348 0.156 0.026 ** 
   
 
AB_D*HERF_SALES    
   
 -0.250 0.158 0.113  
            
Diversified & AB_D=1            
marginal effects 0.009 0.010 0.403  -0.044 0.021 0.032 ** -0.042 0.021 0.048 ** 
This table presents the results of loss reversal probability with high agency problems using the annual estimation of logistic regression. Over-investment is used as the 
proxy of agency problem which is defined as if the firm's Tobin's Q is below the Industry median in annual basis. Dependent variable is loss reversal which takes value 
of 1 if firms becomes profitable in the next year, and 0 otherwise. Independent variables follow Joos and Plesko (2005) with additional firm level control variables and 
definitions are provided in the notes to Table 4.1. Three measures of diversification are used. In regression (1), diversification is dummy variable equals one if a firm 
has more than one segments and zero otherwise. In regression (2) and (3), diversification is calculated as Herfindahl Index based on asset and sales. AB_D (abandonment 
option) is dummy variable equals one if both total assets and number of employees decrease comparing to the previous year, and zero otherwise. Reported coefficients 
are the average coefficients over the estimation period from 1980 to 2016. The number of observation is 18848. Standard errors are clustered by firm and fiscal year. 




Appendix 4.3          
Loss reversal and firm structure: logistic model and agency problem   
Panel B: Loss reversal (alternative asset-based abandonment option) and firm structure under no over-investment (no agency problem) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  
INTERCEPT 0.018 0.080 0.827  0.185 0.134 0.166  0.188 0.134 0.160  
ROA 3.784 0.234 0.000 *** 3.776 0.233 0.000 *** 3.776 0.233 0.000 *** 
PAST_ROA 0.198 0.112 0.076 * 0.197 0.111 0.077 * 0.194 0.111 0.081 * 
SIZE 0.001 0.010 0.928  -0.002 0.010 0.854  -0.002 0.010 0.860  
SALESGROWTH 0.001 0.032 0.965  0.001 0.032 0.963  0.001 0.032 0.974  
FIRSTLOSS -0.089 0.053 0.094 * -0.087 0.053 0.102  -0.088 0.053 0.098 * 
LOSS_SEQ -0.164 0.017 0.000 *** -0.163 0.017 0.000 *** -0.163 0.017 0.000 *** 
DIVDUM 0.216 0.040 0.000 *** 0.204 0.040 0.000 *** 0.205 0.040 0.000 *** 
LEVERAGE 0.733 0.094 0.000 *** 0.719 0.094 0.000 *** 0.725 0.094 0.000 *** 
T_Q -0.011 0.009 0.213  -0.011 0.009 0.226  -0.010 0.009 0.234  
CAPX -0.716 0.194 0.000 *** -0.696 0.194 0.000 *** -0.702 0.194 0.000 *** 
SPECIAL_ITEM -6.168 0.315 0.000 *** -6.168 0.316 0.000 *** 0.244 0.036 0.000 *** 
CREDIT_RATING 0.249 0.036 0.000 *** 0.245 0.036 0.000 *** 0.232 0.035 0.000 *** 
DIVERSITY_D -0.012 0.050 0.818  
   
 
   
 
HERF_ASSET    -0.170 0.111 0.125  
   
 
HERF_SALES     
   
 -0.176 0.111 0.114  
AB_D -1.591 0.048 0.000 *** -0.675 0.157 0.000 *** -0.686 0.159 0.000 *** 
AB_D*DIVERSITY_D 0.508 0.084 0.000 ***     
   
 
AB_D*HERF_ASSET    -0.881 0.175 0.000 *** 
   
 
AB_D*HERF_SALES    
   
 -0.863 0.177 0.000 *** 
            
Diversified & AB_D=1            
marginal effects 0.042 0.009 0.000 *** -0.080 0.013 0.000 *** -0.077 0.014 0.000 *** 
This table presents the results of loss reversal probability with no potential agency problems using the annual estimation of logistic regression. Over-investment is used as 
the proxy of agency problem which is defined as if the firm's Tobin's Q is below the Industry median in annual basis. Dependent variable is loss reversal which takes value 
of 1 if firms becomes profitable in the next year, and 0 otherwise. Independent variables follow Joos and Plesko (2005) with additional firm level control variables and 
definitions are provided in the notes to Table 4.1. Three measures of diversification are used. In regression (1), diversification is dummy variable equals one if a firm has 
more than one segments and zero otherwise. In regression (2) and (3), diversification is calculated as Herfindahl Index based on asset and sales. AB_D (abandonment 
option) is dummy variable equals one if both total assets and number of employees decrease comparing to the previous year, and zero otherwise. Reported coefficients are 
the average coefficients over the estimation period from 1980 to 2016. The number of observation is 20662. Standard errors are clustered by firm and fiscal year. ***, **, 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Appendix 4.4          
Loss reversal and firm structure: logistic model and agency problem   
Panel A: Loss reversal (alternative abandonment option using GSL forecasting model) and firm structure under over-investment (high agency problem) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  
INTERCEPT -0.398 0.097 0.000  -0.366 0.127 0.004  -0.300 0.127 0.018 ** 
ROA 5.716 0.299 0.000 *** 5.693 0.299 0.000 *** 5.684 0.298 0.000 *** 
PAST_ROA 0.291 0.142 0.040 ** 0.288 0.142 0.043 ** 0.286 0.142 0.044 ** 
SIZE -0.036 0.010 0.000 *** -0.039 0.010 0.000 *** -0.040 0.010 0.000 *** 
SALESGROWTH -0.014 0.041 0.743  -0.014 0.041 0.727  -0.015 0.041 0.724  
FIRSTLOSS 0.043 0.049 0.384  0.042 0.049 0.393  0.042 0.049 0.397  
LOSS_SEQ -0.111 0.016 0.000 *** -0.111 0.016 0.000 *** -0.111 0.016 0.000 *** 
DIVDUM 0.146 0.039 0.000 *** 0.138 0.039 0.000 *** 0.135 0.039 0.000 *** 
LEVERAGE 0.189 0.101 0.062 * 0.174 0.101 0.086 * 0.169 0.101 0.095 * 
T_Q 0.389 0.068 0.000 *** 0.390 0.068 0.000 *** 0.393 0.068 0.000 *** 
CAPX -1.086 0.320 0.001 *** -1.070 0.320 0.001 *** -1.063 0.319 0.001 *** 
SPECIAL_ITEM -6.760 0.368 0.000 *** -6.750 0.368 0.000 *** -6.746 0.368 0.000 *** 
CREDIT_RATING 0.176 0.033 0.000 *** 0.175 0.033 0.000 *** 0.175 0.033 0.000 *** 
DIVERSITY_D -0.041 0.039 0.294  
   
 
   
 
HERF_ASSET    -0.032 0.082 0.693  
   
 
HERF_SALES     
   
 -0.100 0.083 0.227  
AB_D -0.043 0.076 0.567  0.332 0.215 0.122  0.270 0.216 0.212  
AB_D*DIVERSITY_D 0.130 0.124 0.296      
   
 
AB_D*HERF_ASSET    -0.394 0.247 0.111  
   
 
AB_D*HERF_SALES    
   
 -0.321 0.248 0.195  
Marginal effects 0.003 0.012 0.23  -0.008 0.023 0.127  -0.078 0.023 0.081 * 
This table presents the results of loss reversal probability with high agency problems using the annual estimation of logistic regression. Over-investment is used as the proxy of 
agency problem which is defined as if the firm's Tobin's Q is below the Industry median in annual basis. Dependent variable is loss reversal which takes value of 1 if firms 
becomes profitable in the next year, and 0 otherwise. Independent variables follow Joos and Plesko (2005) with additional firm level control variables and definitions are 
provided in the notes to Table 4.1. Three measures of diversification are used. In regression (1), diversification is dummy variable equals one if a firm has more than one 
segments and zero otherwise. In regression (2) and (3), diversification is calculated as Herfindahl Index based on asset and sales. AB_D (abandonment option) is dummy 
variable equals one if model-predicted sales growth decreases comparing to the previous year, and zero otherwise. Reported coefficients are the average coefficients over the 
estimation period from 1980 to 2016. The number of observation is 18848. Standard errors are clustered by firm and fiscal year. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance 









Appendix 4.4          
Loss reversal and firm structure: logistic model and agency problem   
Panel B: Loss reversal (alternative abandonment option using GSL forecasting model) and firm structure under no over-investment (no agency problem) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  
INTERCEPT -0.311 0.076 0.000  -0.013 0.116 0.914  -0.013 0.116 0.914  
ROA 4.047 0.231 0.000 *** 4.040 0.230 0.000 *** 4.040 0.230 0.000 *** 
PAST_ROA 0.120 0.104 0.248  0.120 0.104 0.249  0.120 0.104 0.249  
SIZE 0.004 0.009 0.667  0.002 0.009 0.831  0.002 0.009 0.831  
SALESGROWTH 0.014 0.030 0.633  0.015 0.030 0.630  0.015 0.030 0.630  
FIRSTLOSS -0.101 0.051 0.047 ** -0.102 0.051 0.045 ** -0.102 0.051 0.045 ** 
LOSS_SEQ -0.142 0.016 0.000 *** -0.141 0.016 0.000 *** -0.141 0.016 0.000 *** 
DIVDUM 0.178 0.038 0.000 *** 0.168 0.038 0.000 *** 0.168 0.038 0.000 *** 
LEVERAGE 0.275 0.087 0.002 *** 0.255 0.087 0.003 *** 0.255 0.087 0.003 *** 
T_Q 0.000 0.008 0.965  0.000 0.008 0.967  0.000 0.008 0.967  
CAPX -0.283 0.181 0.119  -0.260 0.182 0.152  -0.260 0.182 0.152  
SPECIAL_ITEM -5.845 0.300 0.000 *** -5.841 0.300 0.000 *** -5.841 0.300 0.000 *** 
CREDIT_RATING 0.193 0.034 0.000 *** 0.190 0.034 0.000 *** 0.190 0.034 0.000 *** 
DIVERSITY_D 0.071 0.041 0.083 *     
   
 
HERF_ASSET    -0.295 0.088 0.001 *** 
   
 
HERF_SALES     
   
 -0.295 0.088 0.001 *** 
AB_D -0.155 0.081 0.056 * 0.519 0.280 0.064 * 0.519 0.280 0.064 * 
AB_D*DIVERSITY_D 0.397 0.145 0.006 ***     
   
 
AB_D*HERF_ASSET    -0.637 0.311 0.041 ** 
   
 
AB_D*HERF_SALES    
   
 -0.637 0.311 0.041 ** 
Marginal effects 0.082 0.009 0.000 *** 0.132 0.007 0.000 *** 0.128 0.007 0.000 *** 
This table presents the results of loss reversal probability with no potential agency problems using the annual estimation of logistic regression. Over-investment is used 
as the proxy of agency problem which is defined as if the firm's Tobin's Q is below the Industry median in annual basis. Dependent variable is loss reversal which takes 
value of 1 if firms becomes profitable in the next year, and 0 otherwise. Independent variables follow Joos and Plesko (2005) with additional firm level control variables 
and definitions are provided in the notes to Table 4.1. Three measures of diversification are used. In regression (1), diversification is dummy variable equals one if a firm 
has more than one segments and zero otherwise. In regression (2) and (3), diversification is calculated as Herfindahl Index based on asset and sales. AB_D (abandonment 
option) is dummy variable equals one if model-predicted sales growth decreases comparing to the previous year, and zero otherwise. Reported coefficients are the average 
coefficients over the estimation period from 1980 to 2016. The number of observation is 20662. Standard errors are clustered by firm and fiscal year. ***, **, and * 





Appendix 4.5            
Loss reversal and firm structure                
Panel A: Alternative logistic regression model                
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Coef. Std. Err. p-value 
 Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  
INTERCEPT -0.215 0.055 0.000 *** 0.005 0.080 0.953  0.042 0.081 0.607  
ACCRUAL 3.465 0.152 0.000 *** 3.459 0.152 0.000 *** 3.457 0.152 0.000 *** 
CFO 3.898 0.140 0.000 *** 3.889 0.139 0.000 *** 3.888 0.139 0.000 *** 
PAST_ACCR -0.367 0.140 0.009 *** -0.360 0.140 0.010 ** -0.359 0.140 0.010 ** 
PAST_CFO 0.351 0.091 0.000 *** 0.351 0.091 0.000 *** 0.350 0.091 0.000 *** 
SIZE 0.009 0.007 0.184  0.006 0.007 0.326  0.006 0.007 0.389  
SALESGROWTH 0.090 0.024 0.000 *** 0.089 0.024 0.000 *** 0.089 0.024 0.000 *** 
FIRSTLOSS 0.016 0.036 0.646  0.016 0.036 0.653  0.016 0.036 0.655  
LOSS_SEQ -0.140 0.012 0.000 *** -0.139 0.012 0.000 *** -0.139 0.012 0.000 *** 
DIVDUM 0.162 0.027 0.000 *** 0.154 0.027 0.000 *** 0.153 0.027 0.000 *** 
LEVERAGE -0.129 0.054 0.016 ** -0.145 0.054 0.007 *** -0.148 0.053 0.006 *** 
T_Q 0.008 0.008 0.336  0.008 0.008 0.336  0.008 0.008 0.321  
CAPX -0.254 0.157 0.106  -0.237 0.157 0.133  -0.237 0.157 0.132  
SPECIAL_ITEM -5.320 0.207 0.000 *** -5.317 0.207 0.000 *** -5.319 0.207 0.000 *** 
CREDIT_RATING 0.178 0.024 0.000 *** 0.177 0.024 0.000 *** 0.176 0.024 0.000 *** 
DIVERSITY_D 0.046 0.028 0.092 *     
   
 
HERF_ASSET    -0.217 0.058 0.000 *** 
   
 
HERF_SALES     
   
 -0.253 0.059 0.000 *** 
Marginal effects 0.009 0.007 0.207  -0.040 0.014 0.005 *** -0.047 0.014 0.001 *** 
This table presents the results of loss reversal probability using the annual estimation of logistic regression. Dependent variable is loss reversal which takes value of 1 if 
firms becomes profitable in the next year, and 0 otherwise. Variables definitions are provided in the notes to Table 4.1. To be different from the main analysis, we decompose 
the ROA into CFO and accruals. Three measures of diversification are used. In regression (1), diversification is dummy variable equals one if a firm has more than one 
segments and zero otherwise. In regression (2) and (3), diversification is calculated as Herfindahl Index based on asset and sales. Reported coefficients are the average 
coefficients over the estimation period from 1980 to 2016. Standard errors are clustered by firm and fiscal year. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 








Appendix 4.5          
Loss reversal and firm structure        
Panel B: Alternative logistic regression model full model       
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  
INTERCEPT 0.104 0.058 0.073 * 0.206 0.091 0.024 ** 0.248 0.092 0.007 *** 
ACCRUAL 3.232 0.155 0.000 *** 3.227 0.155 0.000 *** 3.226 0.155 0.000 *** 
CFO 3.819 0.142 0.000 *** 3.809 0.142 0.000 *** 3.809 0.142 0.000 *** 
PAST_ACCR -0.321 0.146 0.028 ** -0.310 0.146 0.033 ** -0.315 0.146 0.031 ** 
PAST_CFO 0.416 0.094 0.000 *** 0.416 0.094 0.000 *** 0.414 0.094 0.000 *** 
SIZE -0.004 0.007 0.601  -0.006 0.007 0.349  -0.007 0.007 0.311  
SALESGROWTH 0.047 0.025 0.061 * 0.047 0.025 0.062 * 0.047 0.025 0.061 * 
FIRSTLOSS 0.000 0.037 0.998  -0.001 0.037 0.975  -0.001 0.037 0.976  
LOSS_SEQ -0.157 0.012 0.000 *** -0.156 0.012 0.000 *** -0.156 0.012 0.000 *** 
DIVDUM 0.169 0.028 0.000 *** 0.160 0.028 0.000 *** 0.159 0.028 0.000 *** 
LEVERAGE 0.179 0.057 0.002 *** 0.161 0.057 0.004 *** 0.160 0.056 0.005 *** 
T_Q 0.002 0.009 0.843  0.002 0.009 0.849  0.002 0.009 0.825  
CAPX -0.714 0.165 0.000 *** -0.696 0.165 0.000 *** -0.695 0.165 0.000 *** 
SPECIAL_ITEM -6.051 0.220 0.000 *** -6.054 0.220 0.000 *** -6.055 0.220 0.000 *** 
CREDIT_RATING 0.202 0.025 0.000 *** 0.201 0.025 0.000 *** 0.200 0.025 0.000 *** 
DIVERSITY_D -0.002 0.034 0.944  
   
 
   
 
HERF_ASSET     -0.095 0.073 0.192  
   
 
HERF_SALES     
   
 -0.138 0.074 0.060 * 
AB_D -1.258 0.033 0.000 *** -0.654 0.108 0.000 *** -0.691 0.110 0.000 *** 
AB_D*DIVERSITY_D 0.251 0.058 0.000 ***     
   
 
AB_D*HERF_ASSET     -0.612 0.121 0.000 *** 
   
 
AB_D*HERF_SALES     
   
 -0.567 0.122 0.000 *** 
Marginal effects 0.026 0.008 0.001 *** -0.072 0.014 0.000 *** -0.047 0.014 0.001 *** 
This table presents the results of loss reversal probability using the annual estimation of logistic regression. Dependent variable is loss reversal which takes value of 1 if firms 
becomes profitable in the next year, and 0 otherwise. Variable definitions are provided in the notes to Table 4.1. To be different from the main analysis, we decompose the 
ROA into CFO and accruals. Three measures of diversification are used. In regression (1), diversification is dummy variable equals one if a firm has more than one segments 
and zero otherwise. In regression (2) and (3), diversification is calculated as Herfindahl Index based on asset and sales. AB_D (abandonment option) is dummy variable equals 
one if both sales and number of employees decrease comparing to the previous year, and zero otherwise. Reported coefficients are the average coefficients over the estimation 





Appendix 4.5       
Loss reversal and firm structure      
Panel C: Alternative logistic regression model with high agency problem (Tobin's Q) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  
INTERCEPT -0.048 0.104 0.644  -0.091 0.141 0.518  -0.009 0.141 0.949  
ACCRUAL 3.049 0.248 0.000 *** 3.032 0.248 0.000 *** 3.026 0.248 0.000 *** 
CFO 4.026 0.241 0.000 *** 4.005 0.240 0.000 *** 4.000 0.240 0.000 *** 
PAST_ACCR 0.046 0.233 0.844  0.051 0.232 0.827  0.048 0.232 0.835  
PAST_CFO 0.811 0.171 0.000 *** 0.807 0.171 0.000 *** 0.804 0.171 0.000 *** 
SIZE -0.020 0.010 0.050 ** -0.023 0.010 0.024 ** -0.024 0.010 0.018 ** 
SALESGROWTH 0.059 0.043 0.170  0.058 0.043 0.177  0.057 0.043 0.181  
FIRSTLOSS 0.054 0.052 0.296  0.052 0.052 0.315  0.052 0.052 0.311  
LOSS_SEQ -0.148 0.018 0.000 *** -0.148 0.018 0.000 *** -0.147 0.018 0.000 *** 
DIVDUM 0.142 0.041 0.001 *** 0.134 0.041 0.001 *** 0.131 0.041 0.001 *** 
LEVERAGE 0.357 0.108 0.001 *** 0.340 0.108 0.002 *** 0.337 0.108 0.002 *** 
T_Q 0.233 0.073 0.001 *** 0.234 0.073 0.001 *** 0.236 0.073 0.001 *** 
CAPX -1.311 0.336 0.000 *** -1.287 0.336 0.000 *** -1.283 0.335 0.000 *** 
SPECIAL_ITEM -5.952 0.349 0.000 *** -5.949 0.349 0.000 *** -5.948 0.349 0.000 *** 
CREDIT_RATING 0.193 0.035 0.000 *** 0.192 0.035 0.000 *** 0.191 0.035 0.000 *** 
DIVERSITY_D -0.072 0.049 0.145  
   
 
   
 
HERF_ASSET     0.046 0.103 0.655  
   
 
HERF_SALES     
   
 -0.042 0.103 0.683  
AB_D -1.162 0.045 0.000 *** -0.733 0.145 0.000 *** -0.803 0.146 0.000 *** 
AB_D*DIVERSITY_D 0.167 0.079 0.034 **     
   
 
AB_D*HERF_ASSET     -0.439 0.162 0.007 *** 
   
 
AB_D*HERF_SALES     
   
 -0.357 0.164 0.029 ** 
Marginal effects 0.011 0.011 0.328  -0.048 0.023 0.033 ** -0.050 0.023 0.029 ** 
This table presents the results of loss reversal probability with high agency problems using the annual estimation of logistic regression. Over-investment is used as the 
proxy of agency problem which is defined as if the firm's Tobin's Q is below the Industry median in annual basis. Dependent variable is loss reversal which takes value of 
1 if firms becomes profitable in the next year, and 0 otherwise. Variable definitions are provided in the notes to Table 4.1. To be different from the main analysis, we 
decompose the ROA into CFO and accruals. Three measures of diversification are used. In regression (1), diversification is dummy variable equals one if a firm has more 
than one segments and zero otherwise. In regression (2) and (3), diversification is calculated as Herfindahl Index based on asset and sales. AB_D (abandonment option) is 
dummy variable equals one if both sales and number of employees decrease comparing to the previous year, and zero otherwise. Reported coefficients are the average 
coefficients over the estimation period from 1980 to 2016. Standard errors are clustered by firm and fiscal year. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 





Appendix 4.5        
Loss reversal and firm structure    
Panel D: Logistic regression model with low agency problem (Tobin's Q) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  
INTERCEPT 0.013 0.080 0.870  0.254 0.130 0.050 * 0.261 0.130 0.046 ** 
ACCRUAL 3.300 0.197 0.000 *** 3.302 0.197 0.000 *** 3.300 0.196 0.000 *** 
CFO 3.746 0.175 0.000 *** 3.742 0.175 0.000 *** 3.743 0.175 0.000 *** 
PAST_ACCR -0.424 0.189 0.025 ** -0.411 0.190 0.030 ** -0.419 0.189 0.027 ** 
PAST_CFO 0.256 0.114 0.025 ** 0.260 0.114 0.023 ** 0.256 0.114 0.025 ** 
SIZE 0.002 0.009 0.822  -0.001 0.009 0.955  -0.001 0.009 0.941  
SALESGROWTH 0.011 0.032 0.722  0.012 0.032 0.715  0.012 0.032 0.706  
FIRSTLOSS -0.070 0.053 0.188  -0.070 0.053 0.186  -0.072 0.053 0.175  
LOSS_SEQ -0.159 0.017 0.000 *** -0.157 0.017 0.000 *** -0.158 0.017 0.000 *** 
DIVDUM 0.198 0.040 0.000 *** 0.185 0.040 0.000 *** 0.188 0.040 0.000 *** 
LEVERAGE 0.500 0.092 0.000 *** 0.485 0.092 0.000 *** 0.487 0.092 0.000 *** 
T_Q -0.004 0.009 0.669  -0.004 0.009 0.672  -0.004 0.009 0.687  
CAPX -0.641 0.194 0.001 *** -0.623 0.194 0.001 *** -0.624 0.194 0.001 *** 
SPECIAL_ITEM -6.322 0.292 0.000 *** -6.320 0.292 0.000 *** -6.320 0.292 0.000 *** 
CREDIT_RATING 0.210 0.036 0.000 *** 0.208 0.036 0.000 *** 0.206 0.036 0.000 *** 
DIVERSITY_D 0.061 0.048 0.202  
   
 
   
 
HERF_ASSET    -0.233 0.105 0.027 ** 
   
 
HERF_SALES     
   
 -0.238 0.106 0.025 ** 
AB_D -1.387 0.052 0.000 *** -0.474 0.167 0.005 *** -0.468 0.170 0.006 *** 
AB_D*DIVERSITY_D 0.402 0.089 0.000 ***     
   
 
AB_D*HERF_ASSET    -0.914 0.187 0.000 *** 
   
 
AB_D*HERF_SALES    
   
 -0.915 0.190 0.000 *** 
Marginal effects 0.041 0.011 0.000 *** -0.094 0.018 0.000 *** -0.095 0.019 0.000 *** 
This table presents the results of loss reversal probability with no potential agency problems using the annual estimation of logistic regression. Over-investment is used as 
the proxy of agency problem which is defined as if the firm's Tobin's Q is below the Industry median in annual basis. Dependent variable is loss reversal which takes value 
of 1 if firms becomes profitable in the next year, and 0 otherwise. Variable definitions are provided in the notes to Table 4.1. To be different from the main analysis, we 
decompose the ROA into CFO and accruals. Three measures of diversification are used. In regression (1), diversification is dummy variable equals one if a firm has more 
than one segments and zero otherwise. In regression (2) and (3), diversification is calculated as Herfindahl Index based on asset and sales. AB_D (abandonment option) is 
dummy variable equals one if both sales and number of employees decrease comparing to the previous year, and zero otherwise. Reported coefficients are the average 
coefficients over the estimation period from 1980 to 2016. Standard errors are clustered by firm and fiscal year. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 




Appendix 5.1             
Dividend payout ratio and firm structure: agency problem hypothesis under propensity matched sample 
Panel A: Group by free-cash flow               
        High Agency Problem         
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  
ROA 0.100 0.041 0.015 ** 0.102 0.041 0.014 ** 0.102 0.041 0.013 ** 
SIZE 0.019 0.005 0.000 *** 0.018 0.005 0.000 *** 0.018 0.005 0.000 *** 
SALESGROWTH -0.005 0.008 0.510  -0.005 0.008 0.507  -0.005 0.008 0.500  
LEVERAGE -0.068 0.026 0.008 *** -0.070 0.026 0.006 *** -0.071 0.026 0.006 *** 
CAPX -0.076 0.036 0.035  -0.075 0.036 0.035 ** -0.076 0.036 0.033 ** 
T_Q -0.018 0.004 0.000 *** -0.018 0.004 0.000 *** -0.018 0.004 0.000 *** 
CREDIT_RATING 0.002 0.010 0.825  0.002 0.010 0.807  0.002 0.010 0.825  
CASH HOLDING -0.049 0.027 0.063  -0.049 0.027 0.065 * -0.049 0.026 0.064 * 
RETAINED EARNINGS 0.012 0.006 0.073  0.012 0.006 0.070 * 0.012 0.007 0.070 * 
R&D 0.007 0.014 0.597  0.009 0.015 0.525  0.008 0.015 0.611  
CFO 0.026 0.019 0.178  0.025 0.019 0.190  0.026 0.019 0.173  
DIVERSITY_D 0.021 0.008 0.009 ***     
   
 
HERF_ASSET     -0.054 0.017 0.001 *** 
   
 
HERF_SALES     
   
 -0.056 0.016 0.001 *** 
             
R^2  0.457    0.457    0.457   
This table presents the results by agency problem under propensity score matched sample. Propensity score matched firms are selected based on propensity scores estimated 
using our regression model parameters. The regressions are presented across the groups of high agency and low agency problems. The criteria for agency problem are free 
cash flow (Panel A &B) and Tobin's Q (Panel C &D). Three measures of diversification are used. In regression (1), diversification is dummy variable equals one if a firm 
has more than one segments and zero otherwise. In regression (2) and (3), diversification is calculated as Herfindahl Index based on asset and sales. Dependent variable is 
the dividend payout ratio defined as total dividend divided by net income. Definitions of independent variables are provided in the notes to Table 5.1. Reported coefficients 
are the average coefficients over the estimation period from 1980 to 2016. Firm and year fixed effect are controlled in the regression. The number of observation is 23253. 












Appendix 5.1             
Dividend payout ratio and firm structure: agency problem hypothesis under propensity matched sample 
Panel B: Group by free-cash flow               
        Low Agency Problem      
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  
ROA 0.099 0.030 0.001 *** 0.098 0.030 0.001 *** 0.100 0.030 0.001 *** 
SIZE 0.042 0.009 0.000 *** 0.040 0.009 0.000 *** 0.040 0.009 0.000 *** 
SALESGROWTH 0.004 0.009 0.663  0.003 0.009 0.705  0.004 0.009 0.682  
LEVERAGE -0.103 0.044 0.020 ** -0.108 0.044 0.015 ** -0.107 0.044 0.016 ** 
CAPX 0.104 0.067 0.125  0.103 0.067 0.126  0.103 0.067 0.125  
T_Q -0.006 0.003 0.042 ** -0.006 0.003 0.053 * -0.006 0.003 0.049 ** 
CREDIT_RATING 0.013 0.018 0.467  0.013 0.018 0.485  0.013 0.018 0.488  
CASH HOLDING -0.021 0.036 0.558  -0.020 0.036 0.574  -0.019 0.036 0.590  
RETAINED EARNINGS -0.006 0.002 0.005 *** -0.006 0.002 0.005 *** -0.006 0.002 0.005 *** 
R&D 0.007 0.005 0.160  0.007 0.005 0.142  0.006 0.005 0.235  
CFO 0.033 0.023 0.158  0.033 0.023 0.152  0.033 0.023 0.150  
DIVERSITY_D 0.008 0.016 0.619  
   
     
HERF_ASSET     -0.058 0.034 0.091 *     
HERF_SALES         -0.052 0.036 0.148  
             
R^2  0.365    0.365    0.365   
This table presents the results by agency problem under propensity score matched sample. Propensity score matched firms are selected based on propensity scores 
estimated using our regression model parameters. The regressions are presented across the groups of high agency and low agency problems. The criteria for agency 
problem are free cash flow (Panel A &B) and Tobin's Q (Panel C &D). Three measures of diversification are used. In regression (1), diversification is dummy variable 
equals one if a firm has more than one segments and zero otherwise. In regression (2) and (3), diversification is calculated as Herfindahl Index based on asset and sales. 
Dependent variable is the dividend payout ratio defined as total dividend divided by net income. Definitions of independent variables are provided in the notes to Table 
5.1. Reported coefficients are the average coefficients over the estimation period from 1980 to 2016. The number of observation is 12565. Firm and year fixed effect are 










Appendix 5.1             
Dividend payout ratio and firm structure: agency problem hypothesis under propensity matched sample 
Panel C: Group by Tobin's Q                 
        High Agency Problem         
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  
ROA 0.219 0.037 0.000 *** 0.219 0.037 0.000 *** 0.219 0.037 0.000 *** 
SIZE 0.028 0.005 0.000 *** 0.027 0.005 0.000 *** 0.027 0.005 0.000 *** 
SALESGROWTH 0.004 0.006 0.459  0.004 0.006 0.485  0.004 0.006 0.474  
LEVERAGE -0.157 0.028 0.000 *** -0.160 0.028 0.000 *** -0.160 0.028 0.000 *** 
CAPX 0.029 0.041 0.483  0.030 0.041 0.460  0.030 0.041 0.462  
T_Q -0.062 0.010 0.000 *** -0.061 0.010 0.000 *** -0.061 0.010 0.000 *** 
CREDIT_RATING 0.023 0.012 0.064 * 0.023 0.012 0.062 * 0.023 0.012 0.064 * 
CASH HOLDING -0.066 0.027 0.015  -0.066 0.027 0.015 ** -0.064 0.027 0.018 ** 
RETAINED EARNINGS -0.001 0.003 0.774  -0.001 0.003 0.783  -0.001 0.003 0.791  
R&D 0.019 0.020 0.349  0.020 0.021 0.322  0.018 0.021 0.373  
CFO 0.020 0.021 0.350  0.019 0.021 0.358  0.020 0.021 0.351  
DIVERSITY_D 0.021 0.008 0.008 ***         
HERF_ASSET     -0.057 0.016 0.000 ***     
HERF_SALES     
   
 -0.055 0.017 0.002 *** 
             
R^2  0.360    0.360    0.360   
This table presents the results by agency problem under propensity score matched sample. Propensity score matched firms are selected based on propensity scores 
estimated using our regression model parameters. The regressions are presented across the groups of high agency and low agency problems. The criteria for agency 
problem are free cash flow (Panel A &B) and Tobin's Q (Panel C &D). Three measures of diversification are used. In regression (1), diversification is dummy variable 
equals one if a firm has more than one segments and zero otherwise. In regression (2) and (3), diversification is calculated as Herfindahl Index based on asset and sales. 
Dependent variable is the dividend payout ratio defined as total dividend divided by net income. Definitions of independent variables are provided in the notes to Table 
5.1. Reported coefficients are the average coefficients over the estimation period from 1980 to 2016. The number of observation is 25999. Firm and year fixed effect 










Appendix 5.1             
Dividend payout ratio and firm structure: agency problem hypothesis under propensity matched sample 
Panel D: Group by Tobin's Q             
        Low Agency Problem      
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  
ROA -0.102 0.045 0.023 ** -0.102 0.045 0.023 ** -0.101 0.045 0.024 ** 
SIZE -0.003 0.009 0.769  -0.003 0.009 0.734  -0.003 0.009 0.715  
SALESGROWTH -0.007 0.016 0.662  -0.007 0.016 0.654  -0.007 0.016 0.651  
LEVERAGE 0.051 0.051 0.311  0.049 0.050 0.328  0.048 0.050 0.336  
CAPX -0.044 0.053 0.410  -0.044 0.053 0.405  -0.045 0.053 0.400  
T_Q -0.004 0.002 0.126  -0.004 0.002 0.132  -0.003 0.002 0.143  
CREDIT_RATING -0.031 0.019 0.105  -0.030 0.019 0.107  -0.030 0.019 0.105  
CASH HOLDING -0.016 0.029 0.572  -0.016 0.029 0.585  -0.016 0.029 0.578  
RETAINED EARNINGS 0.004 0.003 0.112  0.004 0.003 0.109  0.005 0.003 0.104  
R&D 0.001 0.004 0.878  0.001 0.004 0.819  0.000 0.004 0.921  
CFO 0.020 0.034 0.555  0.020 0.034 0.556  0.021 0.034 0.545  
DIVERSITY_D 0.002 0.018 0.932  
   
     
HERF_ASSET     -0.018 0.037 0.622      
HERF_SALES         -0.025 0.035 0.475  
             
R^2  0.523    0.523    0.523   
This table presents the results by agency problem under propensity score matched sample. Propensity score matched firms are selected based on propensity scores 
estimated using our regression model parameters. The regressions are presented across the groups of high agency and low agency problems. The criteria for agency 
problem are free cash flow (Panel A &B) and Tobin's Q (Panel C &D). Three measures of diversification are used. In regression (1), diversification is dummy variable 
equals one if a firm has more than one segments and zero otherwise. In regression (2) and (3), diversification is calculated as Herfindahl Index based on asset and sales. 
Dependent variable is the dividend payout ratio defined as total dividend divided by net income. Definitions of independent variables are provided in the notes to Table 
5.1. Reported coefficients are the average coefficients over the estimation period from 1980 to 2016. The number of observation is 10400. Firm and year fixed effect 







Appendix 5.1             
Dividend payout ratio and firm structure: financial constraint hypothesis under propensity matched sample 
Panel E: Group by coverage ratio                   
        Unconstraint Firms         
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  
ROA -0.005 0.040 0.892  -0.005 0.040 0.905  -0.005 0.040 0.903  
SIZE 0.013 0.007 0.066 * 0.012 0.007 0.079 * 0.013 0.007 0.075 * 
SALESGROWTH -0.001 0.009 0.871  -0.002 0.009 0.865  -0.002 0.009 0.863  
LEVERAGE -0.115 0.032 0.000 *** -0.118 0.032 0.000 *** -0.117 0.033 0.000 *** 
CAPX -0.135 0.051 0.008  -0.135 0.050 0.007 *** -0.133 0.051 0.008 *** 
T_Q -0.014 0.005 0.002 *** -0.014 0.005 0.003 *** -0.014 0.005 0.003 *** 
CREDIT_RATING 0.008 0.016 0.631  0.008 0.016 0.615  0.008 0.016 0.631  
CASH HOLDING -0.018 0.030 0.550  -0.017 0.031 0.567  -0.017 0.030 0.567  
RETAINED EARNINGS -0.003 0.003 0.295  -0.003 0.003 0.318  -0.003 0.003 0.303  
R&D 0.003 0.009 0.774  0.004 0.009 0.673  0.002 0.009 0.823  
CFO 0.060 0.029 0.038  0.059 0.029 0.039 ** 0.060 0.029 0.036 ** 
DIVERSITY_D 0.022 0.013 0.096 *         
HERF_ASSET     -0.055 0.027 0.038 **     
HERF_SALES     
   
 -0.042 0.027 0.123  
             
R^2  0.373    0.373    0.373   
This table presents the results by financial constraint problem under propensity score matched sample. Propensity score matched firms are selected based on propensity scores 
estimated using our regression model parameters. The regressions are presented across the groups of financially unconstraint and constraint. The criteria for financial constraint 
are coverage ratio (Panel A &B) and cash flow volatility (Panel C &D). Three measures of diversification are used. In regression (1), diversification is dummy variable equals 
one if a firm has more than one segments and zero otherwise. In regression (2) and (3), diversification is calculated as Herfindahl Index based on asset and sales. Dependent 
variable is the dividend payout ratio defined as total dividend divided by net income. Definitions of independent variables are provided in the notes to Table 5.1. Reported 
coefficients are the average coefficients over the estimation period from 1980 to 2016. The number of observation is 25878. Firm and year fixed effect are controlled in the 












Appendix 5.1             
Dividend payout ratio and firm structure: financial constraint hypothesis under propensity matched sample 
Panel F: Group by coverage ratio               
        Constraint firms      
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  
ROA 0.111 0.032 0.000 *** 0.111 0.032 0.000 *** 0.113 0.032 0.000 *** 
SIZE 0.026 0.005 0.000 *** 0.026 0.005 0.000 *** 0.025 0.005 0.000 *** 
SALESGROWTH 0.001 0.007 0.929  0.000 0.007 0.950  0.001 0.007 0.936  
LEVERAGE -0.077 0.027 0.005 *** -0.079 0.027 0.004 *** -0.081 0.027 0.003 *** 
CAPX 0.018 0.042 0.668  0.019 0.042 0.655  0.018 0.042 0.663  
T_Q -0.011 0.004 0.004 *** -0.010 0.004 0.004 *** -0.010 0.004 0.004 *** 
CREDIT_RATING 0.010 0.012 0.375  0.010 0.012 0.373  0.010 0.012 0.380  
CASH HOLDING -0.048 0.024 0.047 ** -0.047 0.024 0.050 * -0.047 0.024 0.051 * 
RETAINED EARNINGS -0.002 0.002 0.474  -0.002 0.002 0.469  -0.002 0.002 0.482  
R&D 0.013 0.030 0.660  0.016 0.030 0.598  0.014 0.031 0.640  
CFO 0.012 0.018 0.501  0.012 0.018 0.520  0.012 0.018 0.485  
DIVERSITY_D 0.019 0.009 0.034 **         
HERF_ASSET     -0.054 0.020 0.006 ***     
HERF_SALES         -0.060 0.021 0.003 *** 
             
R^2  0.458    0.458    0.458   
This table presents the results by financial constraint problem under propensity score matched sample. Propensity score matched firms are selected based on propensity 
scores estimated using our regression model parameters. The regressions are presented across the groups of financially unconstraint and constraint. The criteria for financial 
constraint are coverage ratio (Panel A &B) and cash flow volatility (Panel C &D). Three measures of diversification are used. In regression (1), diversification is dummy 
variable equals one if a firm has more than one segments and zero otherwise. In regression (2) and (3), diversification is calculated as Herfindahl Index based on asset and 
sales. Dependent variable is the dividend payout ratio defined as total dividend divided by net income. Definitions of independent variables are provided in the notes to 
Table 5.1. Reported coefficients are the average coefficients over the estimation period from 1980 to 2016. The number of observation is 10376. Firm and year fixed effect 








Appendix 5.1             
Dividend payout ratio and firm structure: financial constraint hypothesis under propensity matched sample 
Panel G: Group by cash flow volatility               
        Unconstraint Firms         
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  
ROA 0.063 0.034 0.060 * 0.063 0.034 0.061 * 0.064 0.034 0.059 * 
SIZE 0.029 0.010 0.003 *** 0.029 0.010 0.004 *** 0.029 0.010 0.003 *** 
SALESGROWTH 0.007 0.009 0.450  0.007 0.009 0.445  0.007 0.009 0.445  
LEVERAGE -0.067 0.052 0.192  -0.067 0.051 0.191  -0.067 0.051 0.188  
CAPX -0.023 0.068 0.732  -0.022 0.068 0.742  -0.022 0.068 0.745  
T_Q -0.004 0.002 0.054 * -0.004 0.002 0.056 * -0.004 0.002 0.056 * 
CREDIT_RATING 0.011 0.023 0.623  0.011 0.023 0.623  0.011 0.023 0.623  
CASH HOLDING -0.042 0.044 0.345  -0.041 0.044 0.352  -0.041 0.044 0.351  
RETAINED EARNINGS -0.005 0.002 0.032  -0.005 0.002 0.032 ** -0.005 0.002 0.036 ** 
R&D 0.027 0.034 0.425  0.028 0.034 0.418  0.027 0.034 0.434  
CFO 0.031 0.025 0.213  0.031 0.025 0.214  0.031 0.025 0.211  
DIVERSITY_D 0.012 0.018 0.506          
HERF_ASSET     -0.018 0.036 0.626      
HERF_SALES     
   
 -0.018 0.038 0.638  
             
R^2  0.392    0.392    0.392   
This table presents the results by financial constraint problem under propensity score matched sample. Propensity score matched firms are selected based on propensity 
scores estimated using our regression model parameters. The regressions are presented across the groups of financially unconstraint and constraint. The criteria for financial 
constraint are coverage ratio (Panel A &B) and cash flow volatility (Panel C &D). Three measures of diversification are used. In regression (1), diversification is dummy 
variable equals one if a firm has more than one segments and zero otherwise. In regression (2) and (3), diversification is calculated as Herfindahl Index based on asset and 
sales. Dependent variable is the dividend payout ratio defined as total dividend divided by net income. Definitions of independent variables are provided in the notes to 
Table 5.1. Reported coefficients are the average coefficients over the estimation period from 1980 to 2016. The number of observation is 29477. Firm and year fixed effect 











Appendix 5.1             
Dividend payout ratio and firm structure: financial constraint hypothesis under propensity matched sample 
Panel H: Group by cash flow volatility           
        Constraint firms      
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  
ROA 0.115 0.035 0.001 *** 0.116 0.035 0.001 *** 0.117 0.035 0.001 *** 
SIZE 0.026 0.005 0.000 *** 0.025 0.005 0.000 *** 0.025 0.005 0.000 *** 
SALESGROWTH -0.002 0.008 0.835  -0.002 0.008 0.816  -0.002 0.008 0.824  
LEVERAGE -0.080 0.026 0.002 *** -0.083 0.026 0.002 *** -0.083 0.026 0.002 *** 
CAPX -0.077 0.036 0.030 ** -0.076 0.035 0.032 ** -0.077 0.035 0.030 ** 
T_Q -0.021 0.005 0.000 *** -0.021 0.005 0.000 *** -0.021 0.005 0.000 *** 
CREDIT_RATING 0.010 0.010 0.347  0.010 0.010 0.333  0.009 0.010 0.349  
CASH HOLDING -0.025 0.025 0.320  -0.024 0.025 0.328  -0.024 0.025 0.333  
RETAINED EARNINGS 0.001 0.004 0.836  0.001 0.004 0.850  0.001 0.004 0.854  
R&D 0.003 0.013 0.790  0.005 0.013 0.684  0.003 0.013 0.809  
CFO 0.016 0.020 0.417  0.016 0.020 0.428  0.016 0.020 0.416  
DIVERSITY_D 0.023 0.008 0.004 ***         
HERF_ASSET     -0.062 0.018 0.001 ***     
HERF_SALES         -0.060 0.017 0.001 *** 
             
R^2  0.343    0.343    0.343   
This table presents the results by financial constraint problem under propensity score matched sample. Propensity score matched firms are selected based on propensity 
scores estimated using our regression model parameters. The regressions are presented across the groups of financially unconstraint and constraint. The criteria for 
financial constraint are coverage ratio (Panel A &B) and cash flow volatility (Panel C &D). Three measures of diversification are used. In regression (1), diversification 
is dummy variable equals one if a firm has more than one segments and zero otherwise. In regression (2) and (3), diversification is calculated as Herfindahl Index based 
on asset and sales. Dependent variable is the dividend payout ratio defined as total dividend divided by net income. Definitions of independent variables are provided in 
the notes to Table 5.1. Reported coefficients are the average coefficients over the estimation period from 1980 to 2016. The number of observation is 7145. Firm and year 






Appendix 5.2             
Dividend payout ratio and firm structure: agency problem hypothesis and second stage of Heckman test 
Panel A: Group by free-cash flow                 
        High Agency Problem         
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  
ROA 0.057 0.021 0.008 *** 0.057 0.021 0.007 *** 0.057 0.021 0.007 *** 
SIZE 0.014 0.004 0.001 *** 0.014 0.004 0.002 *** 0.013 0.004 0.002 *** 
SALESGROWTH -0.008 0.006 0.173  -0.008 0.006 0.174  -0.008 0.006 0.173  
LEVERAGE -0.057 0.020 0.006 *** -0.059 0.020 0.004 *** -0.059 0.021 0.004 *** 
CAPX -0.063 0.027 0.017 ** -0.063 0.026 0.017 ** -0.063 0.026 0.017 ** 
T_Q -0.009 0.002 0.000 *** -0.009 0.002 0.000 *** -0.009 0.002 0.000 *** 
CREDIT_RATING 0.008 0.008 0.273  0.009 0.008 0.263  0.008 0.008 0.273  
CASH HOLDING -0.007 0.011 0.502  -0.007 0.011 0.504  -0.007 0.011 0.492  
RETAINED EARNINGS 0.000 0.002 0.854  0.000 0.002 0.898  0.000 0.002 0.902  
R&D 0.000 0.000 0.765  0.000 0.000 0.747  0.000 0.000 0.754  
CFO 0.017 0.010 0.097 * 0.017 0.010 0.104  0.017 0.010 0.095 * 
INVERSE MILLS RATIO -0.015 0.024 0.543  -0.014 0.024 0.558  -0.015 0.024 0.531  
DIVERSITY_D 0.018 0.008 0.018 **     




 -0.048 0.017 0.004 *** 
   
 
HERF_SALES 
   
 
   
 -0.048 0.016 0.002 *** 
             
R^2  0.445    0.445    0.445   
This table presents the results by agency problem under the second stage of Heckman test. We obtain Inverse Mills Ratio from the first stage of Heckman test using a 
probit model in Table 8 Panel A. The regressions are presented across the groups of high agency and low agency problems. The criteria for agency problem are free 
cash flow (Panel A &B) and Tobin's Q (Panel C &D). Three measures of diversification are used. In regression (1), diversification is dummy variable equals one if a 
firm has more than one segments and zero otherwise. In regression (2) and (3), diversification is calculated as Herfindahl Index based on asset and sales. Dependent 
variable is the dividend payout ratio defined as total dividend divided by net income. Definitions of independent variables are provided in the notes to Table 5.1. Reported 
coefficients are the average coefficients over the estimation period from 1980 to 2016. The number of observation is 31216. Firm and year fixed effect are controlled in 







Appendix 5.2             
Dividend payout ratio and firm structure: agency problem hypothesis and second stage of Heckman test 
Panel B: Group by free-cash flow                 
        Low Agency Problem      
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  
ROA 0.036 0.012 0.003 *** 0.036 0.012 0.003 *** 0.036 0.012 0.003 *** 
SIZE 0.028 0.006 0.000 *** 0.027 0.006 0.000 *** 0.027 0.006 0.000 *** 
SALESGROWTH -0.002 0.004 0.603  -0.002 0.004 0.566  -0.002 0.004 0.577  
LEVERAGE -0.071 0.025 0.005 ** -0.075 0.025 0.003 *** -0.075 0.025 0.003 *** 
CAPX 0.073 0.039 0.063  0.073 0.039 0.063 * 0.073 0.039 0.063 * 
T_Q -0.003 0.001 0.000 ** -0.003 0.001 0.000 *** -0.003 0.001 0.000 *** 
CREDIT_RATING 0.013 0.015 0.397  0.013 0.015 0.401  0.013 0.015 0.405  
CASH HOLDING -0.002 0.014 0.895  -0.001 0.014 0.941  -0.001 0.014 0.939  
RETAINED EARNINGS -0.003 0.001 0.025 *** -0.003 0.001 0.025 ** -0.003 0.001 0.024 ** 
R&D 0.000 0.000 0.775  0.000 0.000 0.775  0.000 0.000 0.776  
CFO 0.020 0.010 0.037  0.021 0.010 0.034 ** 0.021 0.010 0.034 ** 
INVERSE MILLS RATIO -0.008 0.006 0.195  -0.008 0.006 0.216  -0.008 0.006 0.215  
DIVERSITY_D 0.001 0.012 0.964  
   
     
HERF_ASSET    -0.034 0.029 0.244      
HERF_SALES         -0.032 0.031 0.292  
             
R^2  0.351    0.351    0.351   
This table presents the results by agency problem under the second stage of Heckman test. We obtain Inverse Mills Ratio from the first stage of Heckman test using a probit 
model in Table 8 Panel A. The regressions are presented across the groups of high agency and low agency problems. The criteria for agency problem are free cash flow 
(Panel A &B) and Tobin's Q (Panel C &D). Three measures of diversification are used. In regression (1), diversification is dummy variable equals one if a firm has more 
than one segments and zero otherwise. In regression (2) and (3), diversification is calculated as Herfindahl Index based on asset and sales. Dependent variable is the dividend 
payout ratio defined as total dividend divided by net income. Definitions of independent variables are provided in the notes to Table 5.1. Reported coefficients are the average 
coefficients over the estimation period from 1980 to 2016. The number of observation is 19460. Firm and year fixed effect are controlled in the regression. Standard errors 






Appendix 5.3             
Dividend payout ratio and firm structure: agency problem hypothesis and second stage of Heckman test 
Panel C: Group by Tobin's Q                 
        High Agency Problem         
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  
ROA 0.138 0.021 0.000 *** 0.138 0.021 0.000 *** 0.138 0.021 0.000 *** 
SIZE 0.023 0.005 0.000 *** 0.022 0.005 0.000 *** 0.022 0.005 0.000 *** 
SALESGROWTH 0.002 0.004 0.734  0.001 0.005 0.766  0.001 0.005 0.755  
LEVERAGE -0.125 0.020 0.000 *** -0.128 0.019 0.000 *** -0.128 0.019 0.000 *** 
CAPX 0.002 0.029 0.933  0.002 0.029 0.934  0.003 0.029 0.928  
T_Q -0.040 0.007 0.000 *** -0.040 0.007 0.000 *** -0.040 0.007 0.000 *** 
CREDIT_RATING 0.024 0.009 0.012 ** 0.024 0.009 0.011 ** 0.024 0.009 0.012 ** 
CASH HOLDING -0.020 0.017 0.245  -0.019 0.017 0.264  -0.019 0.017 0.267  
RETAINED EARNINGS -0.005 0.002 0.001  -0.005 0.002 0.001 *** -0.005 0.002 0.001 *** 
R&D 0.000 0.000 0.850  0.000 0.000 0.858  0.000 0.000 0.858  
CFO 0.022 0.014 0.132  0.021 0.014 0.134  0.022 0.014 0.131  
INVERSE MILLS RATIO 0.009 0.013 0.495  0.010 0.013 0.456  0.009 0.013 0.478  
DIVERSITY_D 0.014 0.007 0.036 **         
HERF_ASSET     -0.046 0.015 0.003 ***     
HERF_SALES     
   
 -0.044 0.016 0.007 *** 
             
R^2  0.332    0.332    0.332   
This table presents the results by agency problem under the second stage of Heckman test. We obtain Inverse Mills Ratio from the first stage of Heckman test using a probit 
model in Table 8 Panel A. The regressions are presented across the groups of high agency and low agency problems. The criteria for agency problem are free cash flow 
(Panel A &B) and Tobin's Q (Panel C &D). Three measures of diversification are used. In regression (1), diversification is dummy variable equals one if a firm has more 
than one segments and zero otherwise. In regression (2) and (3), diversification is calculated as Herfindahl Index based on asset and sales. Dependent variable is the 
dividend payout ratio defined as total dividend divided by net income. Definitions of independent variables are provided in the notes to Table 5.1. Reported coefficients 
are the average coefficients over the estimation period from 1980 to 2016. The number of observation is 34119. Firm and year fixed effect are controlled in the regression. 








Appendix 5.2             
Dividend payout ratio and firm structure: agency problem hypothesis and second stage of Heckman test 
Panel D: Group by Tobin's Q               
        Low Agency Problem      
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  
ROA -0.017 0.010 0.098 * -0.017 0.010 0.098 * -0.017 0.010 0.098 * 
SIZE -0.002 0.006 0.785  -0.002 0.006 0.768  -0.002 0.006 0.751  
SALESGROWTH -0.007 0.005 0.196  -0.007 0.005 0.193  -0.007 0.005 0.190  
LEVERAGE 0.063 0.035 0.072 * 0.063 0.035 0.074 * 0.062 0.035 0.079 * 
CAPX -0.019 0.029 0.508  -0.019 0.029 0.510  -0.019 0.029 0.508  
T_Q 0.000 0.001 0.835  0.000 0.001 0.848  0.000 0.001 0.862  
CREDIT_RATING -0.015 0.015 0.329  -0.015 0.015 0.328  -0.015 0.015 0.326  
CASH HOLDING -0.002 0.009 0.809  -0.002 0.009 0.820  -0.002 0.009 0.823  
RETAINED EARNINGS 0.002 0.001 0.071 * 0.002 0.001 0.071 * 0.002 0.001 0.071 * 
R&D 0.000 0.000 0.588  0.000 0.000 0.588  0.000 0.000 0.587  
CFO 0.012 0.010 0.232  0.012 0.010 0.232  0.012 0.010 0.224  
INVERSE MILLS RATIO -0.012 0.009 0.167  -0.012 0.009 0.166  -0.012 0.009 0.167  
DIVERSITY_D 0.009 0.014 0.500  
   
     
HERF_ASSET     -0.024 0.031 0.433      
HERF_SALES         -0.029 0.030 0.326  
             
R^2  0.492    0.492    0.492   
This table presents the results by agency problem under the second stage of Heckman test. We obtain Inverse Mills Ratio from the first stage of Heckman test using a probit 
model in Table 8 Panel A. The regressions are presented across the groups of high agency and low agency problems. The criteria for agency problem are free cash flow 
(Panel A &B) and Tobin's Q (Panel C &D). Three measures of diversification are used. In regression (1), diversification is dummy variable equals one if a firm has more 
than one segments and zero otherwise. In regression (2) and (3), diversification is calculated as Herfindahl Index based on asset and sales. Dependent variable is the 
dividend payout ratio defined as total dividend divided by net income. Definitions of independent variables are provided in the notes to Table 5.1. Reported coefficients 
are the average coefficients over the estimation period from 1980 to 2016. The number of observation is 17031. Firm and year fixed effect are controlled in the regression. 









Appendix 5.2             
Dividend payout ratio and firm structure: financial constraint hypothesis with second stage of Heckman test 
Panel E: Group by Coverage       
        Unconstraint Firms         
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  
ROA -0.021 0.016 0.182  -0.021 0.016 0.186  -0.021 0.016 0.180  
SIZE 0.007 0.005 0.204  0.007 0.005 0.226  0.007 0.005 0.206  
SALESGROWTH -0.003 0.004 0.412  -0.003 0.004 0.414  -0.003 0.004 0.421  
LEVERAGE -0.097 0.023 0.000 *** -0.099 0.022 0.000 *** -0.097 0.023 0.000 *** 
CAPX -0.072 0.034 0.036  -0.071 0.034 0.037 ** -0.071 0.034 0.039 ** 
T_Q -0.006 0.002 0.001 *** -0.006 0.002 0.002 *** -0.006 0.002 0.002 *** 
CREDIT_RATING 0.005 0.011 0.685  0.005 0.011 0.670  0.005 0.011 0.684  
CASH HOLDING 0.002 0.010 0.827  0.002 0.010 0.818  0.002 0.010 0.852  
RETAINED EARNINGS -0.002 0.002 0.160  -0.002 0.002 0.167  -0.002 0.002 0.168  
R&D 0.000 0.000 0.022  0.000 0.000 0.023 ** 0.000 0.000 0.022 ** 
CFO 0.031 0.011 0.004  0.031 0.011 0.004 *** 0.031 0.011 0.004 *** 
INVERSE MILLS RATIO -0.020 0.017 0.253  -0.020 0.017 0.249  -0.020 0.017 0.237  
DIVERSITY_D 0.014 0.011 0.190          
HERF_ASSET     -0.038 0.022 0.085 *     
HERF_SALES     
   
 -0.025 0.023 0.282  
             
R^2  0.336    0.336    0.336   
This table presents the results by financial constraint problem under the second stage of Heckman test. We obtain Inverse Mills Ratio from the first stage of Heckman 
test using a probit model in Table 8 Panel A. The regressions are presented across the groups of financially unconstraint and constraint. The criteria for financial constraint 
are coverage ratio (Panel A &B) and cash flow volatility (Panel C &D). Three measures of diversification are used. In regression (1), diversification is dummy variable 
equals one if a firm has more than one segments and zero otherwise. In regression (2) and (3), diversification is calculated as Herfindahl Index based on asset and sales. 
Dependent variable is the dividend payout ratio defined as total dividend divided by net income. Definitions of independent variables are provided in the notes to Table 
5.1. Reported coefficients are the average coefficients over the estimation period from 1980 to 2016. The number of observation is 35678. Firm and year fixed effect are 





Appendix 5.2             
Dividend payout ratio and firm structure: financial constraint hypothesis with second stage of Heckman test 
Panel F: Group by Coverage               
        Constraint firms      
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  
ROA 0.053 0.012 0.000 *** 0.054 0.012 0.000 *** 0.054 0.012 0.000 *** 
SIZE 0.020 0.004 0.000 *** 0.019 0.004 0.000 *** 0.019 0.004 0.000 *** 
SALESGROWTH -0.002 0.004 0.575  -0.002 0.004 0.571  -0.002 0.004 0.578  
LEVERAGE -0.055 0.020 0.006 *** -0.057 0.020 0.005 *** -0.058 0.020 0.004 *** 
CAPX -0.002 0.023 0.933  -0.002 0.023 0.942  -0.002 0.023 0.938  
T_Q -0.004 0.001 0.000 *** -0.004 0.001 0.000 *** -0.004 0.001 0.000 *** 
CREDIT_RATING 0.012 0.010 0.197  0.013 0.010 0.191  0.012 0.010 0.195  
CASH HOLDING -0.008 0.013 0.553  -0.008 0.014 0.565  -0.007 0.013 0.581  
RETAINED EARNINGS -0.001 0.001 0.275  -0.001 0.001 0.288  -0.001 0.001 0.286  
R&D 0.000 0.000 0.003 *** 0.000 0.000 0.003 *** 0.000 0.000 0.003 *** 
CFO 0.010 0.009 0.239  0.010 0.009 0.250  0.011 0.009 0.227  
INVERSE MILLS RATIO 0.003 0.005 0.629  0.003 0.005 0.608  0.003 0.005 0.610  
DIVERSITY_D 0.019 0.009 0.029 **         
HERF_ASSET     -0.049 0.020 0.014 **     
HERF_SALES         -0.055 0.020 0.006 *** 
             
R^2  0.454    0.454    0.454   
This table presents the results by financial constraint problem under the second stage of Heckman test. We obtain Inverse Mills Ratio from the first stage of Heckman test 
using a probit model in Table 8 Panel A. The regressions are presented across the groups of financially unconstraint and constraint. The criteria for financial constraint are 
coverage ratio (Panel A &B) and cash flow volatility (Panel C &D). Three measures of diversification are used. In regression (1), diversification is dummy variable equals 
one if a firm has more than one segments and zero otherwise. In regression (2) and (3), diversification is calculated as Herfindahl Index based on asset and sales. Dependent 
variable is the dividend payout ratio defined as total dividend divided by net income. Definitions of independent variables are provided in the notes to Table 5.1. Reported 
coefficients are the average coefficients over the estimation period from 1980 to 2016. The number of observation is 15463. Firm and year fixed effect are controlled in the 








Appendix 5.2             
Dividend payout ratio and firm structure: financial constraint hypothesis with second stage of Heckman test  
Panel G: Group by cash flow volatility             
        Unconstraint Firms         
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  
ROA 0.031 0.013 0.016 ** 0.031 0.013 0.015 ** 0.031 0.013 0.016 ** 
SIZE 0.015 0.006 0.016 ** 0.015 0.006 0.018 ** 0.015 0.006 0.016 ** 
SALESGROWTH 0.000 0.004 0.954  0.000 0.004 0.951  0.000 0.004 0.950  
LEVERAGE -0.051 0.030 0.093 * -0.051 0.030 0.090 * -0.051 0.030 0.085 * 
CAPX 0.005 0.037 0.897  0.005 0.037 0.896  0.005 0.037 0.895  
T_Q -0.002 0.001 0.053 * -0.002 0.001 0.053 * -0.002 0.001 0.054 * 
CREDIT_RATING 0.014 0.013 0.284  0.014 0.013 0.283  0.014 0.013 0.283  
CASH HOLDING -0.020 0.011 0.074  -0.020 0.011 0.073 * -0.020 0.011 0.075 * 
RETAINED EARNINGS -0.001 0.002 0.433  -0.001 0.002 0.431  -0.001 0.002 0.431  
R&D 0.000 0.000 0.490  0.000 0.000 0.490  0.000 0.000 0.491  
CFO 0.013 0.010 0.204  0.013 0.010 0.203  0.013 0.010 0.203  
INVERSE MILLS RATIO -0.006 0.005 0.288  -0.006 0.005 0.287  -0.006 0.005 0.287  
DIVERSITY_D 0.004 0.015 0.791          
HERF_ASSET     -0.010 0.031 0.749      
HERF_SALES     
   
 -0.009 0.034 0.795  
             
R^2  0.376    0.376    0.376   
This table presents the results by financial constraint problem under the second stage of Heckman test. We obtain Inverse Mills Ratio from the first stage of Heckman 
test using a probit model in Table 8 Panel A. The regressions are presented across the groups of financially unconstraint and constraint. The criteria for financial 
constraint are coverage ratio (Panel A &B) and cash flow volatility (Panel C &D). Three measures of diversification are used. In regression (1), diversification is dummy 
variable equals one if a firm has more than one segments and zero otherwise. In regression (2) and (3), diversification is calculated as Herfindahl Index based on asset 
and sales. Dependent variable is the dividend payout ratio defined as total dividend divided by net income. Definitions of independent variables are provided in the notes 
to Table 5.1. Reported coefficients are the average coefficients over the estimation period from 1980 to 2016. The number of observation is 37811. Firm and year fixed 










Appendix 5.2             
Dividend payout ratio and firm structure: financial constraint hypothesis with second stage of Heckman test  
Panel H: Group by cash flow volatility                 
        Constraint firms      
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  Coef. Std. Err. p-value  
ROA 0.047 0.014 0.001 *** 0.048 0.014 0.001 *** 0.048 0.014 0.001 *** 
SIZE 0.020 0.004 0.000 *** 0.020 0.004 0.000 *** 0.019 0.004 0.000 *** 
SALESGROWTH -0.005 0.005 0.356  -0.005 0.005 0.350  -0.005 0.005 0.357  
LEVERAGE -0.066 0.019 0.001 *** -0.069 0.019 0.000 *** -0.069 0.019 0.000 *** 
CAPX -0.077 0.029 0.009 *** -0.076 0.029 0.009 *** -0.076 0.029 0.009 *** 
T_Q -0.008 0.002 0.000 *** -0.008 0.002 0.000 *** -0.008 0.002 0.000 *** 
CREDIT_RATING 0.009 0.009 0.343  0.009 0.009 0.325  0.009 0.009 0.344  
CASH HOLDING 0.009 0.012 0.443  0.009 0.012 0.430  0.009 0.012 0.437  
RETAINED EARNINGS -0.002 0.001 0.138  -0.002 0.001 0.149  -0.002 0.001 0.144  
R&D 0.000 0.000 0.185  0.000 0.000 0.190  0.000 0.000 0.190  
CFO 0.018 0.011 0.110  0.018 0.011 0.112  0.018 0.011 0.108  
INVERSE MILLS RATIO 0.002 0.020 0.937  0.003 0.020 0.895  0.002 0.020 0.937  
DIVERSITY_D 0.019 0.007 0.009 ***         
HERF_ASSET     -0.055 0.017 0.001 **     
HERF_SALES         -0.053 0.017 0.002 *** 
             
R^2  0.285    0.285    0.285   
This table presents the results by financial constraint problem under the second stage of Heckman test. We obtain Inverse Mills Ratio from the first stage of Heckman test 
using a probit model in Table 8 Panel A. The regressions are presented across the groups of financially unconstraint and constraint. The criteria for financial constraint are 
coverage ratio (Panel A &B) and cash flow volatility (Panel C &D). Three measures of diversification are used. In regression (1), diversification is dummy variable equals 
one if a firm has more than one segments and zero otherwise. In regression (2) and (3), diversification is calculated as Herfindahl Index based on asset and sales. Dependent 
variable is the dividend payout ratio defined as total dividend divided by net income. Definitions of independent variables are provided in the notes to Table 5.1. Reported 
coefficients are the average coefficients over the estimation period from 1980 to 2016. The number of observation is 13552. Firm and year fixed effect are controlled in the 
regression. Standard errors are clustered by firm and fiscal year. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
